¶1134. HEAVEN the everlasting abode of the chh.][E's] That the saints shall enter into heaven after the day of judgment & not continue with X here below is evident by Joh. 14. 2,3. In my Fathers house are many mansions -----I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go to prepare a place for you I will come again & receive you unto my self that where I am there ye may be also. Doubtless these words I will come again & receive you to my self that where I am & c-- will be most eminently fulfilled at X second coming at the end of the world that second coming spoken of Heb. 9. last v. -- & when it is said he will receive them to himself to be where he is tis evidently meant to he must be understood to the place to which I am now go [-ing, or am gone? TS] to that house of my Father to which I am ascended in which I am going to prepare a place for you. at my second coming I will receive to those mansions that I now go to prepare in my Fathers house
¶`Tis also evident by Heb. 6. 20. whether [sic] the Forerunner is for us entred ---- Tis evident that X went to the highest heavens the third heaven far above all heavens at his first ascension as the forerunner of his people implying that they shall all go there in their turn or after him & doubtless in this he was the Forerunner of them with respect to their reception of their proper reward or their compleat happiness which will not be till the last day & their forerunner as to a bodily ascension or translation wherein the saints bodies shall be made like to Xs glorious body & shall ascend as that did But they will not have glorified bodies till then & he is doubtless the forerunner of the whole church in going to heaven which he would not be if after the day of judgment the saints were to stay here below for those which shall then be found alive in such a case never would ascend into heaven at all & then `tis most reasonable to suppose that X will be the first fruits in his ascension in like manner as in his resurrection but X is the first fruits in his resurrection with regard to what the saints shall be the subjects of at the second coming of X 1 Cor 15. 23. X the first fruits afterward [sic?] they that are Xs at his coming [finis]
¶1135. FUTURE STATE. The most eminent excercises & manifestations of vertue are undoubtedly those that are attended with the greatest self denial But if there be no future state such vertue as this will be furthest from a reward When men in this world deny themselves most in their course of vertue they would be the greatest losers for by the supposition they fare hardest at present otherwise they would not go most contrary to their present ease pleasure or interest and so would not deny themselves most. [finis]
¶1136. INFINITE EVIL OF SIN. The following is taken from Dr. Manton in the 5 vol. of his sermons p. 411. "There is this difference between sin & obedience that the heinousness of sin is alwaies aggravated and heighten'd by the proportion of the object But the merit & value of obedience is still lessen'd The sin or offence is aggravated as to strike an officer is more than to strike a private man, a king more than an ordinary officer. Thence it cometh to pass that sin committed against God doth deserve an infinite punishment because the majesty of God is infinite & so eternal death is the wages of sin . But on the other side the value or merit of obedience is lessen'd . The greater God is & the more glorious his Being the greater obligation lieth upon us to love & serve him And the good which we do for his sake being wholly due to him, God is not bound by any right or justice, from the merit of the action it self to reward it For here the greatness of the Object lesseneth the action or respect thereby performed to it Luke 17. 10. For the creature oweth it self to God, who made it & enabled it to do that it can do so that he is not bound to reward it out of his natural justice, but inclined to do it out of his own goodness & bound to do it by his free promise & gracious covenant".
¶1137. HAPPINESS OF HEAVEN. When God had finished the work of creation he is represented as resting & being refreshed and rejoycing in his works. The Apostle compares the happiness Christ entered into after he had finished his labours & sufferings in the work of redemption to this. Heb. 4. 4,10. Therefore we may well suppose that very much of Christs happiness in heaven consists in beholding the glory of God appearing in the work of redemption & so in rejoycing in his own work & reaping the sweet fruit of it the glorious success of it which was the joy that was set before him. And as the Apostle represents the future happiness of the saints by a participation of Gods rest and Christs rest from their works Heb. 4. 4----11 (see note on Heb. 4. 5. p. 857 of the Blank Bible . [)] This seems to argue two things viz 1. that the way that the saints will be happy in the beholding the glory of God will be very much in beholding the glory of his perfections in his works 2. That the happiness of the saints in heaven especially since Xs ascension consisting in beholding Gods /p. 124/ glory, will consist very much in seeing his glory in the work of redemption. The happiness of departed saints under the old Testament consisted much in the beholding the glory of God in the works of creation in the beholding which the morning stars sang together & all the sons of God shouted for joy But their happiness since Christs ascension consists much more in beholding the glory of God in the work of redemption since that the old creation in comparison of this is no more mentiond nor comes into mind but they will be glad & rejoyce forever in this work.
¶The beautifical vision of God in heaven consists mostly in beholding the glory of God in the face of Jesus X. either in his work or in his person as appearing in the glorified human nature. PROGRESS OF THE WORK OF REDEMPTION. [finis]
¶1138. REASONS to think, that the graciouus SINCERITY of our neighbours is a thing which as to it's certain knowledge is altogether UNSEARCHABLE BY MEN.
¶That the devil seeks to destroy men and bring em to final apostacy after their conversion . as he did Peter
¶That it [is (om.E)] so often spoken of as a high prerogative of God to search the heart with respect ot this matter.
¶That some that have been reckond among the most eminent by the church of God in a very enlightend state have proved apostates as Nicolas the deacon
¶That the Apostle commands that a novice or new convert should not be made a bishop lest being lifted up with pride he should fall into the condemnation of the devil. i.e through pride should prove an apostate
¶That it is so much spoken of as so great a work of God to try men & prove whether they are indeed sincere in his dealings with them & so great & high an act of his /mg/ act of the Judge of the world at the last day to make men manifest by their works
¶That God himself speaking of himself after the manner of men (i.e doubtless after the manner of wise & good men) speaks of himself as trusting the profession and appearance of hypocrites & being deceived thereby
¶That the falling away of false professours is so often in Ezekiel called the falling of righteous men from their righteousness . They are called righteous men just in the same manner as true saints are [finis]
¶1139. TYPES That some things in the Old Testament are types of gospel things, and so are intended for our instruction, which are no where explained in the xxx<New> [ed] Testament is evident by Heb. IX. 4,5, "Which had the golden censer, and the ark of the convenant overlaid round about with gold, wherein was the golden pot that had manna, and Aaron's rod that budded, and the tables of the covenant; and over it the cherubims [xo ed] of glory shadowing the mercy seat; of which (or of which things) we cannot [now (mto)] speak particularly: i.e we cannot /540/ now particularly explain what gospel and heavenly things they signified (see v. 8, 9, 23, 24. In like manner as he had said before' Chap. V. 10, 11, "Called of God an high priest after the order of Melchisedec. [sic] Of whom we have many things to say, and hard to be uttered, seeing ye are dull of hearing." [finis]
[c 144 words]
No copy; no "out"--but this could have been cut off; see MS book. Transcribed from Coblentz Ms (Xerox) 9/6/73
¶1140. END OF THE CREATION &c. GLORY OF GOD. The main argument that may modern divines [use?] against God's making his own glory his last end in his works comes only to this that God is selfsufficient & infinitely happy in himself and therefore cant be gratified in the creatures beholding and admiring his glory and loving & honouring him for it because to be gratified or take any pleasure in this would argue that he recieves an accession of happiness but infinite & allsufficient happiness can receive no accesssion . But this argument is not particularly not properly against Gods being gratified or taking pleasure in being glorified amongst his creatures as against his being gratified or taking pleasure in any thing whatsoever pertaining to the creature and is as much an argument against his taking pleasure in the happiness of his /p.[126]/ creatures or in seeing his creatures happy as his taking pleasure in their beholding his glory & glorifying him for it . when indeed if the matter by justly considered and explain'd the supposing of neither of these argues any insuffiency or need in God he dont take pleasure in either of them because he receives any thing from the creature, but because he takes pleasure in what is worthy & eligible in it self considered He delights in communications of his own happiness because tis a thing valuable & desireable in it self that some communications of his happiness should be made and enjoyed so he takes pleasure in his glories being manifested & respected because this is a thing fit & amible in it self that his glory should be manifested & respected. [finis] [Apparently no line in left mg. One on recto could have been cut off, but none in verso margin (intact)]
¶1140. [This MS page is missing from the original, and does not survive in the Andover copies. It began about p. 125 b; and unless No. 1141 (also missing from original and Andover) was very short, was probably contained on p. 125. The Index may show what the subject was, as also any information which can be gained about the contents of the missing Andover pages.]
¶1141. [Missing from both original MS and from Andover copies. Since the rest of the numbers missing from this leaf are not sufficient to fill a page, No. 1141 either started on or at least extended into p. [126]. See note on 1140.] [this number is not entered in JE's index-TS]
Transcribed from the Coblentx MS Xerox 9/7/73 "out"
¶1142. <See No. 1066 B. 5 & 1082. B. 7.> GLORY OF GOD END of the Creation. That glory of God that is spoken of in Scripture as the end of Gods works, is the egress & reception of Gods fulness the egress of it from God & the reception of it by the creature : The fulness of God is twofold tis his excellency & his happiness Answerable hereto there is a twofold faculty in the creature that the egress has respect to and which is its recipient subject viz <the understanding & the will> a faculty of perceiving <enjoying> & of approving . a twofold manner of egress or going forth viz manifestation & communication.
¶There are three things called by the name of glory in SS. excellency, goodness & happiness. [finis]
¶1142. GLORY OF GOD END OF CREATION. That glory of God that is spoken of in scripture as the end of Gods works' is [xo ed] <includes[ed] E> the egress and [xo ed] <or going forth of it & the [ed]> reception<R> of it by the creature. The fulness of God is twofold<:>[D], it is his excellency<E>; and his happiness<H>, answerable hereto<.> there<T> is a twofold faculty in the creature' that [xo ed] <to which [ed]> the egress has respect' to, [xo ed] and which is its recipient subject, viz. a faculty of perceiving<P> <;> and <a faculty [ed]> of approving<A><;> <& [ed]> a twofold manner of egress, or going forth, viz. manifestation<M> and communication<C>.
¶There are three things called by the name of glory<G> in scripure<:> excellency<E><,> goodness<G><,> and happiness<H><.> [finis] [This No. contains 100 words.]
Transcribed from Coblentz MS (Xerox), 9/7/73 "out"
¶1143. CONVICTION. PREPARATORY WORK. There is very commonly that difference between such souls as are of the generation of the upright and born & brought up in thoroughly religious families & others as to the new birth that may be compared to the difference which was between the Hebrew women & the Egyptian women with respect to their travail in the natural birth of their children. [finis]
¶1143. CONVICTION. PREPARATORY WORK. There is very commonly that difference between such souls [xo ed] <persons>[ed] as are of <the [ed]> of [xo ed] generation of the upright, and born and brought up in thoroughly religious families, and others<,> as to the new birth,<;> or that [xo ed] <which [ed]> may be compared to the difference<,> which was between the Hebrew women and the Egyptian women with respect to their travail in the natural birth of their children. [finis] [c. 65 words]
Transcribed from Xerox of Coblentz MS 9/7/73. "out"
¶1144. INSPIRATION PROPHECY. That the prophets after they had once had intercourse with God by immediate revelation from God gain'd acquaintance with [him (om.E)], so as afterwards to know him to as it were to know his voice or know what was indeed a revelation from God is confirmed by 1. Sam. 3. 7. [finis] [end of MS p. (126)]
¶1144. INSPIRATION. PROPHECY. That the prophets<,> after they had once had intercourse with God by immediate revelation from God<,> gained acquaintance with <him, [ed]> so as afterwards to know him<;> as it were to know his voice, or know what was indeed a revelation from God<;> is confirmed by 1. Sam. III. 7, "Now Samuel did not yet know the Lord, neither was the word of the Lord yet revealed unto him." [finis] [c 65 words.]
¶1145 SATISFACTION OF CHRIST. Xs knowing his own infinite dignity & glory, & having it in view in the time of his humiliation, is mention'd as a circumstance that is important & of great consequence, in that humiliation; Joh. 13. 3,4. [finis]
¶1146. Xs RIGHTEOUSNESS OBEDIENCE SUFFERINGS. Christ speaks of his obedience as chiefly consisting in his voluntary undergoing his last sufferings & as a great manifestation of his love to the Father & the end of his sufferings being his openly honouring God by such a manifestation of his love in Joh. 14. 30,31. Hereafter I will not talk much with you for the prince of this ' cometh & hath nothing in me but that the world may know that I love the Father and as the Father gave me commandment even so I do. [finis]
¶1147 MORAL EVIL consisting in something negative. ORIGINAL sin. Because moral evil consists in what is negative therefore it is often called in Scripture by the name of vanity or emptiness & that good which is opposite to it is called fulness. See note on Gen. 1, 2. & Eph. 3. 19. [finis]
¶1148. ABOLISHING THE CEREMONIAL LAW. `Tis very manifest that if the state & circumstances of Gods people were so altered that the institutions of Mossaic [sic] law did not agree thereto but it was necessary that they should be altered to accommodate their circumstances this was a proper occasion for setting aside those laws and particularly if there were need of this to accommodate the multitude of worshippers & the services they had to offer This appears from what Solomon did that we have an account of 1 Kings 8. 64 The same day did the king hallow the middle of the court that was before the house of the Lord for there he offered burnt offerings & meat offerings and the fat of the peace offerings because the brazen altar that was before the Lord was too little to receive the burnt offerings & meat offerings & the fat of the peace offerings. It was strictly enjoin'd in the law of Moses that the people should offer their sacrifices only on the altar of the Lord that was before the sanctuary Exod 20. 24,25 and from time to time it is commanded that the sacrifices should be offered on the altar <& the offering sacrifice any where else is threatn'd even with cutting off from among their people Levit. 17. 8,9.> And how jealous were the children of Isarael when they supposed that the two tribes & half [sic] had built another altar for sacrifice besides the altar of the Lord . But yet when there was occasion by reason of the multitude of people & of sacrifices another place is made use of & that just after the altar had been built vastly larger than that which had been used before & what Solomon did then was attended with all manner of tokens of the divine acceptance See the history 1 K. chap. 8. 2 Chron. Chap. 6&7.
¶And this law of offering sacrifices only on that altar was also often set aside on other occasions by Gods special direction to offer sacrifices elsewhere for instance the altar that Joshua built at Mt Ebal Josh 8. 30 & the altar that Gideon built & the sacrifices he offered upon it Judg. 13. 19, 20. & the altar that Elijah built 1 K. 18. 30 &c-
¶See Bp. Kidders Dem. Part 3. p. 3--------27.
¶Samuels wearing a linnen ephod and officiating as a priest who tho a Levite was not of the posterity of Aaron was a departing from the ceremonial law so his offering a sucking lamb 1 Sam. 7. 9.
---------------------------
¶Add this at B. 5. N. 127. [sic; 1027] p. 5. d. ][E's] The ceremonial law made provision for the inconvenience of the distance even of the inhabitants of that land from the sanctuary Deut. 12. 15,21,22. & chap. 14. 24. [finis; "See Bp. Kidders" &c--- are later in much fainter ink.]
[N.B. It is possible that JE left, or meant to leave, p. 128 and perhaps more blank for additions; but if so, he filled them shortly thereafter; the adds at end seem somewhat concious of shortness of space, esp. last.]
¶1149 [Check Index to see if there is any evidence of there having been a No. 1149. If there was, in all probability it began missing page 132. The amount of text missing from the leaf 131-132 in No. 1150 (c. 1+ MS pp.) suggests that 1149 was was <probably about 1 or 1+> MS page long. [TS has note below concerning misc. numbers]
¶[It is doubtful that E intended to<1> leave 4 full pp. blank for additions to No. 1148; if so, he changed his mind before he finished No. 1150. The position of 1149 is <probably> accounted for on the theory that JE, knowing that he had finished a recto page, intended to start on the next verso, but accidentally turned two leaves too many. See note on No. 1150.]
[1150.]
¶add this at the bottom of the next p. but one][E's] 4. The revelation or promise that was made to him that was improved as the instrument in working a miracle & that he had to depend on was a conditional promise or declaration. suspended on certain acts of his . if it were suspended on no acts of his then he would not be in any respect an instrument in it for therein does his instrumentality lie viz in the connection of the event on his acts . These acts of the instrument that were the the cense the promise was suspended on were twofold First inward or the act of the mind . which was in the exercise of dependence [sic] on Gods sufficiency & faithfulness Secondly those outward acts that he was to perform in signification of those<e> acts of the mind such as prayer or certain words to be spoken as those of Peter Act. 3. 6. In the name of Jesus X rise up & walk or actions to be performed as laying hands on the sick anointing with oil &c-----
¶5. As the faith of miracles was no different sort of faith from other faith (tho' the revelation it relied on was different) so it has the same distictions as other faith or faith in other revelations has . as there is a special or spiritual & common faith in the revelation that God has made of himself in the gospel to mankind in general so there was a spiritual & a common faith of miracles or in those particular revelations or significations of Gods mind made to the persons that were called to work miracles a person might have the latter to a high & not the former & God was pleased sometimes to succeed a common faith so as to cause the miracle to ensue Thus a man might have faith so as to remove mountains & yet have no charity.
¶6. Inasmuch as the faith of miracles was not properly any different sort of faith from other faith . so the faith of miracles was not it self properly miraculous or what was wrought in any more extraordinary manner than other faith (at least it was not alwaies so) Hence the faith of miracles was as much the duty of the person called to work miracles as any other faith & when they faild of it they greatly sin'd Hence X. blames his disciples for want of faith when they could not cure the demoniack brought to `em while he was in the mt of transfiguration. & hence God was angry with Moses for his want of faith in working that miracle of bringing water out of the rock.
-----------------------------------------------------------------¶Not that I suppose that there was any proper promise made of such success to only a common faith but God was often pleased to reward this common faith with such success [sic] This honour & priviledge of being instruments of working miracles being but a common blessing & not one of those things that belong to or accompany salvation . God therefore rewarded this common fiath as he is wont often to reward other common graces & moral vertues with temporal & common rewards & the common faith of many was succeeded to work miracles in a course for a long time and it may be sometimes as long as life lasted but yet this success was uncertain God was not obliged to bestow `em as it is with all [? A: such] kind of ["of" xo by mistake] benefits that are not secured by the promises of the covenant of grace & are not some of the sure mercies of David. That in Math 21,22, & other parallel prpomises are not made to any thing but to a true spiritual faith & prayer. /p. 129/
-----------------------------------------------------------------¶add this at the bottom of the next p. but one][E's] But to make use of rational intelligent creatures as instruments in a manner agreable to their intelligent nature is to make a proper use of their intelligent faculties in the affair but the use of the the use that is made of their intelligent voluntary faculties cant by [sic] as [sic] producing the miracle through the efficiency of those faculties or being employed themselves to produce [it (om.E)] therefore it can be nothing else than as imployed in looking to acknowledging & depending on that being by whose power & will the miracle is indeed wrought
¶God sometimes made use of brute creatures as instruments to do his work so he made use of the two she bears to punish the children that mocked Elisha sometimes he makes use of things without life so he made use of the stones he sent down from heaven to destroy the Amorites but it is not thus that he makes use of intelligent voluntary spiritual creatures or human souls or minds to work miracles indeed they cannot properly & in strictness of speech be instruments at all for a miracle is wrought by the immediate power of God What they do has really no proper efficiency at all in the case as tools have that men work with Their acts are truly no more than circumstances of the miracle it pleases God for wise ends to work the miracle with such acts of theirs as the antecedent & concomitant circumstances & appendages of the work . But the acts of those human minds or intelligent beings that God is pleased to make to be the antecedent & attending circumstances of the work are proper exercises of understanding & will towards him as the author of the miracle But these are the same as acts of faith in him. Created minds can be made use of as the instruments of miracles in no higher sense than that God should annex the miracle to proper acts of those minds towards him as the author so that the mind shall as it were go to God for the effect and bring it down from him.
¶Because it is so suitable and requisite that men that God makes use [of (om.E)] in working miracles should in order to it, act faith in God as the Author of the miracle Hence the prayer of those that were [made (om.E)] use of, to God, for the miracle wrought so commonly preceded the miracle for prayer is only the expression of faith. & hence Christ when he encouraged his disciples to act faith in God in order to their working miracles he from time to time told `em that whatsoever they should ask of God believing they should receive.
¶But in order clearly to understand the nature of the faith of miracles the following things may be noted.
¶1. It was with the faith of miracles as it was with other faith in this respect that it implied a conviction & satisfaction of mind concerning the divine sufficiency & faithfulness /p. 130/ in general i.e. a full & satisfying conviction that God is able to do whatsoever he pleases & that he is immutably true in all that he promises or reveals & also a dependence on a revelation or signification God has given of his mind with respect to that particular thing that God is depended upon for
¶2. The revelation or signification of Gods mind that the prophets apostles & others depended [on (om.E)] in working miracles was either express or only implicit oftentimes before the miracle wrought when God called the person to be made use of to perform such and such acts he did at the same time expressly declare than [sic] on the performance of them such & such a miracle should ensue So it was with many of the miracles of Moses & Joshua and with respect to many of the miracles of the prophets & apostles that are recorded in Scripture where /mg/ is no express mention of an express promise or revelation made by God beforehand that on their performing such acts the miracle should ensue yet there [is (om.E)] all reason to think that this was indeed the case that the persons improved had an inward intimation of the mind of God or what God would do by inspiration or by the word of the Lords coming to `em (as the expression often is in SS) which intimation it was their duty fully to rely upon not doubting in the least but that God would verify his word in doing the work revealed however strange it appeared tho it were as wonderful as a mountains removing from its antient base into the midst of the sea or bringing water out of a rock to have the least hesitancy of faith in such a case would be a great sin as it was in Moses at the waters of Meribah
¶Sometimes tis probable the revelation was not express but only implicit the revelation was not in the form of an express promise or declaration that God would on their performing such acts produce such a miracle but it was only a signification of Gods will by revelation in the manner of a command or direction to go and perform such and such actions or speak such words in order to such a miracle following which implied in it a promise that if they did so in an acknowledgment of his sufficiency & faithfulness & dependence thereon the miracle should follow . In such a case it was their duty without hesitation or doubting to go & perform the acts required tho it were never so publickly, & tho' they pawn'd all their credit on the success of their attempt
¶3. The revelation that the persons improved acted faith in, might be either particular or only general . God oftentimes by some particular revelation directed the prophets to go & do such & such things in a dependance on him in order to such a particluar miracles being wrought with a promise either express or implicit or <[sic]> his concurring almighty power . Or it might be only general as when X sent forth his disciples to work such & such miracles on all proper occasions for the confirming of their doctorine which is all the express command that need to be supposed The Spirit of wisdom guiding of them with respect to proper occasions This was implicitly promised to the apostles when he sent `em forth before his passion but especially when they were sent forth after his resurrection . These things together were equivalent to a particular & express revelation with respect to each particular miracle affording an equal foundation & obligation for faith in God with respect to all miracles they were called to work [[E's] See further last p. but one . [finis]
¶[For what probably happened, see note on No. 1149. <and my page of analysis of problem> The probable order of the MS pp. is as follows: Begun at <1151 & 1152 also on p. 132 of on 132, must have been in ?? TS> top of p. 131; then pp. 131, 129, 130, 128; number ends at bottom of p. 128. The first part of the number i.e. on pp. 132 (?) and 131, survive only in the Andover copy.]
ANDOVER COPIES, pp.1153-1160
¶1150. The Faith of Miracles <Title; period by ed> Was not properly a distinct sort of faith from other faith. I can see no reason from the scripture to imagine so<.> the<T> particular revelation<,> that was the ground of it, was different<.> promises<P>, or revelations<,> made to different persons may be different<;> but it does not necessarily follow that the faith by which these different revelations are believed, or relied on are therefore different revelations are believed, or relied on are therefore different sorts of faith God made They were [xo ed or c] many different revelations that were the grounds of the faith mentioned in the various parts of the XI Hebrews<.> it<I> is one revelation that we have, that the worlds were made by the word of God, that <on which>[ed] that faith depends <,> on [xo ed] spoken of verse 3. The revelation that the world should be destroyed by a flood<,> and that Noah should be saved in an ark<; on which>[ed] that Noah's faith relied<,> on was another revelation. And the revelation made to Abraham that God would make him a great nation, and that all the families of the earth should be blessed in him<;> that <on which>[ed] his faith relied<,> on was another revelation<.> and the<T> revelation<,> that Jacob <Isaac> had concerning <Jacob's & [ed]> Esau's posterity<,> by which he blessed him <them[ed]> concerning things to come<,> was a different revelation<.> and<A> that faith<,> by which the walls of Jerrico [sic] fell down, that was in another revelation<.> but<B> because these revelations<,> relied on by the various examples of faith mentioned in this Chapter <were different,> [ed] is [sic] does not therefore follow that each one had a different sort of faith.
¶The faith of miracles, was a faith in a revelation<,> made by God to the person that <of whom>[ed] God made use of in working the miracle<.> God evermore gave some intimation of his mind and will to the person that <who>[ed] was called to act as the instrument. Neither Moses<,> nor Joshua, nor Elijah, nor any of the prophets<,> pretended to work miracles of their own hands<,> what they pleased, and when they pleased<.> it<I> was only what /1154/ God pleased, and when he pleased.
¶Moses says<,> Numb XVIII. 28<16.28>, "Hereby ye shall know that the Lord hath put me to do all these works, for I have not done them of mine own mind." And Elijah says<,> I<1> Kings XVIII. 36<18.36><,> "Let it be known<,> this day<,> that thou art God in Israel, and that I am thy servant, and that I have done all these things at thy word." These are the two chief of the old Testament prophets for working of miracles.
¶And therefore it was every way fit, and suitable, and necessary, that the person<,> that<whom>[ed] God so much honoured<,> as to make use of him as the instrument of working the miracle<,> should therein act with a respect to God as the author [sic] of the miracle, as the being that wrought by his own power and sufficiency, and of his own will<.> but<B> for the instrument<,> thus<,> in what he does in the affair<,> to have respect to God as the author of the miracle, as working it by his own will and power<,> is the same thing as to act in faith in God<,> or in a dependence on his power and sufficiency and <on>[ed] some revelation or signification of his mind and will. Seeing the instrument is really nothing in the affair, but the work truly is wholly God's, and the instrument a meer<re> instrument<,> without any power or will of his own in the case; hence it is suitable and highly requisite that he should act as in the name of the Lord<.> it<I> is requisite that he should do so visibly, and not take upon him to work miracles as of his own power and authority<,> as Christ did<.> and<A> since God sees the heart, and looks at that, it is requisite that he should not only visibly act as in the name of the Lord, but really and /1155/ internally<,> in the act of his mind. But this is the same thing as to act in faith in God, and in a dependence on him<.> otherwise<O> he does not really act in his name, but in his own name<;> he does not worship God in working the miracle, but makes a God of himself.
¶God is pleased often to make use of men<,> as instruments in working miracles; but<,> when he makes use of intelligent voluntary agents in such an affair<,> he will use them in a manner that is agreeable to their nature, not as senseless lifeless instruments.<"see further last p one at top"[in original]"
¶But to make use of rational intelligent creatures as intruments<,> in a manner agreeable to their intelligent nature<,> is to make a proper use of their intelligent faculties in the affair<.> but<B> the use<,> that is made of their intelligent voluntary faculties<,> cannot by xx be a producing<of>[ed] the miracle through the effeciency of those faculties as being employed themselves to produce<it.>[ed] therefore<T> it can be nothing else than as [Cd. c have misread an "an"?] employing a<ed in>[ed][?] looking looking to<,> acknowledgeing, and depending on<,> that being<B><,> by whose power and will the miracle is indeed wrought.
¶God sometimes made use of brute creatures as instruments to do his work<.> so<S> he made use of the two she bears to punish the children that mocked Elisha<.> sometimes<S> he makes use of things without life<.> so<S> he made use of the stones<,> he sent down from heaven<,> to destroy the Amorites<.> but<B> it is not thus that he makes use of
¶1151. END OF THE CREATION<.> see No. 1066 It is no just objection against God's aiming at glorifying himself<,> as one way of that flowing out, or beaming forth of the infinite good that is to <be>[ed] considered under the notion of a last end of Gods works<,> that this adds nothing to God's happiness<;> any more than it is a just objection against his communication his happiness to his creatures being aimed at by him as his last end<;> for <the>[ed] creature<'>s happiness does not properly add any thing to God's happiness<,> any more than God's being glorified in the view of the creature<,> and by the creature<,> adds something to God's happiness<.> it<I> is true<,> God delights in communicationg his happiness to the creature<,> as /383/ therein he exercises a perfection of his nature<,> and does that which is condecent, amiable, and beautiful, and so enjoys himself and his own perfection in it, as his perfection is exercised in it. So<,> in like manner<,> he delights in glorifying himself<,> as it is in it self condecent and and beautiful, [, xo ed] that infinite brightness and glory should shine forth, and it is a part of the perfection of God to seek it.
¶These two ways of the divine good beaming forth<,> of the infinite good [xo ed] are agreeable to the two ways of the divine essense flowing out, or proceeding from eternity within the Godhead, in the person of the Son and Holy Spirit<:> the one<,> in an expression of his glory<,> in the idea or knowlege of it<;> the other<,> the flowing out of the essence in love and joy. It is condecent that <,> correspondent to these proceedings of the divinity ad intra, that [xo ed] God should also flow forth ad extra.[underlining, ed.]
¶The one last end of all things may be expressed, thus<:> it<I> is<,> that the infinite good might be communicated<;> that it might be communicated to <,> or rather in <,> the understandings [xo ed] of the creature <,> which communication is God<'>s declarative glory<;> and that it might be communicated to the other faculty <(>usually<,> ( [xo ed] though not very expressively<,> called the will<W><)> which <communication>[ed] is the making the creature happy in God<,> as a partaker of God's happiness. [finis] c 350 words.
¶1152. [Since No. 1151 probably began at the top of the missing leaf and is of a little over half a MS page in length, No. 1152 probably began in the lower half of p. 132 <since 1149, possibly a ref. to 1150 & 1151 (over 1 p. long) probably preceded 1152 on p.132, it was probably not over 1/4 p. in length. Of course, if 1149 was very brief, 1152 might be a little longer than that.> and occupied p. 134 (allowing that some space may have been left vacant after either number). No. 1153 begins at top of next leaf.]
*January, 1965, George Claghorn located a fragment in Lib. of Congress which contains on the verso the original of No. 1152. The text follows:
¶1152. COVENANTS. PERFECT OBEDIENCE. X's RIGHTEOUSNESS. So it is most natural to understand that<saying?> of X Joh. 12. 50 And I know that his commandment is life everlasting that obedience to the commands of God the Father is the grand unalterable condition of eternal life to all his subjects universally. See the context [.]
¶1153. MORAL INABILITY. FREE WILL. "SELF DETERMINED POWER." <The following relating to voluntary agents as subject to moral government.> ¶ 1. There is no command given by God or men<a> or that ever is given by one intelligent being to another that does directly and properly respect any thing further than the disposition & acts of the will of that intelligent being that is commanded i.e nothing else by any command given to an intelligent voluntary substance is directly and properly the thing commanded & required of that substance but <the> such acts of its will. It is the soul that is an intelligent substance only that is properly commanded that is [it?] only is a capable subject [sic] of commands for that being only is properly a capable subject of commands that is capable of percieving [sic] commands given. But when in commands that are given to the soul nothing else is required by those commands but its own acts . for a command is to do something . i.e to do something it self a command is not given to one thing that another thing should do something & tho the actions of one thing may have respect to the actions or motions of another & have influence upon them yet the [D: object of the command] directly [sic] & properly is the action of the thing commanded it self & not the effects of its actions. tho the effects may be connected with the actions all that a command given to an intelligent thing properly respects as a command to a thing is what that thing should do or act . And therefore the commands that are given to the soul of man do proper [sic] respect or reach nothing further than the acts of the soul & therefore respect nothing directly or [A; &?] properly beyond such and such acts of the will for the soul it self has no other acts that are its own whereby to fulfill any command. & altho the motions of the body follow the acts of the will by the law of nature which the creatour <has established> yet that don't make the motions of the body the acts of the soul. The acts of the will therefore only are properly the acts that are required by any command God gives us for our actions & all our duties & performances that are required or commanded so far as they are properly ours are no other than such & such acts of the will
¶Other things beside the habit & acts of the will are respected by the commands of God only indirectly viz. as connected with the will so far therefore as any <good> things [sic] is connected with the will & its acts so far & so far only is it the subject of a command, obligation or duty And so far & only so far & only so far as any good exercise of the faculties of the soul or members of the body is not implied in or connected with the will & its acts is it not the proper subject of a command or matter of our duty but is what we are justly excused & free from . and that for that reason & that only because it is not implied in or connected with the <good> [xo D] will & so is not what we can be properly voluntary in
¶Hence it follows that no other sort of inability to any action or performance consisting in the exercise of the faculties of the soul or members of [the (om.E)] body, renders that performance not properly the matter of a command or duty but such an one as implies want of a connection between that action or performance and the disposition & act of the will. If there be any sort of inability to that good thing that does in no wise interfere with hinder or stand in the way of a close proper & immediate connection with or [prob. sic; A: an] implication in the act of the will then that sort of inability does in no wise hinder any good thing from being the proper subject matter of a command And with respect to any command supposed to require any such performance `tis in vain for any to plead their /p. 134/[E's p. 2] inability and to say they can't do it unless they would if they could for willing as has just now been shew[n] is all the thing directly required of `em Let `em perform this let `em exhibit the compliance of the will & they have done their duty <& that which is all that is directly required of the soul in all commands whatsoever> & if there be any thing else desireable [A; ?] that dont attend this compliance of the will & inclination that dont prove to [be (om.E)] implied in it or connected with it from that they are excused. [[E's] See this position more particularly handled in the last paragraph, the next page. [A inserts that ¶ at this point]
-----------------------------------------------------------------¶If there be any act or determination of the soul or any exertion or alteration whatsoever prior to the act of the will <or any voluntary act> in the [A: that] case, as it were directing & determining what the will shall be that exertion or determination is not what any command does properly respect because it is no voluntary act because by the supposition it is prior to any voluntary act or act of the will being that which determines the will in is [sic; shd be "its"] acts & directs it how to act. < next p but three p. 6.> But no command does properly directly & immediately respect any action or exertion whatsoever but that which is voluntary for what a command requires is that the will of the being commanded should be conformed to the will of him that gives the command. What a command has respect to & seeks is compliance & submission but there is no compliance submission or yielding in that which is not voluntary. Hence `tis plain that if there be any sort of act or exertion of the soul prior to its acts of will or voluntary acts directing & determining those acts of the will they cannot be subject to any command I say directly because if they are properly subject to commands & prescriptions at all it must be only remotely as those prior acts & determinations are connected with & dependant on some acts of the will in the soul prior to them but this is contrary to the supposition for it is supposed that these acts of the soul are prior to all acts of the will all acts of the will being directed and determined thereby [[E's] p. 13
-----------------------------------------------------------------¶It will prove according to all schemes that the necessity negative or positive (i.e the necessity or impossibility ) of such acts of the will as are fit & proper to be in such a nature as mans <& not beyond the capacity of his faculties> don't render them improperly the subject matter of prescription & command if by necessity be meant only a prior certainty determination, or fixedness For even according to the scheme of those that hold what they called a sovereignty of the will and hold that the soul determines its own volitions or acts of will if this be true in any proper sense than there is some act of the soul prior to those volitions that it determines for the souls volitions by this supposition are effects of something that passes in the soul some act or exertion of the soul prior to the volitions themselves directing determining & fixing the consequent volition for according to them the volition is a determined effect & if it be it is determined by some act for a cause lying perfectly dormant & inactive does or determines nothing any more than that which has no being see p.7
-----------------------------------------------------------------So that according to the scheme even of those that hold a sovereignty of the will in this sense, the volitions & acts of the will themselves are all determined effects fix'd by something preceding & so in the sense that has been spoken of are < either> necessary . <or impossible. see book on the Freedom of the Will. p. 53. . 2 See Chubb, p 389, a little past the middle-- "self-determining power becomes a necessary cause &c--"> And again if any choose are [sic] in that scheme, [sic] that the acts of the will dont come to pass by any determining or directing cause at all but arise purely accidentally yet still they are necessary as to the subject of them to the soul that is the subject for if the soul be subjected to chance after this manner that its volitions /p. 135/ arise by pure accident without any determining cause whatsoever then to be sure, the soul has no hand in them & neither causes nor prevents them but is necessarily subjected to what chance brings to pass from time to time as much as the earth that is inactive is subject to what falls upon it & necessarily without dependence on any determining cause is by the supposition [wwxo] is not caused nor hindered by any determination of the subject of it nor can be so far as it is by chance without dependence on a determining cause. <See paper of minutes. N. 4. p 8, 9.> So that it is evident to a demonstration on all suppositions that if the volitions or acts of the will of any creature are ever properly the subject matter of duty prescription or command meerly the necessity or impossibility of these volitions in that sense that their being or not being is determined by a prior certainty & fixation does not hinder any of those volitions that are proper to be in a thing of such a nature as mans soul from being properly the matter of divine prescription & command.
¶Hence it follows that no inablility to any good act of will that dont consist in any incapacity of the human nature & faculties to be <the subject of> such an act but amounts to no more than such a kind of negative necessity certainty & fixation as has been spoken of either through <an unsuitable & hateful> aversion already fixed & settled or any other cause that dont bring such a necessity by making that volition impossible by rendring the thing required such as the faculties of human nature are not capable to be made the subjects of but only by determining the will against it I say it follows from what has been said that no such sort of inability to any good act of the will does in any wise render it improperly the matter of divine prescription & command . For that is what I have just now shewn that an act of the will being either necessary or impossible in that sense meerly that the act of the will or the absence of the act is certain by some determination & fixation dont make it the less the matter of divine prescription. [[E's] See p. 14.
-----------------------------------------------------------------¶From the things that have been already laid down & proved it also follows that as to those things that are not the subject matter of duty & commands directly as the disposition & acts of the will themselves but only indirectly as other good actions & performances of the human nature consisting either in any exercise of the faculties of the soul or motions of the body. No other sort of inability to them renders them improperly the subject matter of prescription & command but only that inablitliy that consists in the want of connection between them & those good acts of the will that are proper to be in such a nature as mans & not beyond the capacity of his faculties <and are fit exercises of his faculties [later corr.]> for it has been already shewn that those good acts of the [will (om.E)] that are proper to be in such a nature as mans & not beyond the capacity of his faculties or <[sic? ar? means "are"]> the proper matter of command & it has also been already shewn that all such things as are connected with such acts of the will are also properly the subject matter of command therefore certainly it follows that those things only that are not connected with such acts of the will are not the proper matter of command and this implies that no other sort of inability to them but such as implies a want of such connection makes `em to be not the proper subjects of command. So that if there be any thing that man is supposed to be required to do any exercise affection or exertion of mind that he is required to have or any outward deed /p. 136/ that he is required to perform that he may in any sense be said to [be (om.E)] unable to [do (A ed; om.E)] that dont excuse him or render the thing not properly the matter of his duty & prescription to him unless the inability be such as implies a want of connection between that thing & the good act of will that is properly required of him So that he may properly have that good act of will fully exerted, & yet cant do the thing required there being no connection between his will & the performance. If there be the good act of will that is properly required fully exerted & the performance bent connected & dont follow then the man is excused but otherwise not
¶Again it is further evident that if there be some act of will about the performance required that the performance dont prove to be connected with, so that in some kind of sense the person may be said to be willing to do it or to desire to do it & can't yet is he not excused unless his act of will be a properly good act & that act relating to this thing that is properly required of him. If there be some sort of act of will about it that the performance is not connected with that dont at all excuse the man for want of the performance is not connected with that dont at all excuse the man for want of the performance as long as the good act properly required is absent which if it were present the performance would be found to be connected with it. For if this other act of will dont excuse for the want of the proper act required no more can it excuse for the want of the performance that is connected with the proper act required for it is the connection of the performance with this proper act & that only that causes our duty to be concerned in it & not its connection with some other act of the will that is diverse from the proper act required & therefore tis the want of a connection with this proper act of the will & not its want of connection with some other act diverse from [this proper act (om.E)] that causes our duty not to be concerned in it
¶Thus for instance, if an old notorious drunkard that is under the power of a violet & invinceable appetite after strong [drink (om.E)] be supposed to be commanded entirely to forsake his drunkeness & required so to do under pain of eternal damnation and has some kind of willingness to forsake this vice i.e. his reason tells him that the pain of eternal damnation will be so great an evil that it will far more than countervail all the pleasure or good that he shall have from this vice and therefore wishes he could forsake it, but his actually forsaking it don't prove to be connected with such a sort of act of will this don't excuse him unless this be the proper act of will that is required of him relation to this matter. But [wwxo] but the act of will required of him be not such an indirect willingness which is not so properly a willingness to do the thing commanded to be done as a willingness to escape the punishment threatend but the act of will required of him be a proper direct & full willingness actually to forsake this vice and all those deeds that belong to it If this be the volition required & he has this & the performance don't prove to be connected with it then is the man excused but not otherwise . Or we will suppose the violent lust the man is under the invinceable power of is not any sensitive appetite but some unreasonable malice & an insatiable devilish malignity of spirit against some excellent & most worthy person & very highly deserving of him & the thing required of him under pain /p.137/ pain of damnation is to leave off injuring that person<.> and<A> he finds the same sort of willingness to it, that in the forementioned instance the drunkard has so [sic] forsake his cups, because the first [xo ed] performance does not prove to be connected <with it,>[ed] it does not at all excuse him because his willingness is no proper, direct and full<,> willingness, actually to comply with the command.
¶The case is the same and equality evident<,> and the evidence more direct and plain<,> if the thing required be not any external performance<,> that is connected with some act of the will<,> but only the act of the will itself, or some good compliance of the heart that is properly required of him. /444/ according<A> to the foregoing positions, and if[ed] [xo ed] this act of the will required be wanting, but yet there is some other indirect act of the will<,> about by [xo ed] which the person<,> to escape punishment<,> or on some foreign considerations, is willing to will, or wishes he was willing<,> but yet remains without the proper act of will required<;> His[xo ed] his indirect willingness in such a case cannot excuse the want of the proper willingness that is required<.> as<A> for instance, suppose a man has a most amiable, and agreeable, and every way deserving woman for his wife, and be required to love her, and choose her above above [sic] all other women, er [xo ed] <&>[ed] to love[? wr. over by ed] <cleave>[ed] <to>[ed] her in the choice and acquiescences of his will, as relinquishing all other women<;> but he instead of this is overpowered by a violent lust towards some vile and notorious strumpet, whereby he has his heart alienated from his wife, and has no delight in her, but an aversion to her<;> But <but>[ed?] yet he is sensible that its being with him, [, xo ed?] as it is in this respect is like to prove the utter ruin of himself and his family, and <he>[ed] therefore wishes it was otherwise<;> He <he>[ed] wishes that he loved his wife as well as he does his where,[wr. over by ed] <harlot>[ed] and that his heart cleaved to her with so full a choice, and entire compliance, that he could have as much pleasure and delight in her as in the other<;> It is[wr. over, ed.] <his>[ed] indirect willingness to cleave <to his wife>[ed] in his love and choice to his wife [xo ed] does not
-----------------------------------------------------------------at all excuse him for the want of actual love & choice Or if a child has an excellent father that has ever been kind to him & has every way in the highest degree merited the respect &[prob xo] honour & love of his child and this child be commanded by God to love & honour his father but he is of so vile a disposition that he notwithstanding inveterately hates him but notwithstanding being sensible that his hatred of his father will prove his ruin by his fathers disinheriting him or otherwise wishes it was otherwise but remains still under the invinceable power of his cursed dispositon [mark at end prob. comma or xo of incipient -s] & so in a settled hatred of his father his indirect willingness to love & honour his father dont excuse for the want of the actual compliance of his heart with the duty required of him towards his father And further we will suppose [the (om.E)] thing required be that a man make choice of God as his highest portion & chief good or that this heart should cleave to X Jesus & acquiesce in him as his Saviour his Guide his Lord & best Friend and through fear of damnation as the consequence of the want of such an act of will or choice of heart he wishes he could find if in himself but yet remains destitute of it that indirect willingness he has don't at all excuse him for the want of the proper act of will required. [[E's] see p. 7. [ ][plus prob. a back ref. to p. 2.] If the soul is self-determined <in>[d] its own acts of will<,> as some suppose<;> that determination is an act of the soul<.> for<F> certainly it is an active determination, </p.435/> that is supposed; and therefore<,> if the act of the will be determined by the soul itself<,> it is determined by some antecedent act<,> or act prior to the particular volition directed and determined (see No. 1155)
¶If any say<,> no<N><;> there is no necessity of supposing that the soul<'>s determination of the act of will is any thing prior to the act of will itself; but the soul determines the act of will in willing, or directs its own volition in the very act of volition<;> so that in willing as it does, it determines its own will<:> They that say thus can mean no more <than>[ed] that the soul<'>s determination of its act of will is in the very time [und. by ed] of the act of will itself<,> and not before it in <the>[ed] order of time[und. by ed] , but<B> that does not make it the less before it in the order of nature[und. by ed] so that the particular act of volition should really be consequent upon it, as an effect is on the cause that it depends on<.> thus<T> that act on[wr. over,ed]<of>[ed] <the will>[ed] which determines the dirction of the motion of a body, may not be prior to the motion itself in order of time[ed], but it may direct the motion of the body in moving it<:> but yet the action<,> [xo ed] that determines the motion<,> is not the less before the motion directed and determined<,> in the order of nature[ed], as that by which the determined motion is caused, and on which it depends.
¶Nothing else can be meant but this, by such an objection against the priority[ed] of the determination of the act of will to athe act of will itself<;> unless any will say that the soul<'s> determining its own act of will, and that the determination of the act of the will is the very same with the act of will itself, that is /p.436/ determined. But this is to talk nonsense. If the particular act of will that
-----------------------------------------------------------------appears or comes into existence be ["be" cut off] something properly directed or determined at all then it has some cause of its being in such a particular determined manner & not another & that determination or deciding what what [sic] <shall be> the particular manner of its existence <shall be> is not the very same with the thing determined but something prior to it & on which it depends [[E's] # p 9
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If the particular determined or precise act of will that exists is not consequent or dependent on something preceding determination & direction or [A; ?? od. be and] the determination of the act be nothing at all either preceding or diverse from the very act of will it self then that particular act of will is an existence that has no cause & so is no effect at all but is absolutely something that has started up into existence without any cause determination reason or foundation of its existence which is as great an absurdity as to suppose the world that had from eternity been nonextistent to start into existence all at once at a particular moment absolutely without any cause. And besides to <insist & contend earnestly> [above talk of] [for (om.E)] the soul's [-s xo or possibly blurred] dtermining its own acts of will & then to say [xo, but shd be restored] that its determination of its acts of will is the very same with the acts of will themselves its to dispute & contend about nothing For thus the dispute is not at all about the reason or groung of the acts of will or any of the souls acts but what is contended for it seems comes to no more than /p.139/ this that the soul wills what it wills and determines what it determines or that the <mind>[later add.] acts what it acts and that it has those acts that it has & is the subject of what it is the subject of, or what is, is.
-----------------------------------------------------------------¶add this at p. 2][E's] Whatever determines the acts of the will yet the acts of the will themselves being determined effects or effects decisively fixed by some prior determining cause the acts themselves must be necessary And whatever that be that determines or decides what these acts shall be whether the soul it self or something else it alters not the case, as to the acts themselves being fix'd & necessary evernt . The determination of the act of will must be prior to the act determined as has been demonstrated and by the supposition of the act of the will being determined by it it is dependent on it & necessarily consequent upon it if it be wholly determind by it as it is by the supposition then it is wholly dependent [sic] on it & altogether necessarily consequent upon it. If the acts of the will are determined by any cause whatsoever deciding what they shall be & ben't events absolutely without any cause then [wwxo] then there is a fix'd connection between /mg/ between these effects & their cause As when we [see (om.E)] a body in a motion in a particular direction if that direction of motion ben't absolutely without a cause something has determined the motion to such a course and the direction of motion depends and is necessarily connected with the preceding action of something that gave the moving body that direction and whether we suppose the moving body to determine the direction of its own motion or to be determined by something else, it alters not the case as to the dependence of the effect itself on its cause or of the direction of motion on the determination or determining act by which it is decided.
-----------------------------------------------------------------¶p.5. It is further evident that such an indirect willingness as has been spoken of cant at all excuse for the want of that good act of will that is required. provided that good act of will be properly & fitly required (which is a thing supposed) for this reason that this other indirect willingness don't answer the command fitly given or (which is the same thing) it dont answer the mans duty if the mans duty is not answered by what he does then what he does don't excuse or acquit his for tis his doing something that answers the obligation only that acquits him <with respect to> [later add.] that obligation & not his doing somehting else that does not answer it. But now this other indirect willingness don't answer the mans duty or satisfy the command that required of him another willingness quite diverse from that. If it does it must be either 1. because it is the very thing that the command requires but that is contrary to the supposition or 2. because it is equivalent to the thing, so as to be a balance for it. But this also is contrary to the supposition
¶And as to such good acts of the will or exercises of the heart as have been mention'd viz. a mans making choice of God as his portion & highest ["highest" is wr. as a catch-word; A. copyist added "happiness"] /p. 140/ his [sic] hearts cleaving to Christ as a most excellent Saviour or any other holy exercise of the will, inclination or affection that are proper to be in the heart of man It will further appear than [sic; that] such an indirect willingness to these things as has been spoken [of (om.E)] or their wishing through fear of punishment they could exercise such a will & disposition but find themselves unable i.e they dont find such exercise to be connected with such wishings & wouldings. I say it will further appear that such a willingness or desire for these things cannot excuse for the want of them or at all acquit the person that remains destitute of them let his willingness & desired through such fear be never so true & real & so in that respect sincere. because if they excuse & acquit the person it must be on one of these two accounts either: 1. because these desires are in effect the thing required or 2. That there is that vertue or goodness in them that balances the goodness & vertue of the thing required & so countervails the want of it
¶But <as to the first of these> that that [sic] these indirect desires from foreign considerations are not in effect the same thing that is required has been observed already as contrary to the supposition , and therefore if such a willingness excuses persons it must be on the other account viz
-----------------------------------------------------------------That such indirect desires & wishing from meer fear & self-love & from no other principles than are as much in the hearts of devils & [sic; A ed. changes to: as of] angels hant any vertue or goodness in them to balance be a ba that that be a balance for the goodness of those holy exercises of heart required tho' never so real & sincere is easily proved [[E's] Here largely shew the evidence of this when if ever I should write any thing on this subject to be published.][E's] <Their being sincere alters not the case unless a being sincerely afraid of hell being [sic] a vertue the sincerity of the act dont make it vertuous unless the sincerity of the principle makes it vertuous>
-----------------------------------------------------------------¶That there is some vertue or goodness in such an indirect willingness to balance the goodness of the exercise required or countervail the want of it. A willingness to do a good thing required of us can't countervail the want of that good thing unless it be a good willingness If there be no true goodness or vertue in it then certainly it has nothing to countervail the want of true goodness & vertue a kind of willingness that is not truly a good willingness cant excuse for the want of a good willingness
¶Supposing a son is possessed by a most inveterate enmity against a wealthy and excellent father that is so great as hinders his behaving towards him as a dutiful child which provokes his father to shut up his hand towards [him (om.E)] who otherwise might have his pockets full of money supposing also the son to be a person of violent & impetuous lust but is not under advantage to gratify his lust not having money to spend upon his whores by reason of the penury which his undutifulness brings upon him which causes him to wish that his heart was otherwise towards his father but yet so rooted & vehement is his devilish malignity of spirit towards his honorable father that he still remains under the power & government of it . I suppose that that desire or willingness that he has next p. /p. 141/
-----------------------------------------------------------------¶p 6][E's] If there be any meaning at all in any talk about determining the will as to its acts the meaning must be determining which way it shall act or what the particular acts shall be whether thus or thus. And this plainly supposes that there is some cause of the particular acts of the will or some cuase ground or reason that the will is exerted this way & not the other something that casually determines & decides which was the act shall be.
-----------------------------------------------------------------¶last p. at bottom][E's] I suppose that willingness he has to love & honour his father (tho' he sincerely i.e really & truly desires it for that end that he may gratify his violent lust) dont at all excuse the want of that love or countervail his remaining enmity & the plain reason is that there is no vertue or goodness in it to make up for the want of the vertue required or countervail the badness of his enmity. this is the proper reason & therefore if he had the same indirect willingness [or (om.E)] some other from a principle not so heinous as this yet if it was from no good principle & so it was a willingness that had no goodness in it still it would not at [om. A][all (om.E)] excuse or countervail for the want of the goodness required & that because the reason holds good viz that there is no goodness at all in the willingness & consequently nothing at all to countervail the defect of goodness & so no excuse at all.
¶Sincerity & reality in this willingness dont make it the better that which is real & hearty is sincere whether it be in vertue or vice some persons are sincerely bad and others are sincerely good others may be sincere & hearty in things in their own nature indifferent but being sincere & hearty & in good earnest is no vertue unless it be in a thing that is vertuous a man may be sincere & hearty in subscribing to a covenant offered him by a crew of pirates or gang of robbers obliging himself to join with them & yet there be no vertue in his sincerity The devils are sincerely & heartily willing & desirous to be freed from the torments of hell but this dont make their will or desires vertuous
¶And as an having a real sincere & hearty willing[nes]s to ones duty dont make his willingness to be vertuous or such as can excuse him in a defect of compliance with any supposed duty unless that willingness be from a good principle So it is with endeavours arising from such a will The endeavours have no more goodness in them than the will that the endeavours arise from If a young man that hates his father (as was represented before) from the violence of lust & that he may be under advantage to gratify that is willing to love his father his willingness has no goodness in it nor can excuse for the want of /p. 142/ the required love And if from such a willingness he endeavours to love his father neither have his endeavours tho as sincere as his willingness any vertue in them or excuse for the want of the required love any more than his willingness. The endeavour considered as the act of the willing agent cant be any better than the will it proceeds from For his endeavour is no further his act than as it is an expression of his will but certainly there is no more goodness or vertue in the exercises & expressions of a will than there is in the will it self that is exercised and espress'd . And therefore the sincerity of endeavours or a persons truly endeavouring a thing & doing what they can from a real willingness to obtain the thing they endeavour for dont render those endeavours proceed from ( the reality of which denominates the endeavours sincere) be vertuous. and cant excuse a person in the defect of the thing endeavoured for any more than the will than the will [sic] it self . The devils that possessed the Gadarene were doubtless really afraid X was going to torment `em & were sincerely willing to avoid it and if we also suppose they were sincere in their endeavours to avoid it when they cried Thou Son of God most high we beseech thee torment us not these endeavours however sincere had no more vertue in them than the will they proceeded from and if we suppose they did whatever they could in their endeavours still it alters not the case.
SINCERITY.
¶From what has been said it is evident that persons endeavours however sincere & real & however great & tho' they do their utmost, unless the will that these<o> endeavours proceed from be truly good & vertuous can avail to no purposes whatsoever with any moral validity or as any thing in the sight of God morally valuable & so of weight through any moral value to merit recommend satisfy or excuse, or make up for any moral defect, or any thing that should abate resentment or render it any way unjust or hard to execute punishment for any moral evil or want of any moral good . Because if such endeavours have any such value weight or validity in the sight of God it must be through something in them that is good and vertuous in his sight. For surely that which in his sight is good for nothing is in his sight wholly & entirely vain & without any positive moral value weight or validity. and can have no weight at all in a moral sense positively & properly Tho' there may be something negative in it [sic] as through those<e> endeavours persons may avoid some positive evils that otherwise would be committed & so may in some respects avoid incurring further guilt . as he that saves his neighbor from drowning not from love to him but meerly from covetousness & because his own interest is concernd tho what he does is nothing good in the sight of [God (om. E)] /p. 143/ yet hereby he avoids the greater guilt that would arise in the sight of God through such a degree of murder as he would actually be guilty of if he should stand by & see him drown when he could easily help him. [[E's] Here see No. 5. p. 54. [Note is a later addition.]
¶There is an exceeding great & unknown deceit arises from the use of language from the great ambiguity of the word sincere Indeed there is a vast indistinctness unfixedness & ambiguity in most (or at least very many) of the terms that are used to express those mix'd modes (as Mr Locke calls them) that appertain to moral & spiritual matters whence arise innumerable mistakes strong prejudices & endless controversy & inextricable confusion.
¶The word sincere is commonly used to signify something good & vertuous men are habituated to such an understanding of it so that the [xo] [note in l mg. concerning xo] expression whenever it is used excites that notion & naturally suggests something to the mind that is indeed very excellent much the same with the words honest & upright Yea something more we conceive by it not only something that is honestly & truly good and good in the sight of him that sees not only the outward appearance but the heart but also good with all the heart & from the bottom of the heart. And therefore men think that if a person be sincere in his endeavours to do his duty or to obtain any moral qualification that is supposed to be requisite he is altogether to be justified & it would be hard & unreasonable to blame him much more to punish him for being unsuccessfull. For to say he is thus sincere suggests to the mind as much as that his heart & will is good There is no defect of duty as to his vertuous inclination he honestly & uprightly desires & endeavours to do as he is required his will & heart fully comply with his duty but only the thing supposed to be required don't prove to be connected.
¶Whereas it ought to [be (om.E)] observed that the word sincere has these different significations 1. Sincerity as the word is often used signifies no more than reality of will & endeavour with respect to any thing that is profess'd or pretended without any consideration of the nature of the principle or aim whence this real will & true endeavour arises. If the man has some real will or desire to obtain a thing either direct or indirect or does really endeavour after a thing he is said sincerely to desire it & endeavour after a thing he is said sincerely to desire it & endeavour it without any consideration of the goodness & vertuousness <or>[where did E mean it to go?] of the principle he acts from & the excellency of the end he acts for. What is meant by the mans being sincere in his desire or endeavour is no more than that the apprearance & shew there is of a desire or endeavour is not a meer pretence and dissimulation when indeed he dont at all desire or endeavour the thing that he pretends to Thus a man that is kind to his neighbours wife that is sick & languishing is very helpful in her case & makes a shew of desiring & endeavouring her restoration to health & vigour & not only makes such a show [sic] but there is a reality in his pretence he does heartily & earnestly desire he restoration & uses his true & utmost endeavours for it He is said sincerely to desire & endeavour it because he does so truly tho' perhaps the principle he acts from is no other than a vile & scandalous lust /p. 144/ he having secretly maintaind a criminal intercourse & lived in adultery with her and earnestly wishes for her restored health & vigour that he may return to his criminal pleasures So a man may be said sincerely to hate his neighbour that dont meerly pretend to it.
¶Or 2dly by sincerity is meant not meerly a reality of will & endeavor of some sort or other & from some consideration or other but a vertuous sincerity. That is that a man in [wwxo] in performing those particular acts that are the matter of vertue or duty, there is not only the reality of the form & essence of the vertue appertains to it consisting in the aim that governs the act & the principle that is exercised in it. There is not only the reality of the act that is as it were the body of the duty but also the osul that should properly belong to such a body or those inward principles wherein consists the real vertue that properly should belong to the act. In this sense a man is said to be sincere when he acts with a pure intention not from sinister views or for by ends He not only in reality desires and endeavours after the thing to be done or the qualification to be obtain'd , but he wills the thing directly & properly as neither forced nor bribed His choice is free in the matter he seeks it as vertue & chooses it for its own [sake (om.E)] as delighting in vertue so that not only the thing it self in the matter of it upon some account or other is the object of the willing but the vertue of the thing is the [sic] properly the object of the will.
¶In the former sense a man is said to be sincere in opposition to a meer pretence and shew of the particular thing to be done or exhibited without any real desire or endeavour at all . In the latter sense a man is said to be sincere in opposition to that shew of vertue there is in meerly doing the matter of duty, without the quality of the vertue it self in the soul & essence of it that there [is (om.mg>)] a shew of. A man may be sincere in the former sense and yet in the latter be in the sight of God who searches the heart a vile hypocrite & his deeds & endeavours tho' in some sort sincere may before God [sic] good for nothing & of no significancy or avail
¶In the latter kind of sincerity only is there any true vertue and this is the thing that in the Scripture is called sincerity uprightness integrity, truth in the inward parts & being of a perfect heart. If a man be sincere in his will desires & endeavours in this respect this is of some value in the sight of God And if there [be (om.E)] <[is (A)]> such a sincerity & such a degree of it as there ought to be and it be found that any thing that might be supposed to be required is not connected with it, the man <[is (om.E)]> indeed [or: indeed is (mg)] wholly excused & acquitted in the sight of [God (om.E)] His will shall be surely be [sic] accepted for the deed for such a will is all that is in strictness required of him by any command of [God (om.E)] as we shewed before The commands of God given to any spiritual voluntary being respect nothing wlse directly & properly but the habits & acts of the will . But as to the other kind of sincerity of desires & endeavours as was observed before it being good for nothing in Gods sight is not accepted with him as [or?]
<nor>[ed] is [copyist's mistake for "as"?] of any weight or value to recommend, satisfy, excuse, or counterbalance any good thing that is mentioned. [reading of "mentioned" doubtful?] See Book 1. on Free Will. p. 54. [This ref. prob. later, as others]
ABSOLUTE PROMISE TO NATURAL MEN.
¶Corol. 1. Hence we learn that there is [xo ed] nothing appears in the reason and nature of things<,> from the consideration of any moral weight or validity of that former kind of sincerity that has been /455/ spoken of<,> at all obliging us to believe, or leading us to suppose<,> that God has made any positive promises of salvation or grace, or any saving assistance, or any spirityal benefit whatsoever to any edeavours, strivings, prayers, or obedience of those that hitherto have no true virtue or holiness in their hearts<;> though we should suppose all the sincerity, and the utmost degree of endeavour that [xo ed] <which>[ed] it is possible should be in a person<,> without holiness.
SALVATION OF THE HEATHEN.
¶Corol. 2. Hence we learn that there is [xo ed] nothing appears in the reason and nature of things, as considering the things formentioned<,> that can justly lead us to determine that God will certainly reveal Christ, and give the necessary menas of grace, or some way or other bestow true holiness and saving grace, and so eternal salvation to those heathen<s,> [-s ed] that are sincere (in the manner that has been explained above) in their endeavours to find out the will of the Deity, and please him according to that light <which they have, in order>[ed] that they may escape his future displeasure and wrath, and obtain happiness in their future state through his favour. [end of the No.]
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[ p. 2.] But if any shall insist that the act of the soul<,> that is, [, xo ed] in determining its own acts of will<,> is subject to teh command of God<;> that that determining exertion, [, xo ed] or directing act<,> that directs the consequent /438/ volition<,> is either obedience or disobedience to the command of God<;> I desire such persons to consider that<,> if there be any obedience <in> [ed] that determining act<,> it is <,> to be sure<,> obedience wherein the will has no share,<.> because<B> <,> by the supposition<,> it precedes each act of the will because [xo ed] <since> [ed] each act depends on it as its determining cause, and therefore it is wholly an involuntary act;<.> so <S> that if<,> in these acts<,> the soul either obeys or disobeys, it obeys and disobeys wholly involuntarily<:> it is no willing obedience or rebellion, no compliance, or opposition of the will<;> and what sort of obedience and rebellion is this?
-----------------------------------------------------------------[ see p. 3.] Hence that the absolute decrees of God's [s xo ed] foreordaining or predetermining the volitions of men, are in no wise inconsistent with God's moral government, as exercised with respect to those volitions<,> as commanding, or forbidding, rewarding or punishing them. I say<,> absolute decrees are not inconsistent with those<,> merely because they infer such fixation and certainty of those volitions<.> if<I> they are inconsistent with such a divine moral government<,> with regard to those volitions<,> it must be not be on account of such a certainty or necessity, but on some other account<.> for<F> it has been now proved that such a necessity of particualar volitions does not render such volitions or acts of the will not properly the matter of duty, and so of prescription and command, and consequently of the proper enforcements of commands, and sanctions of law. [finis]
¶1154. FREE WILL. CONTIGENCY. SELF-DETERMING POWER. If the volitions of the mind<,> or its acts of will<,> have any cause<,> then then [xo ed] they are connected with their cause<.> <For,>[ed] for an event not to be dependant of a cause<,> or not to be connected with a cause, and to be without a cause <,> are all the same thing<;> for the very notion of causality consists in that dependance or connection<,> that there is between cause and effect,<.> if<I> there be no such relation between one thing <and another,>[ed] consisting in such a dependance of one thing on another, and connection of one thing with the other, that one thing is dependent on and connected with the vertue<i> and influence of the /p. 456/ other<;> then it is certain there is no such sort of relation between them<,> as is signified by the terms Cause and Effect<.>[cop's line] so<S> far as an effect is connected with its cause<,> so far it is the effect of that cause<;> so much causality is there in the case and no more. The<t> cause properly does /mg/ to bring to pass no more of any effect that [sic; than?] is connected with it,<.> if<I> we say the connection be not tatal but partial, that the effect though it has some connection with the cause, yet is not entirely connected with it; that is as much as to say<,> that it is [xo ed] not all that is in the effect, that [xo ed] is the effect of that cause<,> but part of it arises from thence, and part some other way. To say that there are some effects<,> which are not fully and certainly connected with those things that are actually their causes<;> is the same thing as to say<,> that there are some causes that have actually an efficient power, and exertion of their powers, and yet that this power and exertion are not an effectualy power and exertion,<.> for<F> by effectual [ed's line] we mean<,> that which is actually sufficient<,> without any farther [sic causality in the case<,> to produce the effect,<.> and<A> this surely supposes that the effect<,> on such a power, and [xo ed] exertion of that[xoed] <a> [ed] power<,> the effect [xo ed] will certainly follow<.> because<B><,> if it does not follow<,> it proves in fact<,> that there is not a sufficiency of power or exertion in the cause to produce the effect<;> which is contrary to the supposition.
¶Again, If there be nothing comes to pass<,> that is not absolutely without any cause,<;> then it will follow that there is a certain connection [ed's line¶] between cause and effect,<.> or<O> (in other terms) it will follow that <,> if there be a cause that produces any effect<,> then that cause being put<in exercise>[ed] and precisely with the same power, and the same exertion of power, and every way under same circumstances, will certainly evermore produce the same effect,<.> for<F> otherwise /p. 457/ there will [xoed] something does or may come to pass<,> that is absolutely without cause<;> (which is contrary to the supposition) [() xo ed] or [? wr. over, ed] particular this [miscopied?] will or may come to pass absolutely with [sic] any cause or reason, viz. This difference that appears, viz. that this effect sometimes proves in fact somtimes to allow the cause, and sometimes not, though the cause be the same, the power and exertion, and circumstances of exertion, all precisely and universally the same. See Book on the Freedom of the Will. p. 51. last paragraph. [this material xo ed.] [End of MS p. "14"]
----------------------------------------------------------------- last p][E's] [xo E, black ink of other late corrections] If any thing could come to pass at a particular time without a cause, I scruple not to affirm that it could not be forseen As for instance we will suppose that till about [about ti?(1?)] 56 5760 years ago there was no other being excepting the divine Being & then <the> this ' or some particular body or spirit all at once started out of nothing without any concern of God in the matter but absolutely without cause or any reason at all why it started into being then rather than sooner or later or why such a thing came into being & not something else why of such dimensions rather than less or greater & c-- or why any thing should come into being at all I say if this be supposed it will follow that such an event could not be foreknown it could not be foreseen that that [sic] such a thing would at that time come into being It could not be foreseen that that thing would come into being rather than another when there was absolutely no more reason why that should rather than another It could not be foreseen that it should come into being at such a time rather than another when there was absolute when there was absolutely nothing to give any superiour weight or value to that moment to cause that to predominate <preponderate>[TS] rather than any other with respect ot that event. Such a future event as has been supposed could not be known because it would be absolutely in its own nature unknowable by the supposition as some things cant be done because they are absolutely & in their own nature impossible which the greates degree of strength makes any approach to . So I call that absolutely unknowable to the knowledge of which the greatest capacity of discerning spuuoseable has no tendency & which no increase of discerning makes any approach to But if something thus comes into existence absolutely without any cause or any thing prior as the reason why it should come into existence its futurity is a thing such a thing that no increase of discerning causes any approach or tendency to the knowledge of it And that appears because a great degree of descerning has a greater tendency to the knowledge of things or enables better to know things no otherwise than [as (om.E)] it enables better to discern the evidence of things But an increase of discerning has no tendency to a discerning evidence where there is none. But in the case of the supposition before us of a future existence that is absolutely iwthout any reason why it should be there is even by the supposition absolutely no preceding evidence of it If there be no reason why such an existence should be rather than another then all things at present are exactly equal & the same with respect to that & other supposed existences & therefore there is at present no more evidence that that will be than something else that never will be If there /p. 148/ be at present no reason why this<prob. that>[TS] existence should be rather than another then no reason can be seen why it should be rather than another . if there be at present some more evidence that that will be than another that prevailing evidence consists in something But this is contrary to the supposition for by the supposition at present all things are equal with respect to each & there is nothing whatso[e]ver preponderating with respect to either . If there be evidence at present of this futurity (as I said) the evidence consists in something & therefore either consists in the thing it self or something else if it be self evident then the evidence that now is of the future existence consists in the thing it & the thing<future existence> /mg/ <thing it self> is forseen by the evidence there is in the thing itself but this is contrary to the supposition for it is supposed that the thing it self at present is not. There is no such thing at present in any respect for the evidence of it to be seen in it. And there is no evidence of it in any thing else for by the supposition there is at present nothing else for by the supposition there is nothing at all at present in existene that is in any respect whatsoever connected with it or related to it And therefore there can be no evidence or proof or argument of it for the very notion of proof or argument implies relation & connection with the truth proved ar argued . God therefore on this supposition by his infinite capacity of discerning cant discerning [sic] any proof or evidence of this futurity because there is none to be discerned He cant discern it in himself for by the supposition he is not the Author of it nor is any way concerned nor is there any thing in himself connected with it He cnat discern it in any thing else for there is by the supposition no thing else
¶If any one shall say, that God by his omniscence can know things without evidence I desire that he would consider again what he says for to say that God knows things without evidence, is the same thing as to say that things are known to him without being evident to him i.e they are very clear evident & certain when they are not at all evident If things are evident to God then he sees evidence of `em there is something that is evidence in his eyes tho it may be not in the eyes of others But we may be sure that that which is evidence in his eyes is good <& real> evidence <in its own nature><See Book concerning Free Will at the beginning but especially p. 6. &c--><See Stebbing. p. 236. & Dr Clark's Dem. Prop. 10.> [finis; 2 insertions later than Will ref (wh. may be in the same ink as 1st par. of 1155); Stebbing-Inquiry] Clarke ref. later than Will ref-- wh. means Will ref. prob not to
¶1155.[Numeral in same ink & prob. same time as No. 1154; but space left blank & filled in later in two sep. adds.] FREE WILL, SELF-DETERMINING POWER. They that hold a self-determining power in the will would be understood that the will is active in determining it self or that it determines it's own volitions by its own act for they are strenuous in it that the soul is not meerly passive the in the determin conversation & turning of the will to good &c-- They cry out of the Calvinists for making the will passi man passive They insist upon it that men are active in it so that there is another act preceeding the act of the will according to them
¶Again, if the will determines the will then the will in so determining itself does some thing to determine the will is to do something . And therefore this determination is a doing or act of the will so that here we have plainly an act of the will determining an act of the will and the will determining all its own acts by some preceding act of its own which is a contradiction because this supposes an act of the will before the first act determining that If the will determines its own acts by its own acts then it determines its own volitions by its volitions For if the will be determined by an act of the will tis determined by a volition That which [is (om.E)] an act of the will & not an act of the understanding or any other faculty is a vo [lition (if E finished the word at the r. margin, it is now rubbed & torn off; poss. at bottom on left--if so worn off--but he may have seen "a volition" just above & thot. he had finished.] every surely every act of the will is a volition [[E's] see back No (N.?) 1075 / see also the 11 [?] <page> back [?] &c [?] [finis; counting the present page, this would land on p. 5 of No. 1153, wh. is on same subj. But why didn't he use the page no.??]
END OF BOOK 7