¶1339. GLORIOUS TIMES. Those passages wherein the SS speaks of there being FEW SAVED, and that we must THROUGH MUCH TRIBULATION enter into the kingdom of God And that all that will live godly in X Jesus shall SUFFER PERSECUTION are not to be understood as extending to the promised glorious day of the churches rest & triumph on earth

¶There are innumerable sayings & representations of SS. that must be taken in this sense as when X says that he came not to send peace on earth but a sword &c. This cannot be understood of that day when according to abundant representations of SS. there shall be abundance of peace --- the mountains shall bring forth peace to Gods people --- the wolf shall dwell with the lamb --- & nation shall no more lift up sword against nation nor learn war any more

¶So when the chh of X is represented as a lily among thorns as sheep amidst wolves . as being not of the ® & therefore hated of the world.

¶There are many descriptions of the future glorious days of the chh that do most manifestly signify & declare that the chh's persecutions shall come to an end at that day that her troubles shall be as the waters of Noah that comfort shall be proclaimed to it that all her enemies shall be subdued that God will give her beauty for ashes the oil of joy for mourning & the garments of praise for the sp. of heaviness &c- &c-

¶So when it is represented as if the chhs enemies shall have the dominion . The desire of God's people should be to them & they should rule over them . And that not many wise not many might not many noble are called but God hath chosen the poor of the ® the base things of the ® &c--

¶There is nothing more apparent by abundant descriptions of the word of God than that in the chhs glorious day it shall be otherwise when the kingdom & dominion & the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven shall be given into the hands of the saints of the most high G. When the saints shall possess the kingdom . when according to the oath of the angel Dan. 12. the long time will be ended for the scattering the power of the holy people /p. 156/ & there should be an end to those wonders of the great tribulation of Gods people that in the days of the voice of the seventh angel the mystery of God should be finished & the kingdoms of this ® should become the kingdoms of our Lord & of his X when tho [the?] /mg/ the nations were angry Gods wrath shall come and a reward given to the martyrs of Jesus X when kings should be nursing fathers & queens nursing mothers and the kings of the earth should bring their honour & glory into the church.

¶In the same discourse wherein X tells his chh. that in the world they shall have tribulation & shall be hated & persecuted yet he intimates as if a time would come wherein their sorrow should be turned into joy. Joh. 15. 18---21. & 16. 20,21,22,23.

¶Here the following things may be observed

¶1. The glorious time of the church is represented in SS. as the time when the salvation of the chh should be actually accomplished tho' not in the highest degree yet in a very high degree. That will be remarkably the day of salvation a day wherein the end of the means of salvation of the chh. should be obtained. the end of the great successive dispensations of God from the beginning of the ® in order to the bringing about the salvation of his people & the end of the great revolutions that have gone before from age to age wherein all nature has been as it were travailing in pain for the salvation of the children of God & the end of the chhs own [A: ever] long continued militant state & his many & mighty struggles & conflicts with her enemies whereby Gods people have groned [sic] within themselves while they have waited for Gods salvation, and have been travailing in birth to bring forth Gods event [T?]that is the day of redemption the year of Xs redeemed wherein he shall see of the travail of his soul & be satisfied the proper time of the kingdom of God the time wherein the chh shall have got the victory the jubilee of the chh the day of her triumph & of her possessing that kingdom which she has been violent in her struggles for . That will be a day wherein the travails of the chh shall be over & she shall enter into her rest & shall put on her crown sit in /mg/ in her throne & wear her garments of triumph in a very important sense & great degree

¶And when Gods people are told that thro' much /p. 157/ tribulation they must enter into the kingdom it is not meant of that time when the chh has actually received the kingdom of God and therefore they shall not suffer much tribulation & persecution at least not at all in that manner & in that sense as in preceeding times. The chh shall not continue in travail after she has brought forth the man child she shall not continue in his conflict after victory is obtaind & the day of triumph is come.

¶Nor will that then be true that few shall be saved , when the chhs salvation shall come and the time of conflict & agonizing for salvation shall in so important a sense be over.

¶2. That glorious state of the chh is represented as another ® a future ® with respect to the Old Testament state

¶The great dispensation of God introducing both the Christian & [sic] dispensation and also the glorious state of the Xtian chhs [s or commas?] are represented as a general judgmt God's coming to judgmt &c-- Satan is called the god of this of this ® [wwxo] prince of the power of the air but he will not reign as God over the inhabitants of the earth at that day for that will be the day wherein he shall be conquered & subdued under the feet of his people & his kingdom be overthrown & X & his people shall take the kingdom & he shall be shut up in the bottomless pit & bound there that he may not maintain his kingdom of darkness over the nations any more

¶[?] The things forementiond viz that few shall be saved & all that will live godly in X Jesus shall suffer persecution are meant only of this present evil ® this ® of which Satan is the God. [t ?]This dark ® this time of night & not of that good & happy ® that ® of light & state of salvation peace & joy when the earth shall be full of the knowledge of God as the waters cover the seas.

¶Many things said of Israel in the Old Testament without any express limitation are to be understood only of the times of their state under the Old Testament, for the end of that state was as it were the end of that world & the N. Testament state was regarded as a new world

¶3. The age of the kingdom of X and of the rest and glory of Gods chh is an exempt distinguished age, as the sabbath day was an exempt day and the sabbatical year & the year of jubilee exempt years. some things are said as things that should be every year that yet were not to be understood of the sabbatical year such as the offering /p. 158/ the sheef of the first fruits of barley harvest at the passover & the two loaves of the first fruits of the wheat harvest at the feast of Pentecost. or feast of harvest or first fruits & the feast of ingathering when they had gathered in all the fruits of their land Exod 23. 14,15,l6. & 34. 22. Levit. chap. 23. Num. 28. 26. Deut. 16. 9. But these things have no reference to the sabbatical year for on that year they should have no harvest no first fruits should not at all put the sickle into the corn neither should there be any ingathering at the end of the year. So some things are spoken without express limitation or exception that were not to take place on the year of jubilee

¶The age of Solomon was an exempt age in Israel, and therefore that is spoken of as being perpetual & at all times in Israel which should be at all other times but in that day of Israels rest peace & glory as in Deut. 15. 11. 'tis said the poor should never cease out of the land & yet it is intimated in v. 4,5. that in some exempt season of the extraordinary blessing of heaven upon them it might be otherwise Save when there shall be no poor among you For the Lord shall greatly bless thee in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee for an inheritance to possess Only if thou carefully hearken to the voice of the Lord &c-- This probably was fulfil'd in Solomons days. [finis]

 

[after No. 1339; adds. to No. 1338]

¶ P. 153. .e] [E's] In that case society ceases; i.e that [xo c?] <e> [c?] union ceases between God & men, by which they should be of one society. & where society ceases, there the argument for conversation ceases. If a particular member of the society were wholly cut off, it [xo c] <&> [c] ceasing [xo c] <es> [c] to be of the society, the union being entirely broken; the argument for conversation, the great medium of social concerns, ceases. So if the body be cut off from the head & entirely disunited from that. Moral government in a society is a social affair: 'tis the main thing [xo E?] & most important thing; wherein consists the intercourse between superiour & inferiour constituents of a society of moral agents, between what [sic; xo c] <that> [c] which is original & dependent, directing & directed in the society.

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¶ P. 150. . d.] [E's] The need of conversation in order properly to support & carry on the concerns of society, May well appear, by well [xo c] considering the need of it in order to the answering the purposes of friendship, which is one of the main concerns of society, & in some respects the main social concern, and the end of all the rest.

¶Let us suppose <that> [c] some friend, above all others deat [sic] to us [xo E] <us a person [xo c] in whose friendship consisted the main comfort of his [xo c] <our> [c] life, & the happiness which he [xo c] <we> [c] depended [xo c] on for all future time, should leave with us some piece of his workmanship [xo E] <some> [c] /p. 159/ work of his, or something that he had contrived & accomplished, some manifold complicated effect that he had produced, which we might have alwaies in our view; which work should be a very great, sure & manifold evidence of the excellencies of the mind of his [xo c] <our> [c] friend of his great & fixed & firm benevolence to him [xo c] <us> [c] & then should withdraw forever & never have any conversation with him; [xo c] <us> [c] no word ever should pass, or any thing of that nature; and no word <should be> [c] left behind in writing, nor any word ever spoken left [? MO; 3rd letter wr. as an s] in the memory; would this sufficiently & compleatly answer the purposes of this great friendship, & satisfy its ends & desires, or be a proper support of this great end of society? I cant but thing <k> [c] every sober, considerate person will at once determine, that it would be very far from <it,> [c] for such reasons as these, that it would not give us those views of things pertaining to the support & enjoyment of friendship, suitable to the nature of intelligent volitive & conversible beings; not giving the direct & immediate view, nor at all tending in so great a degree & so agreeable a manner to affect & impress the mind.

¶And as for these[ck MS] reasons, this alone would not answer the ends & purposes of society in this respect; so for the same reasons it would not answer the p other purposes of society. [finis]

 

¶ 1340. REASON & REVELATION. < P. 162. . c.> Great part of Tindal's arguing, in his Christianity as Old as the Creation, proceeds on this ground, that seeing that [xo c] <since> [c] reason is the judge whether there be any revelation, or whether any pretended revelation be really such; therefore reason without revelation, or undirected by revelation, must be the judge concerning each doctrine, and proposition to us [xo c?] contained in that pretended revelation: which is an unreasonable way of arguing. [Here see Book on Controv. P. 190. e. &c.]. [E's; This ref. not in MO] Tis as much as to say, that seeing reason is to judge of the truth of any general proposition; therefore in all cases reason alone, without regard to that particular proposition, is to judge separately & independently of each particular proposition implied in, or depending & consequent upon that general proposition . For whether any supposed or pretended divine revelation be indeed such, is a general proposition. and the particular truths delivered in & by it are particular propositions implied in & consequent on that general. Tindal supposes each of these truths must be judged of by themselves, independently of our judging of that general truth, that the revelation that declares them is the word of God; evidently supposing that if each of these[ck MS] propositions thus judged of particularly, cant be found to be agreeable to reason or if reason alone will not shew the truth /p. 160/ of them; then that general proposition that they depend on, viz that the word that declares em is a divine revelation, is to be rejected: which is most unreasonable & contrary to all the rules of common sense, & all rules of the proceeding of all mankind, in their reasoning and judging of things in all affairs whatsoever.

¶[?] For this is true, that a proposition may be evidently true, or we may have good reason to receive it as true, tho the particular propositions, that depend upon it & follow from it, may be such, that our reason independent on it, cant see the truth, or can see it to be true by no other means, than by first establishing that other truth that it depends upon. For otherwise there is an end of all use of our reasoning powers; an end of all arguing one proposition from another; & nothing is to be judged true, but what appears true by looking on it directly & immediate<ly,> [c] without the help of another proposition first established, on which the evidence of it depends.

¶For therein consists all reasoning or argumentation whatsoever; viz in discovering the truth of a proposition, whose truth dont appear to our reason immediately, or when we consider it alone, but by the help of some other proposition, on which it depends. If this bent [xo c] <be not> [c] allowed, we must believe nothing at all, but only self evident propositions; & [& by C?] then we must have done with all such things as arguments. & [xo c?] <And> [c] all <A> [c] argumentation whatsoever, & all Tindals argumentations in particular, are absurd. He <himself> [c] throughout his whole book proceeds in that very method, which this [xo E?] this <principle> explodes. He argues and attempts to prove, or make evident one proposition by another first established.

¶There are some general propositions, the truth of which can be known only by reason, from whence an infinite multitude of other propositions are infer'd & [wwxo] & reasonably & justly determined to be true & rested in as such, on the ground of the truth of that general proposition, from which they are infer'd by the common consent of all mankind, being led thereto by the common & universal sense of the human mind. And yet not one of these[ck MS] propositions can be known to be true by reason, if reason considers them by themselves independent<ly> [c?] on that general proposition.

¶Thus for instance what numberless truths are known only by consequence from that general proposition, that the testimony of our senses may be depended on. <Tindal says. p. 157. Reason is to judge whether our senses are deceived> [wwxo] the truth of ["of" by c?] /p. 161/ of all these particular propositions infinite myriads of <numberless> millions of xxx particular propositions which are declared ["which" xo c?] we have <only> by the testimony of our sense [xo c?] cannot be known to be true [xo c] by reason considered independent<ly> [c] of that <the> [c] testimony <of our senses> [c] & without an implicit faith in that testimony.

¶So that general truth, that the testimony of our memories is worthy of credit, can be proved only by reason; & yet what numberless truths are there, which we have [xo c] <know> [c] no other way /mg/ & cannot be known to be true by reason considering the truths in themselves, or any otherwise than by the testimony of our memory, & and [sic] an implicit faith in this testimony. So that the agreed testimony of all we see & converse with continually, is to be credited, is a general proposition, the truth of which can be known only by reason . and yet how infinitely numberous are the [xo E?] propositions that men by [xo E?] do men receive as truth, that cant be known to be true by reason riewing[sic] them separate<ly> [c] from such testimony ; even all occurrences & matters of fact persons, things, actions, works, events & circumstances, & all existence that we are told of in our neighbourhood, in our country, or [&? xo ? MO: or] any part of the ® that others tell us of, that we hant seen our selves.

¶So that the testimony of history & tradition is to be depended <on,> [c] when attended with such & such credible circumstances, is a general proposition whose truth can [? MO] be known only by reason. & yet how numberless are the particular truths concerning what has been before the present age, that cant be known by reason considered in themselves & separate<ly> [c] from this testimony, which yet are truths of that sort, & so circumstanced, that all mankind do, ever did & ever will rely on the truth of.

¶That the experience of mankind is to [be (om. E.)] depended on; or that those things, which the world finds to be true by experience, are worthy to be judged true, is a general proposition, which none doubts; and all that is meant [xo c] by this [xo c?] what the ® finds true by experience, can be meant nothing else, that [xo c] <than> [c] what is known to be true by one or the other of those foremention'd kinds of testimony; viz either [xo c?] the testimony of history & tradition; the testimony of those we see & converse with; the testimony of our memories; & the testimony of our senses. I say all that is known by the experience of mankind, is known only by one or more of these[ck MS] testimony<s;> [c] excepting only the existence of that idea, or those few ideas, [s touched up by c?] which are this moment present in our minds, or the immediate objects of present consciousness. And yet how unreasonable would it be to say, that we must first know these[ck MS] things to be true by reason, before we give credit to our experience of the [?? MO; faded] truth of em. [(e)m? MO: them] /p. 162/

¶Not only are there innumerable truth<s,> [c?] that are reasonably received as following from such general propositions as have been mention'd, which cant be known by reason, if they are considered by themselves, or otherwise than as infer'd from these general propositions: but also many truths are reasonably received, and are received by the common consent of the reason of all rational persons, as undoubted truths, whose truth not only would not otherwise be discoverable by reason, but when they are discovered by their consequence from that general proposition, appear in themselves not easy & reconcileable to reason, but difficult, incomprehensible and their agreement with reason not understood. so that men, at least most men, are not able to explain, or conceive of the manner, in which they are agreeable to reason.

¶Thus for instance, this [xo E or c?] <it> [E or c?] is a truth, <which> [c] which we depend on as xxxxx [xo E] depends on that general proposition, that credit is to be given to the testimony of our senses, that our souls and bodies are so united, that they act on each other . But it is a truth that reason otherwise cant discover, & now it is reveald by the testimony of our senses, reason cant comprehend, or explain, or shew, or conceive of any way, that that which is immaterial & not solid nor extended, can act upon matter, which it cannot touch, and <yt> [c] matter act<s> [c] upon that. or if any choose to say, that the soul is material, then other difficulties arise as great. for reason cant imagine any way that a solid mass of matter, whether at rest or in motion, should have perception, & <should> [c] understand, & should exert thought & volition, love hatred &c.--

¶And if it be said that spirit acts on matter, and matter on spirit, by an established law of the Creatour, which is no other than fixd method of his own producing <effects;> [c] still the manner how tis possible to be, will be inconceivable. we can have no conception of any way or manner, in which God who is a pure Spirit, can act upon matter & impell it.

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¶ P. 159. . a.] [E's] DEFINITION. BY REASON I mean that power or faculty an intelligent being has to judge of the truth of propositions, either immediately by only looking on the propositions, which is judging by intuition & self-evidence; or by putting together several proposit<i>ons, which are already evident by intuition, or at least whose evidence is originally derived from intuition.

________________________________________________________________________¶ There are several things in mechanicks & hydrostaticks, that by the testimony of our senses are true in fact, not only that reason never first discovered, before the testimony of sense declared them; but now they are declared, they are very /p. 163/ great paradoxes, and if proposed would [have (om. E.)] seemed contrary to reason, at least to the reason of the generality of mankind, & such as are not either mathematicians or of more than common penetration, and what they cannot reconcile to their reason. But God has given reason to the common <people,> [c] to be as much their guide & rule, as he has to mathematicians & philosophers.

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¶< next p. . a> There are innumerable propositions, that we reasonably receive from the testimony of experience, all depending on the truth of that general proposition, that experience is to be relied <on> [c] (what is meant by experience has been already explain'd) that yet are altogether above reason, & are paradoxes attended with such seeming inconsistencies [sic] with reason, that reason can't clearly remove nor fully explain the mystery < next p. b>

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¶ Even the very existence of a sensible ®, which we receive for certain from the testimony of our sense, is attended with difficulties & seeming inconsistences [sic] with reason, which are insuperable by the reason at least of most men . For if there be a sensible ®, that ® either exists in the mind only or out of the mind, & independed [sic] on its imagination or perception. If the latter, then that sensible ® is some material substance, altogether diverse from all the ideas we have by any of our senses, either [xo E?] colour or visible extension & figure, which is nothing but the quantity of colour & its various limitations [-s?], which are sensible qualities which we have by sight ; and also diverse from any of the sensible qualities we have by other senses; as that solidity, which is an idea we have by feeling, & that extension & figure, which is only the quantity & limitation of these; & so of all other qualities.

¶[?] But that there should be any substance entirely distinct from any or all of these, is utterly inconceivable. For if we exclude all colour, solidity or conceivable extension, dimensions & figure, what is there life, that we conceive of? <I> [c] is there not a removal in our minds of all existence & a perfect emptiness of every thing? But if it be said, that the sensible ® has no existence but only in the mind, then the sensories themselves, or the organs of sense, by which sensible ideas are let into the mind, have no existence but only in the mind; and those[ck MS] organs of sense have no existence, but what is conveyed into the mind by themselves; for they are a part of the sensible ®. & then it will follow, that the organs of sense owe their existence to the organs of sense, and so are prior to thems [-s? mfo; MO: themselves] /p. 164/ being the causes or occasions of their own existence; which is a seeming inconsistence with reason, which I image <ine> [c] the reason of all men cannot explain & remove. last p. . b.

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¶ last p. . c.] [E's] By experience we know there is such a thing as thought, love, hatred &c.-- But yet this is attended with inexplicable difficulties. If there be such a thing as thought and affection, where be [xo c] <are> [c] they? if they should exist & exist in no place, is above our comprehension. it seems a contradiction to say, they exist & yet exist no where. and if they exist in some place, then they are not in other places, or in all places; & therefore must be confined at one time to one place, and that place must have certain limits, from whence it will follow that thought & love &c. have some figure, either round, or [? xo? MO: or] square, or triangular; which seems quite disagreable to reason, & utterly inconsonant to the nature of such things as thought & affections [s xo?] of mind.

¶'Tis evident by experience that something now is . but this proposition is attended with things that reason <cannot> [c;mg] comprehend, & which are paradoxes that seem contrary to reason, knots that reason cannot clearly untie.

¶For if something now is, then either something was from all eternity, or something began to be without any cause or reason of its existence. The last seems wholly inconsistent with natural sense: and the other, viz. that something has been from all eternity, implies that there has been a duration, that is [xo c] past, <which> [c] is without any beginning, which is an infinite duration, which is perfectly inconceivable, and is attended with difficulties that seem contrary to reason. For we cant conceive how an infinite duration can be made greater, any more than how a line of infinite length can be made longer . but yet we see that past duration is continually added to. <I> [c] if there were a duration past without beginning, a thousand years ago, then that past infinite duration has now a thousand years added to <it:> [c] and if so, it is greater than it was before by a thousand years: because the whole is greater than a part.. Now the past duration consists of two parts, viz that which was before the last thousand years, & that which is since. Thus here are seeming contradictions involved in this supposition of an infinite duration past.

¶And moreover, if something has been from eternity, tis either an endless succession of causes & effects; as for instance, an endless succession of fathers & sons, or something equivalent: /p. 165/ But this supposition is attended with manifold apparent contradictions: [see my sermons on the existence of G] [E's] <Or> [c] or there must have been some eternal self-existent Being having the reasons of his existence within himself: or he must <have> [c] existed from eternity without any reason of his existence: both which are inconcievable. [sic] That a being should exist from eternity without; any manner [?? xo c] <reason> [c] why it should be so, rather than otherwise, is altogether inconcievable, [sic!] & seems quite repugnant to reason. and why a being should be self-existent, or have the reasons of his existence within himself, seems also inconcievable, & never, as I apprehend, has yet been explain'd.

¶If there has <been> [c] any thing from eternity, then that past eternity is either an endless duration of successive parts, or successives [sic] hours, minutes &c.-- or it is an eternal duration without succession . The latter seems repugnant to reason, & incompatible with any faculty of understanding that we have: & the other, an infinite number of successive parts, involves the very same contradictions, [-s?] with the supposition of an eternal succession of fathers & sons.

¶or [??? xo c] <That> [c] the ® has existed from eternity without a cause. But this [xo c?] seems wholly inconsistent with reason. <I> [c] in the first place, tis inconsistent with reason, that it should exist without a cause. for tis evident, that there [xo c] is [xo c] <t is> [c] not a thing, the nature & manner of which is necessary in it self, & therefore it requires a cause or reason <out of itself,> [c] why it is so, & not otherwise out of it self. [xo c] And in the next place, if it exists from eternity, then succession has been from eternity; which involves the forementiond contradiction. but if it bent without a cause & dont exist from eternity; then it has been created out of nothing, which is altogether inconceivable, and what reason cannot shew how [xo c?] to be possible; and many of the greatest philosophers have supposed it plainly inconsistent with reason.

¶Many other difficulties might be mention'd as following from that proposition, that something now is, that are insuperable by reason.

¶'Tis evident by experience that great evil both moral & natural evil abound<s> [c?] in the ® . 'Tis manifest that great injustice, violence, treachery, perfidiousness & extreme cruelty to the innocent, abound in the ®; as well as innumerable extreme sufferings, issuing finally in destruction & death, are general all over the ® in all ages. /p. 166/ But this could not otherwise <have> [c] been known by reason, & now is attended with difficulties, which the reason of many, yea most, of the learned men & greatest philosophers, that have been in the world, have not been able to surmount. That it should be so ordered or permitted, in a ® absolutely [ly by c?] & perfectly under the care & government of an infinitely holy & good Good, [sic] has a seeming repugnancy to reason, that few, if any, have been able fully to remove.

¶That men are to be blamed or commended for their good or evil voluntary actions, is a general proposition received with good reason, by the dictate of the natural common & universal moral sense of mankind, in all nations & ages.

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And yet many things attend this truth, that are difficulties & seeming repugnances to reason, that have proved altogether insuperable to the reason of most of the greatest & most learned men in the ®. next col.

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¶ which moral sense is commonly plainly included in what Tindal means by reason & the law of nature.

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¶ I observe further that if the difficulties that attend any general proposition [that (xo in prev. line] is proposed to us to receive as a divine revelation are no greater nor of a different kind from [what (om. E. mg)] might reasonably be expected all things considered to attend a divine revelation of such things given to us for such ends & purposes

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¶ last col. d.] [E's] I observe further, that when the difficulties which attend any general proposition, which is recommended to us <as> [c] true, by any testimony or evidence, that considered by it self seems sufficient, without contrary testimony or evident [xo c] <ce> [c] to countervail it; if [xo E?] <and> [E?] difficulties attend that proposition; if these[ck MS] difficulties are no greater & of no other sort, from [xo c] <than> [c] what might reasonably be expected to attend true propositions of that kind: then these [ck MS] difficulties are not only no valid or sufficient objection against that proposition, but they are no objection at all < p. 167. . d.

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¶& [or? as? xo c?] To apply this to the case in hand; if the difficulties that attend that which is recommended by good proof or testimony to our reception as a divine revelation, and this revelation is attended with difficulties; but yet with difficulties no greater, nor of any other nature, than such as, all things considered, might reasonably be expected to attend a revelation of such a sort, of things of such a nature, & given for such ends & purposes, & under such circumstances; these difficul-/p. 167/ties not only are not of weight sufficient to ballance the testimony or proof, that recommends it; but they are of no weight at all as objections against <the revelation.> [c] they are not reasonably to be look'd upon as [wxo] as of the nature of arguments against it. But on the contrary, they may with good reason be lookd upon as confirmations, & of the nature of arguments in its favour.

¶This is very evident, & the reason of it very plain. For certainly whatever is reasonably expected to be found in a thing [etc. xo E] <a> [c] truth, when we are seeking it, cannot be an objection against its being [both xo E?] <that> [c] truth, when we have found it . If it be reasonably expected in it [xo E] <truth> before-hand, then reason unites it with truth, as one property of that sort of truth. And if so, then reason unites it afterwards [xo c] <with the truth,> [c] after it is found . Whatever reason determines to <be> [c?] a property of any kind of truth, that is properly looked upon in some degree as a mark of the [? xo E?] <the> [c] truth, or of truths of that sort, or as belonging to the marks & evidences of it. For things are known by their properties . Reason determines truth by things which reason determines to be the properties of truth. and if we don't find such things belonging to supposed truth, that were before reasonably expected in truth of that kind; this is an objection against it, rather than the finding of it. [MO: them] The disappointment of reason is rather an objection with reason than something to induce its acceptance & acquiescence. If the expectation be reasonable, then the not answering of it must so far appear unreasonable, or against reason, & so an objection in the way of reason.

¶Thus [?xo c], <Thus> [c] if any one that is in search for person of [sic] things of a certain kind, reasonably expects beforehand, that if he be successful in finding the person or thing of the kind & quality that he is in search of then [xo E?] and [xo c] <he shall find it possessed of certain properties;> [c] when he hath actually found something with all these[ck MS] properties & circumstances that he expected, he receives it & rests in it so much the more entirely as the very thing that he was in quest of. & surely it is [xo c] <it would be> [c] no argumt with him, that his invention is not right, that some things that he reasonably expected, are wanting. but on the contrary this would rather be an objection with his reason. next col a.

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¶ P. 166. .c] [E's] Thus there are many things that I am told concerning the effects of electricity, magnetism &c. and many things that are recorded in the Philosophical Transactions of the royal Society, which I have never seen, & are very mysterious. But being well attested, their mysteriousness is no manner of objection against my belief of the accounts, because from what I have observed & do know, such a mysteriousness is no other than is to be expected in a particular & exact observation of nature, & a /p. 168/ critical tracing of its operations. 'Tis to be expected, that the further it is traced, the more & more [xo c?] mysteries will appear.

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¶ last col. c.]. [E's] In order to judge what sort of difficulties are to be expected in a revelation made to mankind by God, such as Christians suppose the Scriptures to be, <we must remember that it is > [c] a revelation of what God knows to be the very truth concerning his own nature; <of> [c] the acts & operations of his mind with respect to his creatures; <of> [c] the grand scheme of infinite wisdom in his works, especially with respect to the intelligent & moral ®; a revelation of the spiritual & invisible ®; a revelation of that invisible ® which man[ck MS] shall belong to after this life; a revelation of the greatest works of God, the manner of his creating the ®, & of his governing of it, especially with regard to the higher & more important parts of it; a revelation delivered in antient languages.

¶Difficulties and incomprehensible mysteries are reasonably to be expected in a declaration from God, of the precise truth as he knows it, in matters of a spiritual nature; as we see things that are invisible, & not the objects of any of the external senses, are very mysterious involved much more in darkness, attended with more mystery & difficulty to the understanding, than others; as many things concerning even the nature of our own souls themselves, tho <at are> [c] the nearest to us, & the most intimately present with us, & so most in our view, of any spiritual thing<s> [c] whatsoever.

¶The further things are from the nature of those things, that language is chiefly formed to express, viz. things appertaining to the common business & vulgar affairs of life; things obvious to sense & man's direct view & most vulgar observation, without speculation, reflection & abstraction; the more difficult <it is clearly to express them in words.> [c] our expressions concerning them, when words & language are applied to them will be attended with greater abstruseness, difficulty & seeming inconsistence; language not being well fitted to express these[ck MS] things; words & phrases not being prepared for that end. such a reference to sensible & vulgar things, from t he original use & design of words & phrases, is unavoidably introduced, that naturally confounds & loses the mind, & involves it in darkness. p. 170 . a.

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¶It may well be supposed, that a revelation concerning another & an invisible ®, a future state that we are to be in after [xo c] <when> [c] separated from the body, should be attended with much mystery. It may well be supposed, that things of such a /p. 169/ world are of an exceeding different nature from the things of this ®, the things of sense, & all the objects & affairs, which earthly language was made to express; & <that they are> [c] not agreeable to such notions, imaginations & ways of thinking, that grow up with us & are connatural to us; being [xo c] <as we are> [c] from our infancy formed to an agreeableness to the things which we are conversant with in this ®. we could not conceive of the things of sense, if we had never had these external senses. and if we had had only some of these sense & not others; as for instance, if we had only a sense of feeling, without the senses of seeing & hearing; how mysterious would a declaration of things of these last senses be! Or if we had feeling & hearing, but had been been [sic] without eyes or optic nerves; the things of light being declared to us would many of them be involved in mystery, that would appear exceeding<ly> [c?] strange to us.

[<marginal> [E] <note> [E?] [beg. brack. E's ?] I say if we were born without eyes or optic nerves . For as to such as are born blind but yet born with optic nerves I imagine they have some ideas by the state of the optic nerves that [xo E?] others [shd have been other?] than they could otherwise have. as an idea of darkness or blackness and without that confused intermixture of specks or streaks of light with blackness such as is in prints in metzotinte,[?] which I suppose all have when they shut their eyes or when they are in darkness and possibly such a kind of lightsomness [?] on some occasion as we have by pressing our eyes with out fingers when they [are (om. E)] shut which confused light is perhaps from some motion of the animal spirits in the optic nerves tho not excited by rays yet in some degree like that which is excited by a few weak rays.] [Prob. E's]

¶Thus, one [xo c] <those> [c] that was [xo c] <were> [c] in this manner without the sense of seeing, but had the other senses, might be informed by all about them, that they can percieve things at a distance, & perceve [sic?] as plainly, & in some respects much more plainly, than by touching them. yea that they could perceive [sic] things at so great a distance, that it would take up many millions of ages to travail [sic] to them

¶They might be informed many things concerning colours, that would all be perfectly incomprehensible; that yet might be believed, & it could not be said that nothing at all is proposed to their belief, because they have no idea of colour. They might be told that they perceive an extension, a length & breadth of colour, & termination & limits & so a figure of this kind of extension; & yet that it is nothing that can be felt; which would be perfectly mysterious to them; & would seem an inconsistence, as they have no ideas of any such things as length, breadth & limits & figure of extension, but only certain ideas they have by touch. [touching?]

¶They might be informed by them, that [wwxo] that they can <ould> [c] perceive at once the extent & shape, of a thing so great & multiform, as a tree, which is a thing that it would take up them many days to perceive the extent & shape of, by touch; which would seem very new [xo E?] strange & impossible

¶They might be told, that to them that see some things appears a thousand times as great as some others, that yet are made up of more visible points [? MO], or least visible parts, than they : which would be very mysterious, & seem quite inconsistent with reason.

¶These[ck MS] & many other things would be attended with unsearchable mystery to em, concerning objects of sight; & what they could never fully see how they can be reconciled with reason, at least with<out> [c; mg] very long, particular, gradual & elaborate instruction. & after all they would not be [xoc] fully comprehensible, [xo c] <d> [c] so as clearly to see how the ideas connected in these[ck MS] propositions, do agree.

¶And yet I suppose, in such a case, the most rational of [xo E?] persons would give full credit to things that they knew not by reason, but only by the revelation of the word of them that see. I suppose a person born blind in the manner described, would nevertheless give full credit to the united testimony of the seeing ®, in things which they said about light & colours, & would entirely rest in their testimony.

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¶ p. 168. .d.] [E's] If God gives a revelation of things of religion, it must be mainly concerning those things that are spiritual, For it m [xo E] or [? MO] it [xoc; mg] must about about [xo c; some by E?] the affairs of the moral & intelligent universe; which is the grand system of spirits. <it must be chiefly> [c] about hims self & intelligent creatures.

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¶ If God gives us a revelation of the very truth, not only about spiritual beings, & concerning them in an unexperienc'd & unseen state; but also concerning a spiritual being or beings of a superiour kind, & so of an unexperienced nature, entirely diverse from any thing we do now experience in our present state, but [xo c] <&> [c] from any thing that we can be conscious or immediately sensible of, in any state whatsoever, that our nature can be in; then especially may mysteries be expected in such a revelation.

¶The truth concerning any kind of perceiving being of a different nature from ours, tho of a kind inferiour, might well be supposed to be attended with difficulty, by reason of the [xo c] <its> [c] diversity from what we are conscious of in our selves. But much more so when the nature & kind is superiour. For a superiour perceptive nature may well be supposed in some respects to include & comprehend what belongs to an inferiour, as the greater compre-/p.171/hends the less, & as the whole includes a part. & therefore what the superiour experiences may give him advantage to concieve [sic] of what belongs to the nature of the inferiour. But on the contrary, an inferiour nature dont include what belongs to a superiour. when one in [xo E?] <of> [E?] an inferiour nature considers what belongs to a kind of beings of a nature entirely above his own, there is something belonging to it, that is over & above all that the inferiour nature is conscious of. next col. a.

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¶So that if there be a kind of created perceptive beings in their nature vastly superiour to the human nature, which none will deny to be impossible, [sic] and a revelation should be given us concerning the nature, acts & operations of this kind of creatures; it would be no wonder if such a revelation should contain some things very much out of our reach, attended with great difficulty to our reason, being things of such a kind, that no improvement of our minds that we are capable of, will bring us to an experience of any thing like them.

¶But above all, if a revelation be made us concerning that Being that is uncreated & selfexistent, who is infinitely diverse from & above all others, in his nature, & so infinitely above all that any improvmt or advancemt of our nature can give us any consciousness of, in such a revelation it would be very strange indeed, if there should not be some great mysteries, quite beyond our comprehension, and attended with difficulties which is <is> [c] impossible for us fully to solve & explain.

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¶< last p. b> A very great superiority, even in beings of the same nature with our selves, sets them so much above our reach, that many of their affairs become incomprehensible & attended with inexplicable intricacies. Thus many of the affairs of adult persons are incomprehensible & appear inexplicably strange to the understandings of little children: and many of the affairs of learned men & great philosophers & mathematicians, thing which they are conversant in, & well acquainted with, are far above the reach of the vulgar, and appear to them not only unintelligible, but absurd & impossible, & full of inconsistences. But much more may this be expected, when the superiority is not only in degree of improvemt of the faculties & properties of the same <kind of beings;> [c] but also is [in? touched up by c] <the> [c] a superiority of [xo c] nature it self as to its kind.

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¶ It may well be expected that a revelation of truth concerning an infinite Being should be attended with mystery . We find that the reasonings & conclusions of the best metaphysicians & mathematicians concerning infinites, are attended with paradoxes & seeming inconsistences. <T> [c] thus it is concerning infinite lines, surfaces & solids, which are things external. but much more may this be expected in an [xo c] /p. 172/ spiritual being [xo E?] things; such as infinite thought & [& by c?] idea, infinite apprehension, infinite reason, infinite will, love & joy, &c-- [xo E?] infinite spiritual power, agency &c--

¶Nothing is more certain <than> [c] that there must be <an> [c] an infinite universal [xo E] unmade & unlimited Being: & yet the very notion of such a being is all mystery, involving nothing but incomprehensibles [sic?] paradoxes & seeming inconsistences.

¶It involves the notion of a being self-existent & without any cause, which is utterly inconcievable [sic] & seems repugnant to all our ways of conception.

¶An infinite spiritual being or infinite understanding & will & spiritual power must be omnipresent, without extension; which is nothing but mystery & seeming inconsistence.

¶The notion of an infinite eternal, implies absolute immutability. that which is in all respects infinite, & <is> [c] absolutely perfect, & to the utmost degree <&> [c] at all times, cant be in any respect variable. And this immutability being constant from eternity implies duration without succession, <&> [c] which is wholly [etc.; xo E] is wholly mystery & seeming inconsistence. it seems as much as to say, an infinitely great or long duration all at once; or all in a moment; which seems to be saying, an infinitely great in an infinitely little; or an infinitely long line in a point without any length.

¶Infinite understanding, which implies an understanding of all things, of all existence past, present & future, & of all truth & all reason & argument, this [xo c] implies infinite thought & reason. but how this can be absolutely without mutation or succession of act [MO: acts] seems mysterious & absurd. we can conceive of no such thing as thinking, without successive acting of the mind about ideas.

¶Perfect knowledge of all things, even of all the things of external sense, without any sensation or any reception of ideas from without, is inconceivable mystery.

¶Infinite knowledge implies a perfect comprehensive view of a whole future eternity; which seems utterly impossible. for how can there be any reaching of the whole of this, to comprehend it, without reaching to the utmost limits of it. but this cant be where there is no such thing as utmost limits . And again, if God perfectly views an eternal succession or chain of events, then he perfectly sees every individual part of that chain, & there is no one link of it hid from his sight. and yet there is no one link that he sees, but that there is a link yea innumerable links beyond it; from which it would seems to follow, that there is a link beyond all the links that he sees, and consequently that there is one link, yea unnumerable links, that he sees not: inasmuch as there are innumerable beyond every one that he sees. And many other like seeming contradictions might be menti- /p. 173/ iond, [sic] which attend the supposition of /mg/ of Gods omniscience.

¶If there be an absolute immutability in God, then there never arises any new act in God, or new exertion of himself. & yet there arise new effects; which seems an utter inconsistence.

¶And so innumerable other such like mysteries & paradoxes are involved in the notion of an infinite & eternal intelligent Being.

¶[?] Insomuch that if there had never had [sic] been any REVELATION, by which God had made known himself by his word to mankind; the most speculative persons would without doubt have forever been exceedingly at a loss concerning the nature of the supreme Being & first Cause of the universe. And that the antient philosophers & wiser heathen had so good notions of God [MO: orig. “him” touched up by E?] as they had, seems to <be> [c] much more owing to tradition, which originated from divine revelation, than from their own invention . Tho’ human reason served to keep these traditions alive in the ®, & led the more considerate to embrace & retain the imperfect traditions, which were to be found in any parts ramaining: [sic] they appearing, after once suggested & delivered, agreeable to reason.

¶If a revelation be made of the principal scheme of the wisdom of the supreme & infinitely wise Ruler, respecting his moral kingdom wherein his alsufficient wisdom is displayed, in the case of its greatest trial, in [xo c??] ordering & regulation the said moral kingdom to its great ends, when in the most difficult circumstances; extricating it out of the most extreme calamities, in which it had been involved by the malice & subtilty of the chief & most crafty of all God enemies; It being the principal of all the effects of the wisdom of him the depth of whose wisdom <is> [c] is infinite & [etc. xo E] unsearchable & absolutely infinite; his deepest scheme, by which mainly the grand design of the universal, incomprehensibly complicated system of all his operations, & the infinite series of his administrations, is most happily compleatly & gloriously attaind; the scheme in which Gods wisdom is mainly exercised & displayed : It may reasonably be expected that such a revelation will contain many mysteries.

¶We see that to be the case even as to many works of human wisdom & art. they appear strange, paradoxical & incomprehensible /p. 174/ by those that are vastly inferiour in sagacity, or entirely destitute of that skill or art. How are many of the effects of human artifice [xo c?] attended with many things, that are [sic] appear strange & altogether incomprehensible by children & many others, seeming to be beyond & against nature; & in many cases the effect produced not only seems to be beyond the power of any visible means, but inconsistent with <it,> [c] being an effect contrary to what would be expected. the means seem [MO: seems?] inconsistent with the <means> [sic] end

¶If God reveals the exact truth in those things, which in the language of the heathen sages are matters of philosophy, i.e not the things of sense and of common life, but matters of reflection & speculation; as especially things of morality & theology; things concerning the nature of the Deity, & the nature of man, so far as as [sic] related to the Deity: &c-- I say if God reveals the real precise truth concerning these things, it may most reasonably be expected, that such a revelation should contain many mysteries & paradoxes; considering how many mysteries the doctrines of the greatest & best philosophers in all ages concerning these things have contained; or at least how very mysterious & seemingly repugnant they are to the reasons of the vulgar, and persons of less understanding; & <considering> [c] how mysterious the principles of philosophers even concerning matters <far> [c] inferiour far [xo c] to those, which are received for the most undoubted truth [xo c?] now [“now” xo E by mistake?] would have appeared, in any former age, if they then [xo c] had been <then> [c] revealed to be true; <which however are now received as the most> [c] undoubted truths.

¶If God gives mankind his word in a large book, consisting of a vast variety of parts, many books, histories, prophecies, prayers, songs, parables, proverbs, doctrines, promises, sermons, epistles & discourses of very many kinds; all connected together; all united in one grand drift & design; and one part having a various & manifold respect to others; so as to become one great work of God, & as it were [xo c?] one grand system; as it [so c] is with [xo c] the system of the universe, with its vast variety of parts connected in one grand work of God : it may well be expected, that there should be mysteries, things incomprehensible & exceeding difficult to our understanding; analogous to the mysteries that are found in all other works of God, as the works of creation & providence: and particularly such as are analogous to the mysteries, that are observable in the system /p. 175/ of the natural ® & the frame of mans own nature.

¶For such a system or Bible of the word of God is as much the work of God, as any other of his works; the effect of the power, wisdom & contrivance of a God, whose wisdom is unsearchable, & whose nature & ways are past finding out. and as the system of nature & the system of revelation are both divine works, so both are in different senses a divine word. both are the voice of God to intelligent creatures; a manifestation & declaration of himself to mankind. man’s reason was given him, that he might know God; & might be capable of discerning the manifestations he makes of himself in the effects & external expressions, & emanations of the divine perfections. next p. . c.

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¶Thus it is reasonable to expect, that in such a revelation there should be many things plain and easy to be understood; & that the revelation should be most intelligible, wherein it is most necessary for us to understand it in order to our guidance & direction in the way to our happiness: but that there should also be many incomprehensible mysteries in it; yea many things very difficult to our reason in that degree which he have attaind of the use of it: many thing [sic] understood in part, but yet that room should be left for vast improvemt in the knowledge of them: that the revelation should be of such a nature, containing such depths & hidden treasures of knowledge, that there should be room for improvement in understanding, & to find out more & more, to all the wisest and best of men, to the end of the ®: and that the case in this respect should actually be the same as concerning the works of nature; that there should actually be a gradual improvemt in the understanding of it; that many things that were formerly great & insuperable difficulties, unintelligible mysteries, should now by further study & improvemt be well cleard up, & cease to remain any [sic; om. MO] difficulty; & that other difficulties should be considerably diminished, tho not yet fully cleared up.

¶It may be expected, that as in the system of nature, so in this system of revelation, there should be many parts whose use is but little understood, and many that should seem wholly useless, yea & some that should seem rather to do hurt than good.

¶So I might further observe, that if we have a revelation given in antient languages, used among a people whose customs & phraseology is [so c] <are> [c] but very imperfectly understood, then [that? xo c] many difficulties should arise from hence. /p. 176/ and that in a very short concise history, where only some particular facts & circumstances that are to [xo E?] concern the special purpose & design of that revelation are mentiond, & innumerable others are omitted, that would be proper to be mention’d, if the main design were to give a clear full <account & clear idea> connected continued history of such a people or such affairs, as the history mentions; I say in such a case tis no wonder, that many doubts & difficulties arise.

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¶ last p. . c.] [E’s] If it be still objected, that tis <it is> [c] peculiarly unreasonable, that mysteries should be supposed in a revelation given to mankind. because if there be such a revelation, the direct and principal design of it must be, to teach & instruct mankind, & so to enlighten & inform their understanding<s,> [c?] which is inconsistent with its delivering things to men,[ck MS] which he cant [xo c] <cannot> [c] understand, & so dont [xo c] <do not> [c] inform & enlighten, but only puzzle and confound his understanding .

¶I answer 1. Men are capable of understanding as much as is revealed, and as much as is pretended to be revealed; tho they they [sic] cant [xo c] <cannot> [c] understand every thing that belongs to the things, that are reveald; or altho there are secret things pertaining to the thing<s> [c?] revealed, which G. has not reveald. as for instance, G. may reveal, that there are three that have the same nature of the Deity; that <whom> [c] tis <it is> [c] most proper for us to look upon as three persons. <T> [c] tho the particular manner of their distinction, or how they differ, may not be reveal’d . & we may therefore understand so much as is reveald concerning it

¶So he may reveal, that the Godhead was united to man, so as to be properly looked upon the same person: but not reveal how it was effected.

¶2. No allowance is made in the objection, for what may hereafter be understood of the word of God in future ages, which is not now understood. And it is to be considered, that divine revelation is not given only for the present or past ages.

¶3. The seeming force of this objection lies wholly in this, that we must suppose whatever God does, tends to answer the end of which he does it; but <that> [c] those parts of a revelation, that we cant understand, dont answer the end; inasmuch as the [xo E?] informing our understandings, is the very end of a revelation, if there be any such thing.

¶But this objection is no other, than just equivalent to an [? touched up c] objections [-s by E or comma by c?] which may be made against many parts of the creation, particularly of this lower ®. tis <It is> [c] /p./ apparent, the most direct & principal end of this lower ® was, to be for the habitation, use & benefit of mankind, the head of this lower ®. But here are some parts of it that seem to be of no use of him [xo c] <man,> [c] but rather for his inconvenience & prejudiced. as the innumerable stones & rocks that overspread so great a part of the land, which as to any thing known, are altogether useless, and of ten times greater inconvenience than benefit. [finis]