Don McChesney
18th Century Theology
Prof. Westblade
3 December 2015
Freedom
to Pursue
One
of the most hotly contested issues in the modern church is that of free will
and predestination. Whether men
have a choice in regard to their salvation has led to some of the largest
splits in Church history and, to this day, is not even agreed upon within the
Catholic Church. The incredible
difficulty and depth of this conflict has led many theologians, including
Martin Luther, to simply hold these two things as divine paradox and content
themselves with its mystery. Others
laid out fairly comprehensive theologies to deal with the apparent
contradictions. While only a few
have succeeded in producing coherent and cohesive theologies, there have been a
couple schools of thought that presented well reasoned arguments for their understanding. One of those is Jonathan Edwards, who
can track his thinking back through Aquinas and even as far back as
Augustine. EdwardÕs explanation for
predestination centers on his definition of the will and its freedom, if one
agrees with his definitions the argument follows logically.
Jonathan
EdwardÕs conception of freedom is a rejection of the mainstream thought of his
day which focused on free choice. Most
of his contemporaries argued that freedom is the ability to make an arbitrary
choice between two options. Gideon describes this theory saying Òyou have a
free will when you have both the power to choose and the power to refrain from
choice. Just as you are free to,
say, leave a room just when you can both leave voluntarily and voluntarily
refrain from leaving, you have free will when you are free to will.Ó[1] If freedom is the ability to choose
between two options, the next step is to consider the implications for the
will. In this understanding, the
will is the deciding agent between the two options. The will must be free and voluntary for
the choice to be free. The person
who was free would be at liberty to pursue their own desires because they make
their own choices. This is the
freedom that was often spoken of in EdwardÕs day. This freedom is extremely difficult to
reconcile with predestination. It
seems a logical impossibility to both state that a manÕs will is free and that
his choices are pre-determined and pre-ordained by God. A manÕs natural desires conflict with
GodÕs desires and so one would be forced to bow to the other.
John
Locke attempted to resist this view of free will well before Edwards wrote his
famous work. In his paper, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Locke
acts on a similar impulse of Edwards in rejecting the widely accepted view of
free will, but he raised very different issues with the system. Locke challenged the system by stating
that sometimes the will and desires conflict and it was possible to will
something that one did not desire.
Without going too far into detail, it is important to grasp the basic
ideals behind this philosophy because as Arthur Murphy writes ÒThe framework
for this [EdwardÕs] analysis is borrowed from LockeÕs great chapter on ÒPowerÓ
in the Essay concerning Human
Understanding but shrewdly modified to suit his own quite different
purposes.Ó[2] Locke argued "The will is perfectly
distinguished from desire; which in the very same action may have a quite
contrary tendency from that which our wills set us upon. A man" (says he)
"whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to use persuasions to another, which,
at the same time I am speaking, I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case
'tis plain the will and desire run counter."[3] Here Locke argues that there is a
situation in which you can speak to persuade someone and yet desire that he is
not persuaded. It would seem in
this case that the will is contrary to desire in this situation. By this proof,
Locke is attempting to show that the will cannot simply be arbitrary choice
between two things, in which a manÕs desire is the determining factor. If the will and desire can differ than
the will is not dictated by desire.
It is directly in response to this argument that Edwards begins the
defense of his understanding of the will and freedom.
Edwards
begins by presenting his definition. Initially, Edwards simply posits his
conception of the will and leaves his understanding of freedom for later in the
essay. He defines the will as Òthat
by which the mind chooses anything. The faculty of the will is that faculty or
power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing: an act of the
will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.Ó[4] So it would initially appear that
Edwards agreed with LockeÕs separation of will and desire, however he then goes
on to directly attack LockeÕs understanding. Edwards responds ÒBut yet I can't think
they are so entirely distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run
counter. A man never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires,
or desires anything contrary to his will.Ó[5] In
reference to LockeÕs example, he continues:
In this instance, it is not carefully
observed, what is the thing willed, and what is the thing desired: if it were,
it would be found that will and desire don't clash in the least. The thing
willed on some consideration, is to utter such words; and certainly, the same
consideration so influences him, that he don't desire the contrary; all things
considered, he chooses to utter such words, and don't desire not to utter 'em.[6]
If the man did not want to be saying the
words, and was not under compulsion to say them, then he would not say them. He must have wanted to say them, and so
there must be another unstated motive.
There must be an external reason for wanting to speak in such a way
besides persuading the listener. While
not the same thing, desire and the will in Edwards understanding are closely bound
together. Desires are a primary motivator of the will and so they will not come
into conflict.
Once
Edwards has set this basis for his understanding of the will, he goes on to lay
the foundation for his conception of freedom by discussing the motivations that
rest beneath our choices. Knowing
that will is the faculty by which we make choices, Edwards proposes that there
is a Òdeterminer of the willÓ[7]
which is an object on which or toward which a choice is directed to. He
explains himself stating ÒIt is sufficient to my present purpose to say, it is
that motive, whichÉ is the strongest, that determines the will.Ó[8] At
the most basic level, men act and make decisions because something drives them
towards it. Men do not remain paralyzed
by indecision because there is always a strongest motive which drives them to a
choice. Murphy explains this saying ÒSuch acts of willÉ are the effects of
antecedent causes and in their turn the causes of those voluntary actions in
which a man is properly said to act freely or as he will, or pleases.Ó[9] Therefore
a personÕs actions, are the results of decisions which are in turn based on motivations.[10] Edwards
lays this out more fully saying ÒThat motive which has a less degree of
previous advantage or tendency to move the willÉ is what I call a Ôweaker
motive.Õ On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and hasÉ the greatest
degree of previous tendencyÉ I call the Ôstrongest motive.ÕÓ[11] Each
manÕs will has natural tendencies.
And diverse motives are received differently by the unique
predispositions. Some men find
money the most powerful motivation, while for others fame is far more
powerful. The strength of the
motives is determined by the personÕs nature. In the end, whichever motive is stronger
will dictate the will. Despite this,
we still believe that actions are free when they are not physically limited by a
force that opposes the will. While
actions are free if not physically limited, the will is dictated by the
motives. So, to determine whether
the will is truly free, it is necessary to examine the origin of the
motivations that dictate the choices.
When
discussing the motivations of men, Edwards finds it necessary to lay out some
distinctions between the physical and the moral in order to address the unique
problems presented by the will. The
most important point that he presents is that of moral necessity. Edwards describes moral necessity as
Òthat necessity of connection and consequence, which arises from such moral
causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connection
which there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions and
actions.Ó[12] By this, he means that moral necessity
is the necessity forced by manÕs nature through which inclinations and motives
are translated into actions. He
illustrates this point saying ÒA strong habit of virtue and great degree of
holiness may cause a moral inability to love wickedness in general, may render
a man unable to take complacence in wicked persons or things; or to choose a
wicked life, and prefer it to a virtuous life.Ó[13] For some people growing in a habit of
virtue will cause them to continue and thrive in it, for others it will cause
them to rebel and choose wickedness.
The nature of a person promotes a moral necessity to react to a
situation in a certain way. This
necessity stems from the innate motives which men posses. MenÕs choices then are free and are made
based simply on who they are. Some
would stop here and say that this shows that the will truly is free to choose
between arbitrary options. Edwards,
however, takes this a step further and asks where the motivations come
from. As he states Òthe volition
which is caused by previous motive and inducement, is not caused by the will
exercising a sovereign power over itself, to determine, cause and excite
volitions in itselfÉ for the way in which motives operate, is by biasing the
will, and giving it a certain inclination or preponderation
one way.Ó[14] Here he is saying that the will cannot
determine itself and its motives do not naturally rise out of it. As Murphy describes:
An act of volition or choice cannot
choose to come into existence, for until it has been Ôput forth into existenceÕ
by a previous cause it simply is not there to cause or determine anything. When it does exist it cannot choose but
be just the choosing, preferring or Ôliking betterÕ that it is. Nor can the agent act voluntarily from
any other choice or preference than the one he has. In acting as he pleases he necessarily
does what pleases him, and his being pleased to do so is the effect of previous
causes over which, as an effect, it can, of course, have no controlÉ there is
indeed no place in it for any self-determining power.[15]
It is impossible for the will to be self
determined and a manÕs innate motives cannot have arisen accidentally. This leaves only one option, there must
be a previous cause that determines what makes up a manÕs most basic motives
and decides what choices he will make over his lifetime. There is only one possible cause
previous to man and that is God.
This means that God determines the moral necessity of each man and that
moral necessity dictates how a man will make choices throughout his life. While his actions are free, and are made
without manipulation from God, simply by making a man who he is, God
predestines the outcome of his life, and leaves the man completely free and
responsible for his own choices. This
makes God the ultimate cause of all things.
God
is the cause of manÕs nature and motives, those motives dictate manÕs choices
and those choices result in the manÕs actions. Therefore, menÕs choices are both free,
made of their own choice and volition, and predestined, preordained by God
dictating their nature. By the time
Edwards has finished defining his terms the argument is done. If you accept EdwardsÕ understanding of
the will and freedom, and both are very compelling, then it becomes natural and
logical to accept both a complete predestination and a complete free will for
humanity.
Bibliography
Yaffe, Gideon "Locke on Refraining, Suspending, and the Freedom to
Will." History of Philosophy
Quarterly Vol. 18, no. No. 4 (2001): 373-91. Accessed December 1, 2015.
Murphy, Arthur E. "Jonathan Edwards
on Free Will and Moral Agency." The Philosophical
Review Vol. 68, no. No. 2 (1959): 181-202. Accessed December 2, 2015.
Ramsey, I. T., and Paul Ramsey. "The
Works of Jonathan Edwards. Vol. I: The Freedom
of the Will." The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 9, no. No. 37 (1959): 377.
Edwards, Jonathan. "Freedom of the
Will." Freedom of the Will (1754). Accessed December 4, 2015. http://edwards.yale.edu/research/major-works/freedom-of- the-will/.
[1] "Locke on
Refraining, Suspending, and the Freedom to Will." History
of Philosophy Quarterly Vol. 18, no. No. 4 (2001): 373-91. Accessed
December 1, 2015.
[2] Murphy, Arthur E.
"Jonathan Edwards on Free Will and Moral Agency." The
Philosophical Review Vol. 68, no. No. 2 (1959): 181-202. Accessed
December 2, 2015.
[3] 1.139 Freedom of the
Will
[4] 1.137 Freedom of the
Will
[5] Ibid
[6] 1.139 Freedom of the
Will
[7] 2.141 Freedom of the
will
[8] 2.141 Freedom of the
will
[9] 185 Murphy
[10] 185 Murphy ÒIt should be noted here
that this freedom belongs not to the act of will or volition itself, but to the
voluntary action which is its effectÉ how or whether the acts of volition are
determined by antecedent causes has nothing to do with the question as to
whether or not the actions that are the effects of such coalitions are
free. These latter are free when
they are the effects of volitions, when in preforming them a man does as he
pleases, and to do as one pleases is to preform an action that is caused by and
act of volition, of choice or of will.Ó
Here Murphy lays out the idea that acts can be free without motives
being free.
[11] 2.142 Freedom of the
Will
[12] 5.156 Freedom of the
Will
[13] 5.160 Freedom of the
Will
[14] 10.225-226 Freedom of
the Will
[15] 187 Murphy