Robbie
Crouse
Prof. Westblade
REL 319
May 4, 2006
Lest
we should abstract this great theologian from history, we must remember that
Edwards wrote and preached in a particular context with certain issues in mind. He worked within a certain tradition,
Reformed Puritanism, but many of the topics he considered already had their own
tradition. One of these subjects is
virtue, which has a long history in the Western tradition. The classical philosophers, Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle, formulated many of the categories of virtue. Cicero, Seneca, and the Stoics expanded
and continued the legacy of virtue.
In the Christian heritage, Thomas Aquinas did more to synthesize a
classical, pagan, and Aristotelian notion of virtue with Christian piety. His monumental works, Summa Theologica and Summa Contra Gentiles, became the
definition of virtue even past the Protestant Reformation. In his own colonial
time, Edwards confronted this long-standing interpretation and also the more
recent traditions of the Deist formulation of ÒbenevolenceÓ and the Arminian
concept of Òfree-will virtue.Ó This
paper aims to demonstrate how Edwards furthers the tradition of virtue and
modifies it with his own thought; it seeks to show EdwardsÕ theological
uniqueness through the window of his work on the familiar topic of virtue. His intellectual unity is clearly
evinced as he redefined virtue from its Western formula to his own view on the
supremacy of God in all things.
Edwards
intended to publish The End for Which God
Created the World and The Nature of
True Virtue together as one edition called Two Dissertations. Like
all his thoughts, EdwardsÕ understanding of virtue returned to the final
purpose of God. One cannot separate
his ethics from ontology and teleology.[1] His own thinking begins with the final
end of man in order to make sense of life in light of that end. Edwards starts not with the end of man
but with the end of God. He then
demonstrates that these two ends cannot be separated and are not even at
odds. GodÕs end is to display Òthe
manifestation of his own glory in the highest happiness of his creatures.Ó[2] Following his Reformed inheritance in
the Westminster Confession, Edwards argues that GodÕs chief end is the exact same
as manÕs: Òto glorify Himself and enjoy Himself forever.Ó God is most glorified by the happiness
of his creatures. That GodÕs glory is the final end of creation was not a new
thesis; theologians throughout church history argued this, yet most did not argue
that God is most glorified by the satisfying enjoyment of his creatures.
That is, other writers knew that manÕs end is happiness and the glory of God, but they did not
suspect that manÕs end is happiness in
the glory of God. The question that
writers seemed to answer differently, even if it is only in emphasis, was how
manÕs happiness and GodÕs glory relate
and how virtue is involved in that.
Edwards, Aquinas, and many of the Deists answered in agreement that
manÕs happiness is his end. Their
common source was AristotleÕs basic supposition that all men seek happiness as
that end which justifies all action, Òas that end for which all else is done.Ó[3] They differed, though, on what manÕs
happiness is in.[4] Again, they
agreed also that GodÕs glory is manÕs other end, but only Edwards connected the
two in such a way that manÕs happiness is glorifying to God, and manÕs
happiness is the enjoyment of God.
This is extremely important for understanding the first break that
Edwards makes from the tradition that defined virtue as manÕs end in happiness.
For Aquinas and
several of the Deists, God is glorified when his image is reflected in the
perfection of his creatures, when man is Òmade like him.Ó The Deists argued that manÕs happiness
is in perfection itself, which is attained through virtue, benevolence to
mankind, and the subjection of the passions to reason. Aquinas saw happiness as manÕs perfected
knowledge of GodÕs essence that is realized in the beatific vision. He especially used the Aristotelian
language that happiness is the actualization of all manÕs potential, Òhuman
flourishing and freedom.Ó Edwards
does not deny that mankindÕs perfection in Christ glorifies God, but he points
out that this is not its Òchief consistence.Ó God does not want perfected men that are
not interested in him. Even
justification, sometimes held by the Arminians as manÕs utltimate end, does not
constitute the final end for Edwards.
These are proximate ends inextricably tied to the final end of enjoying God.[5] ManÕs final end and happiness does not
consist partly in respect to God, but for Edwards, it consists chiefly in it.[6] The impact of this is huge in EdwardsÕ
understanding of virtue, which only can have reference to God.
Because Edwards refuses to have a final
end of man apart from God, he also refuses to have virtue apart from God,
especially delight in Him. He does
not use the word in its classical root Òvirtus,Ó which originally meant power
or manliness. Instead, he describes
virtue in terms of beauty and love.[7] The
Nature of True Virtue begins by asserting that
Òvirtue is by definition something beautiful.Ó[8] For him, there are several different
types of beauty, primary and secondary beauty, and general and particular
beauty. In the first distinction,
primary beauty pertains to Òbeings that have perception and willÓ and to Òthose
qualities and acts of the mind that are of a moral nature.Ó To perhaps counter an understanding of
virtue like Aquinas, Edwards wrote that virtuous beauty Òdoes not belong merely
to speculation; but to the disposition and will, or to the heart.Ó Secondary, or inferior, beauty belongs
to inanimate things or concepts which consist in
Òmutual consent and agreement in from, manner, quantity, of regularity, order,
uniformity, symmetry, proportion, and harmony.Ó[9] An example of this beauty would be
balanced shapes, the human body, or society justice. True virtue, then, for Edwards, consists
only in primary beauty: the will itself is not beautiful apart from its active
principle of beautiful habits and the beauty it is directed toward.
For the
second distinction, he divides general beauty from particular beauty because
particular beauty appears beautiful only in a Òlimited, private sphereÓ and
general beauty appears beautiful Òwhen viewed most perfectly, comprehensively,
and universally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connexions with
every thing to which it stands related.Ó[10] True virtue cannot be of particular
beauty in the same way that musical notes on their own can be beautiful but
when sounded together are discordant.
This introduces one into EdwardsÕs ontological philosophy. As an occassionalist, Edwards believed
that God upholds creation at every moment by his being so that there is no
existence apart from God; all being is fully dependent on God.[11] Gerry McDermott writes that in EdwardsÕ
philosophy Òevery entity is related to every other;Ó thus his social ethic
appeals to the structure of being.[12] True virtue, for Edwards, must include
the entirety of being as its reference point.
This
definition of general beauty and theme of the total being continues in EdwardsÕ
work as he defines virtue as Òlove to being in general in the beauty of consent
and harmony.Ó[13] ÒBeing in generalÓ may seem an odd
phrase but Edwards is trying to make another distinction between the particular
and the totality. He gives the
example that a man who loves only those who love him,
or only a select few, is not often called a virtuous person.[14] A virtuous person is someone who takes
into account the comprehensiveness of existence in the same way that a good
composer is one who arranges individual notes that are harmonious together as a
whole. EdwardsÕ ontology is such
that one is simply making a mistake of moral prudence in separating being from
its interconnectedness. The text
does not go much further before Edwards does reveal to his suspenseful readers that Òbeing in generalÓ is in fact God, for Òtrue
virtue consists in love to God.Ó[15] McDermott expresses EdwardsÕ ontology
well when he writes that Òto fail to love God would be to violate the
structural principle of EdwardsÕs philosophical ethics: one ought to
acknowledge gratefully that one is related to all of being, and therefore preeminently related to and dependent
on the sum and comprehension of all being (God).Ó[16] Here, Edwards show his peculiarity again
by not separating God from virtue.
This section is a direct assault on the Deists who claim that God has
set up the world in such a way that he does not need to be involved in it. Edwards shows the supremacy of God over
all things, including the entirety of all existence.
The
definition virtue solely as Òa supreme love for GodÓ demonstrates a strong
break from the Western tradition of virtue. Even Aquinas, a Christian theologian,
wrote that virtue had to do with perfection of man's being and not necessarily with a relation to God.[17] The habits of natural virtue in the
Thomist sense, namely those which one does on natural ability without GodÕs
aiding grace, have no place in EdwardsÕ God-centered system. The Thomist virtues have a quality that
is inward turning because the virtues are for the perfection of oneself, but
for Edwards, virtue is outward looking, or Òdispositional.Ó One foundational disagreement resides in
metaphysics, since Edwards does not abstract God from the any being or
existence in the universe, but another point of contention that this question
of Òvirtue without GodÓ hinges upon is the end of man. Though Aquinas and the Deists include
some part of manÕs end in relation to God, the majority of it has to do with
human perfection in virtue.
EdwardsÕ portrayal of virtue is Òdispositional;Ó it points to the object
and source of beauty, not the doer. It is directed virtue, both to its ultimate
source and connection, God, and to its benefited recipient, all creation. This also allows to Edwards to not let
virtue become a good or an end in itself, since for him, God does not want a
ÒvirtuousÓ (in the Thomist sense) but disinterested man, but Òa truly virtuous soulÓ which Òseeks the
glory of God above all thingsÓ and Òmakes that his supreme joy and delight.Ó[18]
Edwards claims that any ÒvirtueÓ apart from a disposition to
God arises from Òself-love.Ó He
defines self-love in two different ways, though. Self-love in the first sense is merely
Òa manÕs love of his own happiness.Ó[19] This self-love is neither moral nor
immoral but is the drive for all men to pursue happiness in something. Edwards
says that this is the will, or disposition. The second sense of self-love, which is
quoted above, is selfishness, which pursues happiness in oneÕs own private interests. A pursuit of virtue for the telos of
oneÕs duty or perfection is ultimately self-love, says Edwards.[20] In Charity
and its Fruits, Edwards comes back to the essence of love found in I
Corinthians 13:5, ÒLove does not seek its own.Ó[21] He is not denying that man should seek
his own happiness but that happiness should not be sought for in oneself. John Piper describes EdwardsÕ view of
self-love as Òinfinitely parochial,Ó[22]
and McDermott calls public affection, Òembracing and expansiveÓ and private
affection, which is self-love, Ògrasping and self-reducing.Ó[23] Self-love is confined, narrow, and
selfish—and not virtuous—until it embraces or delights in the good
of the whole universe of being, or
more simply, until it embraces God.
Until self-love rises to embrace God, it embraces Òan infinitely small
part of universal existence.Ó[24] Even virtue done as oneÕs duty or telos
succumbs to self-love because it disposition points back to oneÕs self.
EdwardsÕ
treatment of self-love and virtue apart from God, like everything else he
wrote, attempts to demonstrate the fullness of God in all things. Yet Edwards does conclude that Ònatural
virtues,Ó virtues of the natural conscience, Òbelong to general nature of
virtue. What they are essentially
defective in is that they are private in their nature; they do not arise from
any temper of benevolence to being in general.Ó[25] This may be one of the most interesting
sections of The Nature of True Virtue,
ÒOf natural conscience and the moral sense.Ó After defining manÕs end as enjoyment in God and virtue as Òa supreme love to God,Ó Edwards does hold out that
there is a Òsecondary operationÓ of Ònatural virtue.Ó[26] This kind of virtue arises from
self-love and the principle of the natural conscience, yet Edwards considers it
a part of Òsecondary beautyÓ since it does have harmony, agreement, and
proportion. Examples of these
natural virtues are the natural affection of a parent for a child, pity,
gratitude, natural instinct (courage), distributive justice, temperance,
worldly wisdom, and private benevolence.
Edwards writes that Òthey are beautiful within their own sphereÓ but
Òthe reason why men are so ready to take these private affections for true
virtue is the narrowness of their views, É leav[ing] the Divine Being out of
their view.Ó[27] The reason that Edwards calls this
Òsecondary beautyÓ is that the virtues intimate GodÕs beauty and harmony, but
they Òtake no delight in him.Ó The
principle of natural conscience primarily points to justice and is akin to the
Golden Rule, Òbeing consistent with ourselves.Ó[28] Natural conscience Òmay see the justice
in supreme love for GodÓ and Òif well-informed, will approve of true virtue . .
. yet without seeing the beauty of it.Ó[29] In short, Edwards has just described the
traditional cardinal virtues, habits that do not have a disposition to God, and
has labeled them as Òbelong[ing] to the general nature of virtue,Ó even though
he has defined true virtue as only that disposition which has Òa supreme regard
for God.
In
this section Edwards must contend with the very facts that pushed Aquinas to
make virtue able to be apart from God.
The fact is that non-believers and unregenerate men seem to do ÒgoodÓ
things that benefit society. They
are just, temperate, courageous, and perhaps even wise. Edwards concludes that these types of
men are guided by natural conscience.
Unlike Aquinas, though, Edwards does not conclude that natural
conscience has a different end than the law of God; it teaches the same actions but does not deal directly with
the heart.[30] EdwardsÕ repeated phrases, Òif it
[natural conscience] is well-informed,Ó Òproperly cultivated,Ó or Òproperly
enlightened,Ó demonstrate his belief that the conscience can be seared so it
does not teach true justice.[31] But a well-informed conscience does
Òrestrain vice and sin in general,Ó says Edwards. With these statements, it may seem that
Edwards has returned to the tradition of the Western classical heritage by
affirming that there is a place for natural virtue apart from God. He even seems very close to the Catholic
tradition when he writes that Òthese natural
principles, for the most part, tend to the good of mankind . . . for self-love
is exceeding useful and necessary.Ó[32] This statement, coupled with the
following quotation, may be one of the most unsettling and interesting of the
entire work: Òself-love often restrains from acts of true wickedness; and not
only so but puts men upon seeking true virtue;
yet is not itself true virtue, but is the source of all the wickedness that is
in the world.Ó[33]
In
the first quotation, Edwards portrays self-love as necessary to society and in the second he portrays self-love as
causing men to seek true virtue. Explicating this text is difficult
because Edwards will oftentimes use both definitions of self-love in a single
passage. The surrounding context
would seem to indicate that the Òself-loveÓ he is talking about it is the
second kind, which seeks virtue for the perfection of oneself. But why would he say that this
inward-directed virtue is exceedingly useful and necessary and that is puts men
on the path to virtue? If it is self-love in the neutral sense, neither moral nor
immoral, then it would be an abrupt transition in the middle of EdwardsÕ train
of thought and would seem to have nothing to do with his present argument. He was writing on how natural
principles, which arise from self-love, which he also calls Òself-love virtue,Ó
can be beautiful in the secondary sense.
Aquinas writes that the natural virtues are the ÒseedbedÓ and
ÒfoundationÓ for the theological virtues, and the entire Western tradition
emphasized the usefulness and profitability of the natural virtues, especially
to bring one to the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. Would Edwards make this claim also? It would seem somewhat inconsistent with
his earlier descriptions of virtue.
This statement about the usefulness of Òself-love virtueÓcould perhaps
denote a means to true virtue, but
Edwards would leave out spiritual regeneration in this language of means. Edwards maintains his Calvinism by
strongly repeating that the cause of true virtue is regeneration by the Holy
Spirit. The Holy Spirit gives the
Òspiritual senseÓ or Òvirtuous tasteÓ that triggers one to virtue.
Miscellany 73, ÒInfused Habits,Ó deals with this
very subject quite explicitly and may shed light on the peculiarities of the
earlier passage. Here, Edwards
wrestles with the question of how a man becomes virtuous—where does he
get his motivation? His answer is
very clear: ÒTo say that a man who has no true virtue and no true grace can
acquire it by frequent exercises of [it], is as much a contradiction as to say
a man acts grace when he has no grace, or that he has it [when] he has it not.Ó[34] One cannot acquire true virtue by a
practicing of it, for Òbefore he begins to exercise it, he must have some of
it.Ó As far as the natural virtues
go, Edwards addresses this when he rhetorically asks if Òa man by degrees got the habit of acting
virtue by acting something that was a good practice.Ó[35] The phrase Òby degreesÓ may refer to
secondary virtue, which is represented as leading to true virtue by good
Òpractice.Ó[36] This, though, is still a contradiction
he says. ÒThe man begins to reform
today who did not begin yesterday—how comes he by more virtue at that time that he first begins to reform?Ó Edwards refuses to suggest that men
Òhave some sparks of virtue remaining in them,Ó and even if that is the case,
Edwards argues that an outside principle or motivation must still motivate the
heart to flame the spark of virtue.[37] This Miscellany proves that Edwards does
not suggest in The Nature of True Virtue
that one can attain true virtue through ÒdegreesÓ of virtue if the Spirit is
not involved.
This does
distinguish him from the Arminian tradition, but if he still believes that
natural virtue can be the means of
true virtue, with the Spirit being the cause, then it remains a startling
statement. The question
remains—can natural virtue with the Spirit bring one to true virtue? Elsewhere, such as in The Divine and Supernatural Light,
Edwards does see the preached Word of God as the ordinary means by which the
Spirit works. This section of The Nature of True Virtue, though,
Òself-love puts men upon seeking true virtue,Ó may reveal EdwardsÕ belief that
natural virtue can also be a means for the Spirit to quicken a manÕs heart to
God in true virtue. He may be
alluding subtly to this when he writes that Ònatural
conscience, if well-informed, will approve
of true virtue . . . yet without seeing the beauty of it.Ó[38] In this, the Spirit seems to add to
natural conscience to lead to the sight of true, virtuous beauty. This does sound very similar to a
Catholic and Arminian conception, yet Edwards only touches on the subject; it
is not an emphasis, and he breaks more sharply from the tradition later.[39]
Though
natural virtue may be of some profit, and though it perhaps may be a means for
true virtue, Edwards thoroughly demonstrates the superiority of true virtue
over natural virtue even in its own sphere of human society. He returns again to the definition that
true virtue is ÒpublicÓ and ÒgeneralÓ and natural virtue is ÒprivateÓ and Òparticular.Ó Anticipating the possible objection that
the natural virtues are needed to keep society together, he argues that true
virtue orders society better than the virtue that looks only at ordering
society. Paradoxically, true virtue
that has broad vision to all being is able to benefit the particular while
narrow vision does not ultimately give benefit to particulars. For Edwards, his metaphysics of the
interconnectedness of reality in God establishes this fact. True
prudence, which is not a natural virtue, recognizes that benefit from one creature
to another ultimately comes from God.
ÒOne that loves being in general, will necessarily value good will to
being in general, wherever he sees it,Ó Edwards writes.[40] This love to being in general also
manifests itself in love to particulars: Òfrom such a disposition [to being in
general] may arise exercises of love to particular being. No wonder that he who is of a generally
benevolent disposition should be more disposed than another to have his heart
moved with benevolent affection to particular persons.Ó[41] A real benefit to another person is
derived Òonly from love to God; that is sufficient to render love to any
created being.[42]Ó All other attempts at benevolence that
do not arise from a general mindset
are Òfundamentally and essentially defective.Ó[43] The relationship of God and man is the
foundation of manÕs relation with other creatures.
The
practical implication of this is that Edwards will only preach true
virtue. He admits earlier that
natural virtue may have some benefits to the communities in a very limited and
narrow sense, but true virtue, which considers the whole, will have real benefit to the community. Edwards does not view any created thing
as independent or separate from its ultimate being in God. To speak casually, one cannot be too
Òheavenly mindedÓ in Edwards theology.
One must be heavenly-minded to
be of any earthly good. He asserts that all benevolence must come from a love
of God in order for it to be profitable.
In other places in his works, he does speak of a Òcivic virtueÓ that is
in relation to man only, but he does not advocate it directly.[44] He mentions it only to say that it
exists. Since it delights in the
whole, true virtue Òdirects natural instincts and their proper manner and
channelÓ and it delights in the particulars which
beatify the whole.
Edwards in
this work again exalts God as supreme in all things. To quote Gerry McDermott, Edwards places morality back into the heart of GodÕs
sovereignty, for Òmorality without God is blasphemous because it flouts the one
who founded and sustains true morality.Ó[45] He must also deal with the apparent
problem of when virtue appears to be good though it does not relate to
God. This is the issue that the
middle of this paper tried to wrestle with to try to find Edwards position on
the purpose of natural virtue.
Edwards advocates some profit in natural virtue and even entertains the
possibility of natural virtue as leading to true virtue, but in the end, he
returns to preach that true virtue perfects the Òinfinitely parochialÓ vision
of self-love virtue. The
dissertation also does not attempt to make virtue manÕs end; it has
ÒdispositionalÓ character that points to the perfection and happiness in God,
not potentiality in man. For
Edwards, virtue is neither a means nor an end, but a ÒfitnessÓ which has beauty
only because of the One it connects to, who is the fountain of all beauty and
connects all things in Himself.
Bibliography
Edwards, Jonathan. Justification by Faith Alone. Ed. Don Kistler. Morgan: Soli Deo Gloria,
2000.
—. The Works of Jonathan Edwards. ed. Paul Ramsey.
New Haven: Yale UP,
1957.
Hunsinger, George. ÒDispositional Soteriology: Jonathan
Edwards on Justification by Faith
Alone.Ó Westminster Theological Journal 66
(2004): 117.
Lee, Sang Hyun. The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards. Princeton: Princeton UP,
1988.
McDermott, Gerald. Jonathan
Edwards Confronts the Gods: Christian Theology, Enlightenment
Religion, and Non-Christian Faiths. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000.
---. One
Holy and Happy Society: The Public Theology of Jonathan Edwards.
University
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Mrimoto, Anri. Jonathan
Edwards and the Catholic Vision of Salvation. Penn State, 1995.
[1] Sang Hyun Lee, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988), 4.
[2] Jonathan Edwards, The End for Which God Created the World, quoted in John Piper, GodÕs Passion for His Glory (Wheaton: Crossway, 1998), 31.
[3] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I. 7.
[4] I apologize for ending a sentence with a preposition but EdwardsÕ language is always that happiness is in something. There is no abstract ÒhappinessÓ that does not find its rest in some object. Happiness, therefore, is not an object but the tie or bond that connects man to the object that brings pleasure and happiness.
[5] For Edwards, this is enjoying God himself, not merely his gifts of perfection, knowledge, or justification.
[6] Jonathan Edwards, A Dissertation Concerning the Nature of True Virtue in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol.1, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven: Yale UP, 1957), 125.
[7] Edwards ties beauty and delight very closely. True beauty can only cause delight, and true delight in the proper object is a beautiful thing. As Edwards defines manÕs end as delight in God, it is appropriate that he describe the connection of that end as beauty itself.
[8] Ibid., 122.
[9] Ibid., 127.
[10] Ibid., 122.
[11] Sang Hyun Lee, The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 8-9. As an occassionalist, there is a sense for Edwards that the universe is created every second by God so that he can logically say that God is the only true, continually existent being.
[12] Gerald McDermott, One Holy and Happy Society: The Public Theology of Jonathan Edwards (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1992), 101.
[13] Jonathan Edwards, The Nature of True Virtue, 122.
[14] Ibid., 123.
[15] Ibid., 125.
[16] Gerald McDermott, One Holy and Happy Society, 102.
[17] For Aquinas, God gives grace to achieve the end of perfection but there is no direct reference to Himself in virtue.
[18] Jonathan Edwards, The Nature of True Virtue, 127.
[19] Ibid., 130.
[20] Edwards criticizes the heathen moral philosophy in Miscellany 1357 that is arises from self-love and pride in oneÕs own abilities and potential.
[21] Jonathan Edwards, Charity and Its Fruits, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 8 (Yale UP, 1989), 257-58.
[22] John Piper, GodÕs Passion for His Glory, 108.
[23] Gerald McDermott, One Holy and Happy Society, 103.
[24] Jonathan Edwards, The Nature of True Virtue, 131.
[25] Ibid., 137.
[26] Ibid., 138.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., 133.
[29] Ibid., 134.
[30] Ibid. ÒThus natural conscience, if the understanding be properly enlightened, and stupifying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God, is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every article.Ó
[31] This is parallel to verses such as Ephesians 4:17-24 and Romans 1:21,28,32 that seem to teach that the conscience, which tells right and wrong, can be seared and become malfunctioned.
[32] Ibid., 139. Emphasis added.
[33] Ibid. Emphasis added.
[34] Jonathan Edwards, Miscellany 73.
[35] Ibid. Emphasis added.
[36] ÒPracticeÓ may connote that it is not quite true virtue but is a shadow of Òthe real thing,Ó true virtue.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Jonathan Edwards, The Nature of True Virtue, 134. It is also uncharacteristic that Edwards uses the phrase Òseeking virtue.Ó In other passages he seems to say that virtue seeks God. Here, he may be using virtue more like the Deist and Catholic notion of virtue as human perfection.
[39] Much of this discussion may be avoided if one interprets Òself-loveÓ in the earlier passage as the neutral kind. But this interpretation does not entirely dismiss the above arguments, and it does not entirely answer the question of how Edwards thinks that the natural virtues and true virtue are connected. I do agree with John Piper thought that Edwards sometimes moves back and forth between the two different kinds of self-love without warning, and this in turn may be the best explanation for the earlier passage. This, however, introduces the reader of this paper to a deep question than cannot be answered in this time and space. It commends more research for a further delve into EdwardsÕ view of the Òvirtuous pagan.Ó Cf. Gerald McDermott, Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods: Christian Theology, Enlightenment Religion, and Non-Christian Faiths (Oxford, 2000).
[40] Ibid., 124.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., 127.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Cf. Gerald McDermott, One Holy and Happy Society: The Public Theology of Jonathan Edwards (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP), 1992.
[45] Gerald McDermott, Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods, 89.