¶ 1203. <see 1201.> THE CEREMONIAL LAW was not so invariable but that from time to time it gave place when the moral reason of things required it Thus in Ruths admission who was a Moabitess so in the admission of an Ammonite and Moabite among Davids worthis [sic] 1 Chron. 7. 7. In the uncleans eating the Passover in Hezekiahs time see 2. Chron 30. 17---20 & the Levites helping to slay the sacrifice [-s? mg] See Notes on 2. Chron. 29. 34.
¶ This [sic] things shew the ceremonial law not to be immutable & are intimations that it one day was to be wholly abolished to give place to the moral reason of things on the great change to be made in the days of the gospel when all nations should be Gods people. <Gideon who was of the tribe of Manasseh executed the office of a priest and offered sacrifice on another altar besides that before the tabernacle by divine appointment Judg. 6. 24. &c.> [finis; last item added later after next written; belongs somewhere above in the text.]
¶ 1204. We may judge what the Scripture means when it speaks of KNOWING GOD & JESUS CHRIST as a thing peculiar to the saints by comparing the following texts. John 17. 3. John 10. 14,15 Matt. 25. 12. Deut 33. 9. Job. 9. 21. Ps. 31. 7. [finis]
¶ 1205. FUTURE STATE We see that God provides some proper good for the satisfaction of the appetites & desires of every living thing. There is no appetite of any beast bird fish insect or animalcule but God has made provision of an answerable good something suitable proportionable & adequate to it. And will he not make provision for the best most rational noble appetites in the world the desires of vertue & love to God Would he so order things that the higher these appetites are the more disappointment men must suffer the more must they must [sic] be crossd which is the case if there be no future state. [finis]
¶ 1206. CHRISTIAN RELIGION. concerning <the FALL> the need of a REVELATION in order to know whether there be <any [c]> FORGIVENESS of sin to obtain [sic] & how far & upon what terms and whether REPENTANCE will be accepted, & what & how far, and to discover an ATTONEMENT. SATISFACTION. The substance of what follows is taken from the preface to the Religion of Jesus Delineated, p. 11 &c-- /p./
¶ All having sin'd and incurred the divine displeasure, it was needful the Philosopher should say, & shew, what hope or expectation he has of the divine favour and forgiveness. For if there be no forgiveness with God, I am afraid there will be no religion. The philosopher's light will be but small, if he can not descry the iniquity & rebellion of human nature against God: and it will I fear be a false light, if it does not descry, that iniquity & rebellion against the infinite God, the Creatour & Preserver of all things is an unmeasurable [sic?] evil and indignity. He must not be an infinite God, as he is confess'd to be, whose displeasure and punitive power is not dreaded, and whose pardon & favour is not most highly valued. If there is no prospect of pardon and reconciliation, despair sure will prevent repentance and consequently religion: as also the wrath of the almighty will blast the soul, & deny the means, or a blessing on the means, that are to lead us to repentance.
¶ We should be pleased have ["have" xo c?] been ["en" xo c] pleased now to hear, what such a rational philosopher has to say, in the discovery and assurance of divine forgiveness. ---- The pardon that is indulged by a mortal prince is an act of grace; much more must the forgiveness of the supreme Governour of the world be so. How then the light of nature or law of reason will assure us of a free, gracious act of the eternal God, let the rationalist judge.
¶ If the light of nature proclaims to the world forgiveness of sin, we should suppose that it is either a total or partial forgiveness. If it is only a partial forgiveness. If it is only a partial forgiveness, then tho we sit under the patience and forbearance of God at present; tho' we enjoy sun and rain & fruitful seasons in this world, we may be sent to fearful punishment in the next, may be remitted to a flaming purgatory, or at least to those low spirited pleasures the poets fancied in their Elisian fields. The territories of the dead will be hung all in darkness. If a total remission be by the philosopher's light opened to us, it will shew us a discharge in due time from the penalty that is inflicted on the body. And a discharge from that will shew us a dismission from the grave. And that dismission will be a resurrection from the dead. Which neither old nor new phisophers [sic] say any thing of. <S [c]> strange there should be so deep a silence, on so important a matter, & so necessary, as remission of sins is in the religion of nature.
¶ And here we should have been glad, to have had the philosopher consider the dismal phaenomenon of death, and to have heard what he would argue concerning it. As whether it were the attendant of innocent nature, or of the guilty only. If of the innocent nature, would the good creatour make pure and honourable vessels so soon to be broke to pieces? If of the guilty only, how long has nature been thus guilty? Is there any history of the world that makes mention of an immortal people? And then how comes it to reign over those that have not actually sinn'd & thereby contracted guilt? How great a part of mankind dies in infancy? And therefore how can they be supposed to have been set in a state of probation?--- If <our [c]> primitive ancestours sinn'd, how comes it that penalty must be produced down to latest posterity? Does natural light shew, that posterity may be punish'd for the transgression of remote ancestours? And if it may & such a visible penalty (with all the forerunners & consequences of it) continually lies upon mankind how shall we be delivered from it? Or must we never be delivered from death & the grave? Does not the philosopher's light here leave him and the darkness call for some supernal revelation? But what religion of nature shall we now have without REMISSION OF SINS.
¶ It will doubtless be said, that it is a man's duty to repent; and that upon REPENTANCE, we may be assured God will pardon the sin & be reconciled. /p./ But this important case should be a little further considered. It may seem rational indeed, to conceive, that an offending creature is obliged to repent of his offence against his great & good Creatour. Repentance may seem his first duty, or the first part of his return to his duty to his God. What can be accepted from an impenitent spirit?
¶ But how does it appear that REPENTANCE must needs obtain a PARDON? or that all the penitent must needs be forgiven? For 1 It will not be said that all temporal governours are obliged in reason and equity, to pardon all the penitent criminals in all their dominions. Just execution may be due to the community. The honour & dignity of the government must be supported. It is supposed, that the divine legislatour himself has forestalled his vicegerents the secular princes, from the pardon of wilful murder. much less will he be obliged by any of our regret & repentance, to pardon that and all other sins of such despicable subjects as we are [xo E?] <are [c]>.
¶ 2. A wise governour would scarce publish a law beforehand, in which he promised pardon and impunity to the most flagrant transgressours of all his laws, in case they should repent. Let us suppose there was once a state of innocency (and there must have been so, as long as we are sure that God made man good), we cannot rationally suppose that man in that state had a law in reason & nature, assuring him, that in case he transgress'd any of the laws or all the laws, he was then under, he should upon his repentance be immediately pardon'd. Such a pardoning law would be the ready way to supplant precedent laws, to make man negligent of his obedience to them, & to enervate the force of any penal sanction added to them, & to enervate the force of any penal sanction added to them. And if the light & law of reason did not, in the state of innocence, promise pardon to future penitent transgressours, how does it do it since? Reason was as clear then, as it is now, and as much Gods law then, as it is now. And the nature and perfections of God would be as much known then as now. It is true, reason does not say, that the penitent shall be equally punish'd with the impenitent. So much duty as is performd in and by repentance, so much guilt will be prevented, which would be contracted by & for the omission of such duty. And thereupon so far as the goodness of God leads us to repentance, it would lead us to a proportionable impunitty. But it does not follow, that the performance of a small part of our duty, must procure the pardon of a great deal of sin. But,
¶ 3. What is this repentance that is supposed to be such an infallible security of the divine forgiveness? Is it a perfect abhorrence of all sin, and a perfect return to God, and to full obedience to him for the future? Were it so, (tho it would not compensate or attone [xo c] for past impiety) yet more might be said in the behalf of it. But since it is an imperfect repentance, proceeding from an imperfect knowledge both of the evil of sin that has been committed, and of God against whom it has been committed; it is but an imperfect duty, and raises us but to an imperfect obedience. And so the repentance itself, and the obedience it leads us to, with [xo c] <will [c]> both stand in need of forgiveness. Now that which it self stands in need of forgiveness, will scarce procure forgiveness for a deal of sin & impiety. May sin & repentance go on forever in a perpetual round? To allow this (says the learn <ed [c]> Dean of Chichester) differs nothing from allowing a liberty and impunity to sin, without repentance; Dise [?] on Prophecy p. 58. At least [best?] to admit that repentance, that must consist with future sin, and to forgive the sins that are intermix'd with repentance, must be the act of sovereign, unobliged clemency & grace /p./
¶ 4. At what time must this repentance begin and commence? If early & in youth, how shall I be assured, that the sins & impenitence of thirty or forty years will be forgiven? Or will a long adjourned late repentance be accepted with God in order to a full forgiveness? How will the religion of nature assure me of that? or has it nothing to say in this case? O how defective will it be! If I have sinn'd fifty years, and have but one [xo c] <one [c]> month to live, will reason assure me, that the repentance of one month, suppose it to be true, will obtain the forgiveness of all the sins of fifty years? What evidence of that? Sure I am it is hard to perswade the sensible conscience, that one notorious sin such as murder, adultery, blasphemy, will upon any repentance be forgiven. Prima est haec ultio, quod se iudice, nemo nocens absolvitur. [Iu.] And I have some reason to suspect that some gentlemen & persons of distinction, that have lived long in impiety, are driven from due thought of repentance and reformation, by a terrified mind that tells them, their sins are too many & too flagrant to be forgiven. And so there is no more to do, think they, but drink on & revel on, and despair & die. But if the light of nature does not assure us, that a late repentance will be accepted to forgiveness, it does not assure us that repentance as such, will be favour'd with such a blessing.
¶ 5. But if we are assured, that forgiveness may upon repentance be some how or other obtain'd, it should be considered, whether that forgiveness must be an absolute, gratuitous one, or must be procured by some sufficient atttonement [xo c] made to the offended majesty
¶ If Forgiveness must be absolute & gratuitous (i.e unobtain'd by propitiation; gratuitous to us it will be, whether so obtaind or no) then,
¶ (1) What meant the numerous expiations & expiatory sacrifices, that were so generally made by mankind? Were they all contradictions to the law of truth? Did they implicitly confess, that God had been offended? That there was some excellency or dignity pertaining to God that must be attoned? that by some bloody propitiation, he is really atoned? And did the law of truth deny all this? Or did the God of truth never give any attestation to the acceptableness of propitiatory sacrifice? And
¶ (2) Is there no perfection in the divine nature, that in case of sin & designed forgiveness of sin, would require an honourary propitiation made thereto? --- It might be proper to consider, what the necessary purity & rectitude of that nature is; what the holiness & justice is, and its contrariety to all moral evil and trupitude. --- It would be useful to enquire, whether there be such a perfection as justice belonging to the divine nature ---The philosopher must sure <ly [c; over E?]> acknowledge, that there is some divine attribute or [as?] perfection that we know not how to call better than by the name of vindictive or punitive justice. Plutarch has his tract De sera [late] numinis vindicta. [line E's; vowel marks by C?] The poet can say, "Raro antecedentem scelostum deseruit [?] pede poena dando [claudo?]." The earth is full of divine judgments or the awful demonstrations of divine justice. Many are cut off in their sins, as if they were not to be forgiven. Many are so punished, as if it were designed that their sins should be read in their punishment. Upon commission of notorious sin, conscience is so terrified that many chuse strangling & death, rather than the horrours of their own mind. Occultum quaticute [??] intus tortore /p./ flagellum. And our author [<E's brack.>the author of the Religion of Nature delineated]<E's> <says [c]> that if it be reasonable, that the transgressours of reason should be punished, they will most certainly one time or other be punished.
¶ (3) Consideration should be had, whether there may not be pertaining to the divine Being, something analogous to what in superiours and persons of eminence, is called sense of honour, which in its regulation is but a due care to act according to a persons proper sphere and dignity. The divine Being cannot but be conscious of his own incomparable perfection and essential glory, of his transcendent dominion & authority, and of the vast obligation he has laid upon all intelligent beings, whose essence and powers he upholds, to regard his law and will. And if in this view of his own incomparable glory, he sees it unmeet and unsuitable to his matchless highness and grandeur, to forgive a world of impiety, idolatry, enmity, blasphemy and all manner of abomination committed against himself, without a suitable vast propitiation; what has the world to say against it? Surely reason or the nature of things has something to say, that the region [xo c; does JE mean "religion"?] <recovery [c]> of guilty nature should be founded on some great & glorious propitiation presented to the majesty of heaven. [finis]
¶ 1207. LORD'S DAY. The Israelites in all their solemn geasts were to remember & praise God for their redemption out of Egypt as [it? A: as] seems [sic] by Ps. 81. 1---7. How much more should Christians commemorate that infinitely greater redemption of Jesus X of which the other was but a shadow by keeping a holy day.
¶ <That the main design of the sabbath is to commorate & celebrate Gods works of mercy [& salvation from enemies] is manifest by the 92 Psalm.> [finis. Last ¶ added after next No. written; is mark at beginning of signif. mark or blurred or xo start on a number?]
¶ 1208. END of the CREATION. GLORY OF GOD Nature of REDEMPTION. SATISFACTION OF X Nature of TRUE VERTUE & RELIGION.
¶ When we are considering with ourselves what it would have been fit & proper for God to have a chief respect to and make his highest end in creating a world (if he did create one) and in establishing a system of intelligent creatures. and what he should have the greatest regard to in his governing the world & regulating things in this created system of intelligence and what they should make their highest end and whom <* Did E mean to xo last 2 words?> & what they should have chief regard to, and what regard or regard to what being or beings should reign in their hearts & have the chief rule & dominion in their behaviour It may help us to judge of this matter with the greater satisfaction & ease, to consider what would be determined by some third being of perfect wisdom (if such an one were possible) different both from the Creatour & the created system not interested in or concerned with either but only occasionally sto<e [probably]>pping in to decide this matter Or if <we> make the supposition thus that perfect & infinite wisdom justice & rectitude were distinct person or being not interested either in the Creatour or his created system any otherwise than only that it was his office to decide or order the<o>se matters between <both> most properly & suitably & to be a kind of umpire between them to determine & settle what is most proper and agreeable [sic] to natural reason and rectitude with respect to /p./ on to another, without partiality without favour or affection to either side. --- Would not such a being or person in such an office in judging of the forementioned matters that he might determine what is most fit & worthy equally view the whole that is the [sic; A: then] before him i.e. the summ of all being the universality of existence as together making one whole consisting of created and creating existence which all together is the whole of what is to be the object of regard. And now in order to determine what sort & what measure of regard each part of this whole is to be the object of or how every individual belonging to this universality or sum total is to share regard or respect of those intelligences that are concerned with this whole that each part may have its proper portion & the portion that it is worthy of & that in the nature of things it is most fit & suitable that it should have & that all things may be most properly adjusted in the most proportionable reasonable & beautiful manner every thing must be weighed in an even balance. And [wwxo] and in adjusting the proper measures & kinds of regard that every part of the summ of existence is to have care must be taken that greater existence or more existence should have a greater share than the less that a greater part of the whole is worthy to be more to be looked [upon (up to? --om.E)] & respected than a lesser part & that in proportion (other things being equal). And that the more excellent is more worthy to be regarded than the less excellent. (<parentheses in pencil> And in adjusting the degree of regard these two things are to be considered conjunctly viz. greatness & goodness or the degree of existence & the degree of excellence). Such an arbiter in considering the system of created beings by it self would determine that the general system consisting of many millions was of greater imprtance and was to have a greater share of regard than only one individivid; [sic] for however considerable some of the individuals might be so that they might be much greater & as it were have a greater share of the sum total of existence than another yet one dont exceed another so much as to be in any measure worthy to be put in the balance with all the rest of the system. And in adjusting the degrees of regard proper for the individuals the degree of the importance & excellence of each must be considered so that the greater & more excellent should have a greater share than the less worthy and [wwxo] and in adjusting the measures of regard due to every part of the sum total of universal existence including the infinite & eternal creatour & lord of all. (<parentesis in pencil> then this supream Being with all in him that is great and considerable and excellent & in any respect worthy is to be as it were put into the balance against the creature against individuals & against the whole system and according as he is found to outweigh in such proportion is he to have a greater share of regard.) And as it would be found in such a case that the whole system of created beings in comparison of him is as the light dust of the balance (which is taken no notice of by him that weighs with the balance (which is taken no notice of by him that weighs with the balance) and is as nothing & [A; xo??] less than ne- vanity so must the arbiter determine with regard to the /p./ regard he must have And as he is infinite & has all possible <existence perfection & excellence so he must have all possible [om. in tran?]> regard as he is every way the first & supream Being & his excellence is in all respects the original excellence the fountain of all good & the supream beuty & glory so he must in all respects have the supream regard as he is God over all & <[at> the Head of all reigning with most absolute dominion over all<]> on whom all are dependent and all perfectly subordinate & subject So it is fit that he should be the object of regard in such a manner that regard to other things must be subject respect to him [must (om.E)] <A:should> reign over all our respect to other things & that our [xo by mistake?] regard to creatures should be universally & perfectly subordinate & subject to our regard to him.
¶ When I speak of the regard proper in this manner to be shared and directed towards different parts of the sum total of intelligent existence I mean regard in general or the regard of the whole not only the regard of individual creatures or of all creatures but the regard of all intelligent existence created & increated. Tis fit it should be thus with respect to the regard of the Creatour as well as the creature For tis as fit that his regard should be proportionable to the worthiness of objects as that the regard of creatures should And thus such an arbiter as I supposed must be supposed to decide the matter as he would decide most properly beutifull & agreeable to truth. Such a judge would determine. And therefore he must determine that all things should proceed accordingly that all that is done & acted by this universality of existence all proceedings managements & conduct through the whole ought to be according to such a rule. that all intelligent creatures should thus make the supream being the object of their supream regard & perfectly subordinate to it their regard to every thing, and consequently that they should make him their supream end in all things (<parenth. in pencil here> & also that the Creatour hims. should supreamly regard himself & act in all things supreamly with regard to himself making himself his supream end, in creating & governing the world and all that he does with respect to the created system.)<in pencil> Such an arbiter as I have supposed as he would decide how things should proceed most fitly according to the nature of things would determine that the whole created system the whole universe including all creatures animate & inanimate should in all its proceedings <[&? D deletes]> or revolutions & changes great & small, that come to pass in it as it were act with & from such an absolutely supream regard to God as its last end that every wheel both great & small of the vast machine should in all their motions move with a constant immutable regard to God as the ultimate end as much as if the whole system were animated & actuated by one common soul that were [sic] possessed of such perfect wisdom & rectitude <or as if such an arbiter as was before supposed being possess'd of such perfect wisdom & rectitude became the common soul of the universe & animated & actuated it in all its proceedings.> Thus such a supream arbiter & director as I have supposed must determine that things should proceed /p./ proceed [sic] as he would determine that things should proceed most beautifully. <See papers on the End of the Creation p. 22,23,24.> [This ref. a later add. in space at end of ¶]
SATISFACION FOR SIN
¶ Now let us consider how such an [xo c] <a perfectly wise, holy & disinterested [c]> arbiter [a superfl. w xo E] whose office it should be to regulate all things within the whole compass of existence according to the most perfect propriety would determine in case the creature should injure the most high, <should [c]> cast contempt on the majesty & trample on the authority of the infinite Lord of the universe whether he would not determine that in such a case that [xo c] the injury should be repaired his majesty vindicated & the sacredness of the authority thoroughly supported. And that it was very requisite in order to things being regulated & disposed most fitly & beautifully that such injuries should not be forgiven in the neglect of this or without due care taken of this matter. ----(<Parenth. in pencil here> If it be fit that Gods [xo c] <the [c]> honour of Gods majesty should be maintain'd at all in any degree (which I suppose none will deny) then why is it not most fit that it should be maintaind fully if it would be quite improper & unsuitable that the dignity of the supream Being the sacredness of the authority of the infinitely great Governour of the world should be entirely neglected should be suffered at all times & to the greatest degree to be trampled on without any care to defend or support it and that the majesty of this great King as to the manifestation of it should be o[b]scured [also Rem] by his enemies to the greatest degree & that continually & forever without any vi[n]dication or reparation at all; then why is it not most suitable & most becoming that the vindication should be thorough & the reparation compleat & perfect?) <Parenth. in pencil here>
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¶ Hitherto I have gone on a supposition of their [sic] being a third person besides the Creatour & the creature a person of perfect discerning & comprehension of understanding & rectitude of disposition not interested or concerned with either the Creatour or the created system only as having it for his office to state the highest propriety fitness & beauty with regard to their concerns one with another & acts on towards another The thing which has been supposed is impossible But the case is nevertheless just the same as to what is most fit & suitable in it self as if there were such an arbiter to state and determine it. And therefore tis as proper for God to act act [sic] according to this greatness fitness and accordingly to give rules to his creatures & make establishments for them and regulate all things in the system of created intelligencies [sic] & with relation to the intercourse between him & them as much as if he were dictated & directed in every thing by such a third person and as much as if such an arbiter were not only the soul of the world but were a common spirit animating the summ total of existence consisting of God and the creatour [sic]. There is no such third person to be umpire in the affair, nor is it possible it should Therefore it is fit that God himself. [sic] (<parenth. in pencil> There is no third being differing from both G. & the world possessed of perfect discerning & rectitude to give rules of propriety to both. Nor can there be any nor is there need of any seeing God himself is possessed of that perfect discerning & rectitude and on this account it belongs to him to be supream arbiter supream lawgiver & that /p./ his own infinite wisdom & rectitude should state all rules & all methods of proceeding & mutual intercourse between him & <the creature)<pencil> there must be some supream arbiter of right fitness & propriety or else tho<e>se things will be liable to fail & not take place in some instances. And if there must be such an one it must be God> it belongs to him And tis proper for him to state all things according to the highest propriety rectitude reason & beauty of things without partiality to other [sic; either?] side and if he should fail he would as it were fail of the business of his proper office.
_________________________________________________________________ ¶ (<parenth. in pencil> Tis not the less belong [sic] to God to act in all these things just as an indifferent perfectly wise arbiter between God & creatures would do because he is as it were interested & is one party concerned.)<pencil> Because a being interested
_________________________________________________________________ ¶ Tho he is not animate [sic] by the spirit of a third person of infinite wisdom & rectitude yet he is animated & directed by a spirit of infinite wisdom & rectitude tho it be his own Spirit & seeing it is a Spirit of infinite wisdom & rectitude does not the less infallibly direct him according to wisdom & rectitude than if it were not his own.
_________________________________________________________________ ¶ unfits one to be a determiner or judge no otherwise than as interest tends either to blind a person & mislead him to think that is most reasonable & suitable which is not or to incline him to act contrary to his judgment But that God should be in danger of either of these is contrary to the supposition for it is supposed that he is possessed of the most absolutely perfect discerning & that supposes that he cant be blinded or misled in his judgment & 'tis also supposed that he is possessed of the most perfect rectitude of heart & that supposes that he can't be inclined to go contrary to his judgment
¶ OBJECTION I. Some may be ready to say that seeing God himself is the supream determiner of all things, who is one party in transactions between him & his creatures it may be proper for him not to determine in every respect as it would be proper for an indifferent being no way interested to do because that would too much limit his generosity. And indifferent third being might fitly determine that tis proper that God should be the supream object of respect that all creatures should make him their supream end & that he should be the supream end of all things to whom the <all [sic]> whole course of nature and the whole frame of the universe in all its motions should have respect & tendency as its last end that this would [be (om.E)] no other than equal & just in it self but yet that it might shew a noble generosity in God when he himself orders & regulates all things to deny himself forego his own right & make the good of his creatures his last end. Seeing it is so that God himself is the supream determinier [sic] in his own cause it would look like selfishness in him in his actions to prefer himself to all other beings [A; -s?]
¶ Ans. I answer such an objection must arise from a very inconsiderate ignorant notion of the vice of selfishness & the vertue of generosity. (<in pencil> If by selfishness be meant a beings <disposition to> regard to [sic] himself this is no otherwise vicious or unsuitable than as <the publick weal> exceeds the value or importance of self compared with others as to created beings one single person must be looked upon as vastly less and so his interest of less importance than the interest of the whole system)<pencil> & therefore /p./ a contracted confined spirit a disposition to prefer self as if that was more than all is exceeding vicious. (<in pencil> And a foregoing one's own interest for the sake of others is no further excellent no further worthy of the name of generosity than it is treating things according to reason)<pencil> and a prosecuting what is worthy to be prosecuted and an expression of a disposition to prefer something to self interest that is more worthy to be valued. (<in pencil> If God be so great & so excellent that all other beings are as nothing to him & all other excellency be as nothing & less than nothing & vanity in comparison of his excellency then /mg/ & God be omniscient & infallible then he knows that he is infinitely the most valuable being & therefore if it is fit that his heart should be agreeable to this infallible all comprehensive understanding this clear & perfect & infinitely bright light then tis suitable that he should value himself infinitely more than his creatures & act accordingly in all his proceedings with respect to his creatures and that he should require an answerable disposition & conduct in his intelligent creatures.)<in pencil> [here an "out" in pencil]
¶ OBJECTION. II. Some may object and say if the case were so that God needed any thing or his happiness could be advanced by the world that he hath made or they could be profitable to him it might be fit that God should make himself or his own interest his highest end in creating & governing the world and it might be proper for his creatures to make him their highest end in what they do. But seeing it is not so but God is above all need & all capacity of being aided to or advances [sic] as to his wellfare or interest therefore it cannot be suitable that God or his creature [so A; -s? mg] should make this their supream end for it would be improper & foolish in either to seek that which cant possibly be obtained and which don't need to be obtained. The highest good that can be brought to pass by any thing that can be done by either God or created beings is the happiness of the creature [-s?] therefore this is properly made the highest end by both.
¶ Ans. 1. Tho it be true Gods happiness is infinite eternal unchangeable and independent, & so can't properly be added to not dor nor [sic] can he be dependent on the creature for it. yet some thing seems to be supposed in the objection (<in pencil> that is not true & that is that God is not happy in any thing that he sees in the creature in what he sees of the creatures qualifications dispositions state & action, or that no part of Gods happiness (to speak of G. according to our manner of conception)<in pencil> God may have a true proper & real delight & so a part of his happiness in seeing the state of the creature in seeing its happy state as he may delight in the exercise of his own goodness & so in gratifying the inclination of his own heart & yet all his happiness be eternal & immutable for he eternally has this disposition & eternally sees & enjoys this future gratification of it as tho' it were present & indeed all things are present to him (<parenth. in pencil> with him is no succession no past & future. And he is inde-/p./pendent in this delight he brings the thing to pass by which he is gratified by his own independent power. And as it is with the creatures happiness so it is with his holiness God really delights in it in the same manner. So it is in God's being glorified his glories shining forth being expressed ex<hi>bited [sic] & communicated This is in it self fit & excellent & therefore God delights in it but as he accomplishes it himself by his independent power so God is independent in this delight ([or)] <in pencil> & that altho the dispositions & voluntary actions of his creatures are made the means of it, yet these are perfectly in Gods hands and disposed of by Gods independent power So that still God is independent on it & as if he sees it perfectly from eternity so his delight in it is eternal & immutable. And if it should here be said that it seems reasonable to suppose that Gods infinite happiness should be in himself that he should be his own infinite happiness should be in himself that he should be his own infinite & alsufficient compleat objective good & that the creature or any of [xo?] <JE prob. started to write "any thing"> its beuty or any thing it does should not be any part of it or be requisite to make the objective happiness full & compleat I answer that ( <pencil> altho God has truly delight in the creatures happiness & holiness yet still his happiness is in himself <For> these are but communications of himself they are wholly beams from this fountain Gods delight in these things is only a delight in his own brightness communicated & reflected and in his own action of communicating which is still to be resolved <N.B. This is a mathematical term.> into a delight in himself. [<E's brackets> See what I have formerly written on this subject].
¶ 2. Let it be considered whether our not being able to profit God is any good evidence that God ought <not> to be supreamly loved and our love to God ought not to be as much as may be answerable to his infinite superiority to all other beings in greatness excellency & the <dependence> subordination of all things on [sic] him & the dependence of all on him. i.e whether love & benevolence to him ought not absolutely to reign in our hearts & all our regard to creatures & all our afections [sic] & actions be subordinate to that (<pencil> If it be so then our not being able to profit God is no argument that we should not make those things that love & benevolence to God most naturally & directly tends to & seeks, our supream end or what we have a supream respect to in what we do from this love)<pencil> indeed tis an inconsistence to suppose otherwise. For doubtless love ought to seek that which love tends to love should seek to gratify it self. love is not fit to be had & cherished any further than it is fit to be gratified the nature of love is a disposition or tendency but that tendency is not to be sought and cherished as excellent which when we have it must be opposed & not allowed of. (<in pencil> therefore if we ought to love God we ought to make what love to God tends to our end.)<in pencil> & [meant to be xo?] under that ratio or in that manner that therein we have respect to God and gratify our regard which is the same thing as to make him our end Love seeks to please & honour the beloved it is averse to his /p./ displeasure & dishonour; & <therein seeks God &> that whatever we think about Gods being added to by anything we can do. Love in seeking to please & honour God seeks God. & if we ought to have supream love to God then we ought supreamly to seek what love to God tends to & that is supreamly to seek God & that is to make God our [end (om.E)] supreamly. & that in whatever way we do this if it be chiefly in shewing kindness to our neighbours yet if this be done chiefly from love to God then herein we make God our highest end. (<in pencil> There is no other way if our regard to God ought to be supreme [sic] we must make him our highest end.<in pencil>)
_________________________________________________________________ ¶ COROL. 1. The things which have been observed shew plainly that a supream regard to the Deity is essential to true vertue. And that those schemes of religion or moral philosophy however well <in some respects> they may treat of benevolence to mankind and many [xo E] other vertues depending on it yet if a supream respect to God and love to him ben't laid in the foundation and all other vertues handled in a connection with this and subordination to it & dependence on it are not true schemes of philosophy but are fundamentally wrong. And whatever other benevolence or generosity towards mankind and other vertues or qualifications which go by that name any are possessed of that are not attended with a love to God which is altogether above them & to which they are subordinate and on which they [are (om.E)] dependent there is nothing of the nature of TRUE VERTUE and RELIGION therein. (<in pencil> And it may be asserted in general that nothing is of the nature of true vertue or religion in which God is not the first & the last,)<pencil) or which with regard to its exercises in general have not their first foundation & source in apprehensions of Gods supream glory & worthiness, & an answerable supream esteem of & love to him & which has not respect to God as the supream end.
¶ COROL. 2. (<in pencil> What has been observed may serve to shew the reasonableness of the doctrine of the SATISFACTION OF X & see the fourth page back. a.b.c that it is most rational to suppose <if [c]> that God did determine to forgive such as had cast contempt on his infinite <majesty [c]> and <on [c]> his authority as the infinitely high Lord over all & to take such into favour infinite <wisdom [xo c]> wisdom would some way or other so contrive the matter that the injury done to the appearance or exhibition of the dignity & sacred authority of the [Rem; this??] great King should be fully repaired & his majesty entirely vindicated & set forth in all <tis its innevitable [xo E]> awfulness inviolable sacredness & worthiness of regard & reverance.
¶ It can't here be reasonably objected that God is not capable of properly receiving any satisfaction for an injury because he is not capable of receiving any benefit <that [c]> a price offered to men satisfies for an injury because it may truly be a price to them or a thing valuable and beneficial but <that [c]> God is not capable of receiving a benefit For God is as capable of receiving satisfaction as he is [xo c] an injury 'Tis true he cant properly to [sic] profited so neither can he be properly hurt. But as /p./ rebelling against him may properly be looked upon as of the nature of an injury or wrong done to God & so God is capable in some proper sense of being the object of injuriousness so he is as capable of being the object of that which is the opposite of injuriousness or of the repairing of an injury. If you say What need <is there that [c]> God have any care for the [xo c] repairing the honour of his majesty when it can do him no good <& [c]> no addition can be made to his happiness by it You might as well say what need <is there that [c]> God care when he is despised dishonoured and his authority & glory trampled on when [xo c] <since [c]> it does him no hurt Tis a vain thing here to pretend that God cares only because it hurts the creatures own happiness for 'em to cast contempt of [sic] G. is that agreeable to the natural light of all mens minds the natural sense of their hearts & the dictates of conscience which unavoidably & necessarily arise after some very direct most profane & daring opposition to & reproach of the most high that God is now angry & much provoked only because the audacious sinner has now greatly hurt himself & hurt his neighbours that happen to see him? No this is entirely diverse & aliene [? "& aliene" om. Rem] from the voice of natural sense in such a case which inevitably suggests that God is provoked as one will regard himself & [xo E?] for himself as having a direct respect to his dignity & majesty. And this is agreeable to the strictest reason Tis impossible if God infinitely loves & honours himself as one infinitely worthy to be loved & esteemed, <but [c (mg.)] that he should from the same principle proportionably [c's y over E's e?] abhor and oppose opposition to himself & contempt of himself And if it <be [c over is xo?]> in its own nature decent & becoming of [xo c] <proper for [c]> him thus to love himself then it is in its own nature fit & becoming in him to hate opposition to himself. And for the same reason & from the same principle God when he is contemn<ed [c]> & injured & his authority & glory <are [c]> trampled in the dust he [xo c] will be disposed to repair the injury done to his honour & raise his injured majesty out of the dust again.
¶ As I observed before tis requisite that there should be some supream arbiter of absolute rectitude & fitness with regard to the sum total of existence that should determine & fix what is most proper to take place in all that is acted or comes to pass with relation to God and the creature otherwise supream fitness & rectitude might be liable to fail & give place to something else & to be justled out of the universality of things & have no place. And tis fit that the supream Being who is first independent & selfexistent & infinitely wise & infinitely & immutably holy & just should be this supream arbiter. (<in pencil> But it is not necessary that this office should belong to each person of the Trinity. Tis most proper that he that is the first person from whom the other two are that he should be the person that should have this office to determine rectitude & propriety for the three persons & for all creatures And consequently nothing is in the way but that one of the other persons should act under him in affairs relating to rectitude between God & the creature as in repairing the honour done to God by the sin & rebell<cd be -ions> of the creature making satisfaction &c-- [finis]
¶ 1209. FUTURE STATE. "There must be a future state otherwise indeed are moral powers and their acquisitions by labour & industry made to very little purpose nay wilfully destroyed in a manner to which we see nothing that bears any likeness or analogy in the whole course of nature To suppose no future state succeeding to this [blot here; over a short word?] is to suppose God to do what no man could do without being limited in power or extremely capricious to lay a noble foundation & not carry on the building, or to sow manure and cultivate meerly to have the pleasure of destroying things in their blossom and when they are near to maturity or when the harvest is at hand God will must [most? om. A] perfect every good work he hath begun. He must therefore compleat the moral building that may be raised upon so goodly a foundation and which as far as it is advanced promises a very perfect superstructure. Shall there be spring in the moral world & no harvest? Surely the work is not finished when moral powers are brought by due culture and variety of discipline and probation to be fit for higher exercises than they could be qualified for before they were come to this maturity & vigour. If it stops here tis a very imperfect work: Nay tis a cruel work, it is a cruel end to such an excellent beginning and an end it in no respect looks like, or threatens --- The same excellent disposition which alone disposed God to create moral beings capable of high improvements to all eternity, and to place them in a first state where their powers might have the properest means & materials of exercise for their improvement must excite him to place them afterwards in a situation suited to their improvements made in this state. We know that a state designed meerly for probation discipline cannot alwaies last. So neither can it in the nature of things for all material things must wax old & wear out But moral powers are of a different kind they do not wear out They must be wilfully destroyed if they cease to be. And can he who is infinite goodness take pleasure in destroying moral powers and in disappointing all their natural hopes & desires ----& knocking down at once all the acquisitions made by them with much patience and suffering with earnest labour & struggling ---- Here the effects of vertue & vice are not fully compleat they cannot be so 'till after a state of trial for in it the effects of trial only can appear & not the full harvest. But effects appear which do indeed promise and excellent harvest effects which are themselves the first fruits or at least the beautiful pleasant blossoms that betoken a joyful harvest to come in its due season. Effects which shew us how happy the vertuous mind may ["nay" inserted by D] must be if after its state of formation & trial it is placed in circumstances for which it is become fit" Turnbull's Xtian Philosophy p. 119, 120, 121.
see further. 1211. [finis]
¶ 1210. LORD'S DAY. THE PERPETUITY of the FOURTH COMMANDMENT. Mr. Turnbull in his Christian Philosophy having cited a passage from Mr. Locke on Education concerning the great importance of the improvement of the understandings of children after having mention'd some reasons why he had quoted it proceeds p. 231, 232, 233, 234. [¶] "And in the next place to give me an opportunity of remarking how much the improvement of our understanding depends upon education and consequently upon the care of society about education. The many beneficial advantages of that close social dependance among mankind of which this is an essential or necessary part are very evident and have been already treated upon All therefore I would now observe on this head is that a state which does not take proper care to put & keep the education of the youth /p./ of the higher ranks in life upon a good foot neglects the most essential thing to the well-being of every private person and of society in general the most essential thing to the end of government if that be publick happiness and when this is not the end and the proper means to it are not carefully pursued a state of government is indeed much worse than a state of nature This needs no proof, for it is indeed with the consent of all thinking men in education that the foundation stones of private & publick happiness private and publick vertue things in their nature absolutely inseparable must be laid according to it will the superstructure be As for those that have time and the means to attain to knowledge in a well-governed state it is indeed a shame for them to want any helps or assistances for the improvement of their understanding that are to be got. Those who by the industry & parts of their ancestours have been set free from the constant drudgery to their backs & bellies others lie under should bestow some of that time which commonly is either very foolishly if not wickedly spent or lies very heavy on their hands in [A; on?] the improvement of their heads & to enlarge their minds with pleasant & useful knowledge ------ But the publick care of education ought to extend yet further and comprehend in it the whole body of the people in such a manner as that not only as that not only [sic] all useful arts & crafts may be understood & brought to perfection but that all even the meanest may have opportunities of being instructed in the principles of virtue and true religion. Now here I cannot but observe, that the one day in seven besides other days of rest allows in the Christian T time enough for this (had they no other idle hours) if they would but make due use of these vacancies from their daily labour and apply themselves with as much diligence to the study of religion as they often do to a great many things that are useless & yet more difficult. This is certainly true provided any care was taken of the common people in their infancy; or those whose sacred business it is to instruct them would take due pains to enter them according to their several capacities into a right way to this knowledge and to assist & encourage them in their endeavours to improve in it. And this shews us what an excellent institution it is by which a convenient portion of time is thus set apart from labour to be dedicated to the improvement of the mind and teachers are appointed for that beneficial end None can chuse but approve such an institution if they have any just sense of the dignity of human nature and of the common unalienable rights & priviledges of mankind and of the chief end of society & government or unless they inhumanly & barbarously as well as impiously think that the bulk of mankind are made to be meer beasts of burden whose understandings ought to be put out as certain Scythians are said to have done the eyes of their slaves or kept in darkness that they may be more tame drudges less apt to rebel because less sensible of bad usage: And that if they are allowed so much as any diversion or respite from labour it should be for the same reason as bells are hung about the necks of pack-horses or mules. Experience shews that the original make of their minds is like that of other men and they would be found not to want understanding fit to receive very useful instruction if they were but a little encouraged and helped in it as they should be by those who in Xtian countreys are employed & maintain'd for that most beneficial noble end" [finis]
¶ 1211. FUTURE STATE. "It becomes the Father of rational beings it is agreeable to his wisdom & goodness to pursue the best methods of promoting vertue for of all his works rational beings are the most excellent & the highest excellency of rational beings is a vertuous temper & right action <* 1211> It therefore highly becomes the universal Father & Governour to make every thing contribute to the increase the promotion the honour & advantage of vertue It must be the noblest exercise of his wisdom & goodness and the greatest benefit to the universe to execute a scheme for forming exercising exhibiting illustrating & rewarding the vertue of all beings according to their several ranks & degrees And if that be the scheme God intends & pursues he will certainly make the promotion of vertue the measure and rule by which he acts in conferring benefits & favours in distributing happiness & misery and consequently vertue must be sufficiently taken care of in all its stages and vice cannot in the ultimate result of things be the gainer the triumpher but must on the contrary be made fully to feel its odiousness to God on account of its intrinsick deformity and guilt its contrariety to the rational nature and its repugnancy to all the noblest exercises of moral powers." Turnbulls Xtian Philos. p. 432. [finis]
¶ * JE began the number here and apparently added the preceding (& highly significant) lines above after the rest had been written. Cp. the 2 starting pts. JE prob. intended to begin at the earlier point in the first place.
¶ 1212. SATISFACTION OF X. Texts taken from Rawlin on Justification which shew that the holiness & justice of God insist on sins being punished Levit. 10. 3. Ps. 11. 6.7. Exod. 34. 7. Job. 34. 10,11. Job. 10. 14. chap. 7. 20. Josh. 24. 19. [finis; added by JE Jr: "(Quote all these)"]
¶ 1213. SATISFACTION OF X Some things which Chubb says about P. 125, 126. "Tho' we should allow that the holiness of God disposes him to hate sin & punish the sinner yet these disposition [sic] dont take from the freedom of Gods will" ---"[xo E?] As to what is said of Gods being obliged in justice to punish sin every being is left free by the laws of common equity & justice to dispose of his own peculiar property as he will and is not accountable to any for the use or non-use the enjoying or not enjoying or disposing of the same." --- "If God is pleased to punish the sinner nothing which the sinner can do for himself or any other do or suffer for him can properly merit his exemption from punishment or give a right to claim his discharge at Gods hand
¶ In p. 130 d.e. As it is unreasonable to suppose that God punishes the sinner for punishments sake to gratify an angry passion so if he should punish the innocent in the guilty's stead this would be so far from retrieving his honour so as to repair the damage done by sin that on the contrary it would add to his dishonour by representing him as unjust & unholy in punishing the innocent & letting the guilty go free. And tho the person suffering should voluntarily offer himself to suffer in the sinners behalf it makes no alteration in the case because such a voluntary offer makes no alteration in the sinner He is as guilty after it as before, and consequently is as much the proper object of punishment as before And the innocent person as he doth not contract the guilt of the other by that voluntary offer he being as innocent as before so that offer cannot make him the proper object of punishment and consequently the suffering of the innocent cannot make satisfaction for the guilty"
¶ P. 131. "Whoever doth that which God is so well pleas'd with as to pardon the sinner for its sake such a one may fitly be esteemed a saviour or redeemer to the sinner." ---- this in a secondary & less proper sense may be called the price of sinners redemption" ---- P. 132 "And so that which is thus pleased to accept may in a secondary & less proper sense be said to merit a sinners redemption /p./
¶ In p. 135, 136. He insists that a sinners pardon is of of [sic] free grace & bounty & therefore can't properly be merited by the death of X and that X did not properly pay our debt because it was his duty to die he did it in obedience to God & so was a debt he himself owed to God
¶ P 139. He supposes that X redeems sinners from thraldom to sin and Satan by his death as Tit. 2. 14. 1 Pet. 1. 18. as his death is a prevailing argument with the sinner to forsake sin as it was an evidence of his divine mission
¶ & in P. 140. That the suffering & death of X are instrumental towards delivering sinners from condemnation as they were an acceptable act of obedience and recommended him so to the Fathers love that he exalted him to his right hand to be an intercessour -- and are an argument with God to pardon believing penitent sinners for Xs sake. Ibid. d.e. He says the scriptures that speak of X as a price a ransom &c-- are figurative as when it is said Isai 43. 3. I gave Egypt for thy ransom [finis]
¶ 1214. SATISFACTION OF X. Tis said that God is not obliged to fulfill his threatnings of punishmt of sin. Not to dispute about the import of the word obliged let [it (om.E)] <be [om.?]> considered whether it is not fit that God should fulfil his threatnings. If any answer no then I would enquire further whether <the [c]> fitness of things don't seem to [xo E] require that God should pay some regard to his threatnings that belong to his law as its sanctions whether seeing [xo E] the law with its sanctions bent published & exhibited as [xo E] that they [xo c] <his subjects [c]> may view it as a rule of proceeding between the Lawgiver & <his [c]> subjects and whether it can <have [c]> the influence intended or indeed any significancy if it bent understood as such in some measure. therefore it [sic] <if [c over "it"]> it bent fit that God should act impertinently & insignificantly it surely <is [c]> fit that some regard should be paid to it [xo c] <the threatning the law [c]> not only by the [?] in the P [prob. xo E] not only in the actions of the subject but also in the proceedings of the Judge And if it be fit that some regard should be paid to it how great a regard If the rule may be set aside and departed upon [xo c] <from [c]> in one instance why not in two and why not in four Where are the limits The threatnings are no further sanctions than they are supposed to be declarations of truth. Therefore is it not fit that <the threatenings of the law should be neglected. [c]> the [there? xo E] truth is a thing that should alwaies attend them in an inviolable manner. If God has reserved to himself the liberty to depart from the rule at his pleasure without any signification beforehand or any reason given to determine what his pleasure will be then how can the subject know but that he will alwaies depart from it [finis]
¶ <Actually for E G. does depart fr the inviolable rule of enforcemt. of sanctions in that the elect are selected for grace faith. But this is made rational for the elect by the doct. of satisfaction (and by "inherency" treatments a faith & perseverence) wh. is one reason it is defended so fiercely. The Calvinist pushed the arbitrarings further back, to the pretemporal election; the arminian preferred to leave is at the point of forgiveness>
¶ 1215. Concerning the declaration or manifestation which God made of his mind to Adam concerning the rule of his duty to God & what [God (om. E; mg)] expected of him enforced with threatnings of his displeasure in case of a violation of that rule & promises of his favour in case of a compliance <especially Adams consent being supposed> I say as to this being called a COVENANT we have this to warrant us in it that it is agreeable to the sense in which the Scripture uses the word covenant every where. That there was a promise of favour in case of compliance as well as a threatning of wrath in case of disobedience we have all manner of reason to suppose from the nature of the thing, and from what we read about the tree of life and from what the Apostle says Rom 7. 10 <see also Rom 10. 5. & Rev. 22. 14.> of the commandments being ordained to life [<E's brackets.> see 1074. B. 7.]<E's brackets> The consent of mankind is no more express to the cov. of grace under the gospel than Adams consent before the fall Adams consent before he fell must be supposed for his dissent wou[l]d have been sin Which to suppose before he sin'd is a contradiction. [finis]
¶ 1216. INCARNATION SATISFACTION & RIGHTEOUSNESS OF X. "Sponsori nostro id incumbeant praestandum quod lex a nobis exigit ut illius impleatur Rom VIII. 4. Nosque juxta antiquam conventionem servemur. Legi autem hominibus latae nisi per hominem /p./ satisfieri non potest: neque quoad precepta, quae [?] spiritum & animam & corpus sancta servari ac Deo impendi postulant, neque quoad comminationes, quibus & corpori & animae sua mors indicitur. Unde necess est, sponsorem nostrum vere hominem esse, ut corpore atque anima, omnem justitian impleat Mat. III. 15 Et utriusque mors subita, suos a morte vindicet, Heb. II. 14. Hinc est quod Apostolus individuo nexo haec duo copulet Factus ex mulieri, & factus sub lege Gal. 4. 4. IV. 4. Indicans proximum incarnationis Christi finem esse, ut in natura sua humana illi subjiciatur legi quae homini primum lata est. Witsii, in Symbol. Exercitat. 14. Sect. 30, 31. quoted by Rawlin on Justification. p. 84, 85. [finis]
¶ 1217. SATISFACTION OF X. "Rom 3. 25. 26. "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation thru' faith in his blood to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past that he might be just & the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus. ---To declare his righteousness the rectitude of his nature or his punitive justice So the word properly signifies and in this sense is frequently used see 2 Thes. 1. 5,6. 2 Tim. 4. 8. Rev. 15. 5,6,7. & 19. 2. Grotius to evade the force of this text in favour of the doctrine of Christs satisfaction would have it translated goodness, or bounty and in support of this refers to several passages where the word is so rendered by the LXX which as we deny not says Dr. Owen that in some places in the Old Testam<t> where it is used by the LXX it doth or may do so so we say here that sense can have no place which is no where is [sic] direct & proper. For the thing intended by it in that sense is expressed before, " [<brack. is in MS> in the foregoing verse <brack. is in MS>] "in those words freely by his grace and is not consistent with that that follows that he may be just which represents God as he is, a just Judge" Rawlin on Justif. p. 94 95 Mr. Locke has offered another exposition of these words and by the righteousness here spoken of understands the righteousness of God in keeping his word with the nation of the Jews notwithstanding their provocations or as he explains it more fully in his Notes on v. 5. to which he refers God's faithfulness in keeping his promise of saving believers Gentiles as well as Jews, by righteousness through faith in Jesus X. But this seems to be as ill supported as that of Grotius. For I cannot find one single passage in the whole N. Testament where is used in that sense. Most certainly it is used in a very different sense in this context v. 21, 23. & throughout this epistle where it alwaies signifies either the righteousness by which we are justified or that perfection of God which makes such righteousness necessary to our justification In the former sense it is used chap. 9. 30,31 & chap. 10. 4. and both these senses seem to have place chap. 10. 3. where the word is used twice in one verse And as to the sense which it bears in the 5 v of the 3d chap. which is the only passage Mr. Locke refers to in support of his opinion tis evidently to be understood there of the justice of God that perfection which is manifested and displayed in punishing the sin & unrighteousness of men: the sense it likewise bears in the text under consideration Not to add that the Apostle speaks here of the remission of the sins of particular persons even of all that died in faith under the dispensation of the Old T. and not of the remission of the sins of the Jews nationally considered as Mr. Locke is obliged to understand it consistently with the sense of the text. Compare Heb. IX 15. Rawlin on Justif. p. 94, 95
¶ Again Ibid. p. 104. 105. "It were (as an excellent writer has express'd it) manifestly more honourable and worthy of God, not to have exacted any recompense at all, than to have accepted, in the name of a sacrifice, such as were unproportionable, & beneath the value of what was to be remitted & confer'd. What had been lower must have been infinitely lower. let any thing be supposed less than God, and it falls immensely short of him, such is the /p./ distance between created being & uncreated, that the former is as nothing to the latter. And therefore bring the honour & majesty of the Deity to any thing less than an equal value, and you bring it to nothing. And this had been quite to lose the design of insistence upon a recompence: it had been to make the majesty of heaven cheap, and depreciate the dignity of the divine government instead of rendring it august & great." <Rawlin on Satisfaction p. 104, 105.> [finis; reference (incorrect) at end added by Jr.]