880 [sounds very much like a rule from Ramist logic:] when there are two parts of a disjunction one of them will not be and not the other unless there be some reason why one should be rather than the other
[a form of the ontol argument:] we decieve ourselves when we thing<k> we do in our minds suppose it or when we imagine we suppose it to be possible what we do when we go to thing<k> of absolute nihility (if I may so speak) is only to remove one thing to make way for & suppose another in this case there is no such thing as two parts of a disjunction when we are come to Being in general we are come to one single point without a disjuction. Therefore God is because there is no other way God therefore is because there is nothing else to make a supposition of.
[the following follows from his notion that causation of everything is self-evident.] Tis absurd to suppose therefore if matter exists it exists accidentally without any reason at all which is absurd tis absurd to suppose one atom of matter to exist accidentally to have being & there be no cause for it therefore, the absurdity seems to appear still vastly greater that there should be so many millions such an infinite number of such causeless existences what we see often comes to pass we are more ready to think there is some cause for, that [sic, than] what happens but once
again,
[This is an incredible, long argument against the possibility of the universe coming about by chance, particularly the supposition that great amounts of time increase this possibility.]
¶880. BEING OF A GOD. Concerning that objection against the force of the argument from the order & final causes of things to prove the Being of a God viz. that this order might happen in an infinite number of changes of the fortuitous positions of the parts of the matter that the universe is composed of in their endless wanderings in infinite space
¶To this it may be answered 1. That matter could not be from eternity of it self without any cause having no necessary existance or there being no reason without supposing an efficient Cause why matter should have existence Tis absurd to suppose that any thing is and there is absolutely no reason why it is when there are two parts of a disjunction one of them will not be and not the other unless there be some reason why one should be rather than the other there must be something to preponderate with respect to that part of the distinction [sic] that has prevail'd if one scale of a balance descends and the other ascends it is a sure evidence that there is a preponderation . There is a reason to be given why God should have a Being the reason is because there is no other way there is nothing else supposeable to be put with the Being of a God as the other part of the disjunction If there be it is absolute & universal nothing. A supposition of something is a supposition of the being of God it dont only presuppose it but it implies it it implies it only consequentially but immediately God is the summ of all being & there is no being without his being all things are in him & he in all. But there is no such thing supposeable as an absolute universal nothing we talk nonsense when we suppose any such thing. we decieve ourselves when we thing<k> we do in our minds suppose it or when we imagine we suppose it to be possible what we do when we go to thing<k> of absolute nihility (if I may so speak) is only to remove one thing to make way for & suppose another in this case there is no such thing as two parts of a disjunction when we are come to Being in general we are come to one single point without a disjuction. Therefore God is because there is no other way God therefore is because there is nothing else to make a supposition of.
¶But we know that it is not so with respect to the matter of which the universe is composed if it be nothing else can be supposed but the existence of such matter as we find in some places then why is it not every where alike if this matter can be supposed not to be in such a part of space then surely it is in the nature of things supposeable that it should not be in other parts of space. it is not in [it (om.E)] self necessary that there should be matter in other places more than in this place which is empty If it be in it self necessary that matter should be, why is there no more of it there is room for a great deal more or why is there is [sic] so much why is there not less. Surely here is a supposeable disjunction so much or not so much or so much & more yea here is room for infinite different parts of a disjunction or distribution all equally supposeable viz infinite different quantities of matter of which there is no more reason in the thing it self that any one should be rather than any other therefore to suppose that one certain particular of all this infinite number should be and all the rest not be without any disposing cause is infinitely absurd.
¶Again why should this matter that there is be so disposed of as to occupy just such particular parts of space in such a situation & not be disposed in any of the other infinite manners equally supposeable. Here again is one particular of an infinite number of particulars equally supposeable which can't /p./ be without a reason
¶By these things it appears that matter is not a thing of necessary existence. Tis absurd to suppose therefore if matter exists it exists accidentally without any reason at all which is absurd tis absurd to suppose one atom of matter to exist accidentally to have being & there be no cause for it therefore, the absurdity seems to appear still vastly greater that there should be so many millions such an infinite number of such causeless existences what we see often comes to pass we are more ready to think there is some cause for, that [sic, than] what happens but once
again,
¶2. The objection supposes not only that the matter of which the universe consists could have being from eternity without any cause but also that it could be in motion from eternity without a cause, which is more palbably [sic] absurd. The objection supposes that the numberless parts of matter were in motion from eternity & so have been subject to endless changes in their situation with respect one to another but it may justly be enquired what set em in motion or what caused em to move rather than to stand still, when we see an arrow or a stone flying through the air we conclude yea we know that there must be some cause of its motion and some cause why it flies in such a direction & so swiftly and at such a time. Tis plain that the being of matter is not necessary, but that the contrary viz its not being is a thing supposeable but tis more plain and manifest to every one with less reflection that tis not necessary that matter should be in motion that it may be suppose to lie still & it is more palpably manifest still that it is not necessary that matter should move in such a direction & with such a degree of velocity 'tis self-evident that matter in it self is indifferent to an infinite number of directions & therefore, when we see matter actually determined to one particular direction & proceeding in one path <out of the infinite> & all the rest of that infinite [number (om.E; mg. here)] of paths that [xo E] it is certain that tis not absolute perfect indifference that thus determines it to one rather than all the rest but some determining cause & so it is as plain that matter if it moves is in it self no more disposed to move in that degree of velocity that it has than an infinite number of other degrees & therefore there is some cause why it moves in such a degree of velocity
[A six-line beginning on sec. 3 is xo here.]
¶The unreasonableness of supposing matter & motion (which are not necessary existences) to be from eternity without any cause, has been illustrated by the similitude of a chain hung up or hanging down from an infinite height and we observed the last link was supported in the air without falling down we argue that this must be the effect of some cause The supporting that link is not of the link it self, for supposing gravity be the nature of the link then we know that supporting the link is something added besides what is in the link it self, & therefore it must be from some other cause. now it dont satisfy to say that the preceding link is the cause of this effect in that & the next the cause of the support of that & so on in infinitum for still a cause is justly demanded of this effect in [the (om.E)] whole infinite chain which has not this effect in it self, because the whole is supposed to have gravity in it self which is a tendency to descend. The case is exactly parallel because 'tis not a thing in dispute whether things that now are, or are existing in any part of the infinite succession of things exist of themselves or need a cause as much as the suspension of /p./ any one of the links of the chain for by supposition they both need a cause, for instance the existence of the present generation of men needs a cause just so much as the suspension of the last link of the chain for 'tis not a thing now in dispute whether a generation of men came into being of themselves And therefore, the ascribing the suspension of the last link to the suspension of the foregoing & that on the next & so on in infinitum is just so sufficient to account for the suspension of the whole, as to ascribe the existence of the present generation to the preceding & of that to the preceding & so on is to account for the existence of the whole infinite succession. or it is just the same thing as if (supposing all thing [sic] by gravitation tended in the same direction) it should be asked what held up the earth & it should be answered that it lay on something else & that on something & so in infinite [sic] & yet all these things that lie one upon another by gravitation tend to sink one from under another. And its still the same thing if we should suppose the body of the earth to be heaved up, contrary to its supposed tendency by gravitation & it should be solved in the same manner viz that it was lifted by something under it & that by something under that & so in infinitum. For the holding it up contrary to its natural tendency is an effect that needs a cause as much as moving it contrary to its natural tendency the later is only the like effect (viz opposing the natural tendency of the earth) to a further degree. Yea the atheists do actually solve the existence of the motion of bodies that is observed in the world this very way for they suppose it is to be accounted for thus that one body moved another by percussion & that another & so on in infinitum. & that so the present motion that is observed in the bodies of the universe is to be accounted [for (om.E)] tho there be no reason in the nature of things as they are in themselves why they should move & not be at rest or if they do move why they should move in these & those directions & with such degrees of velocity & not in any other of the infinite number of directions or degrees of velocity equally possible. Now therefore let us a little more particularly consider how unreasonable this is. If there was a row of perfectly elastick bodies of infinite length & at last at a certain moment that next to us tho 'till then it had alwaies been at rest to move and of a sudden start forward out of its place we should conclude that this could not be without a cause, & would it at all satisfy any one to say that the next to it moved & struck against that & the preceding struck against that & so on in infinitum. The case is the same if we should suppose a chain infinitely long that had 'till this moment alwaies lain at rest but now we observe the link next to us starts out of its place & the reason assigned should be that this last [wwxo] this last link was drawn & put in motion by the next & that by the next & so in infinitum & still the case is the same if we should suppose a solid cylinder infinitely long with one end near to us but protracted to an infinite length from us & we observe that that end next to us on a sudden moves forward & it should be asked what was the cause & answer should be made that the parts next adjoining to it moved it moved & moved that & the parts next to that moved that & so in infinitum but would it not be /p./ [aborted entry occurs here: see next p.] reasonable in such a case to ask why the whole mov'd and tho we should have this reason to conclude that the cylinder had some cause of its motion without it self that it moved only just at such a moment, when there was no more reason in it self that it should move, than at any other moment when it was at rest, so it is with respect to an infinite row of bodies there is no more reason that the motion of the row should be so ordered as to set that next to us in motion just at that moment rather than any other moment. If we should see such a cylinder infinitely long as we supposed thus of a sudden put in motion would not such a motion as plainly shew a cause without it self as if we saw a cylinder of a finite length or a short one of two foot long after it had been at rest suddenly to start out of its place. By which it appears that 'tis just so unreasonable, to suppose an infinite succession of beings not existing of themselves to be without an efficient cause without themselves as a finite succession
¶What we observed just now of the unreasonableness of supposing of an infinite row of bodies striking one against another & setting one another in motion without any external cause is applicable with an exact parity of reason to a circular row of bodies in motion by percussion if one of those bodies be observed to move & it should be enquired why it did so & it should be said it was moved by the next & that by the next & so round [and] round in infinitum. And the case is still the same if we should suppose one single body in motion from eternity with a particular direction & degree of velocity
[JE had evidently used the top of this page on a (probably) previous number, then lost or rejected it. The following text occurs, xo, at top of MS p. "121"]
His election as he was man was a manifestation of Gods sovereignty. God had determined to exalt one of the creatures so high to such an union to himself that he should be one person with God and that he should have holiness, blessedness & glory answerable thereto and so that he should be the head of all other elect creatures [? xo?] that they might be united to God and be glorified in him His sovereignty appears in choosing the species of creatures of which this should be viz not of the angels the superiour species [finis]
Intro. This text turns out to be alm. identical (+ same, in ink, + hand) with the text at top of p. "7," wh. is a continuation of No. 769. Alas, comparison shows that the form on top of p. "121" is the earlier of the two
¶Evidently, for at least some way into the bk (thru p. 6 anyhow), The book was not yet sewn tog. nor were any pp in it but what were wr. on -- or at least that the book was not sewn + the other pp if alr. folded tog., were laid aside as he wrote. This is the only such slip in the book. Either JE was more careful after that, or he soon decided to complete the no pp + sew it up
Notice also that sheets for pp. 1-4, "123-6" are shorter narrower than sheets for 5-20 (+ - "122")
& it should be asked why that body thus moved & it should be answerd that its motion this moment was caused by the motion it had the last moment, & that by the motion it had the preceding moment & so in infinitum
¶The absurdity of an infinite succession of beings having existence without any external cause by having it one from another when yet no one of them could have it of themselves or have [it (om.E)] by any necessity or reason in the nature of things, in themselves considered will further appear by this supposing there had existed an eternal succession of generations of blind men and the present generation were able to tell the number magnitude & position of the stars & it should be enquired how they came by this knowledge which no one could have of themselves because they were all blind & so all insufficient for such knowledge of themselves & it should be answered that the present generation were instructed in it by the foregoing & they had it from the preceding & so on in infinitum. This is very absurd & foolish & the only reason why it is so is this because here it is supposed that those successive generations of men are possessed of something that is transmitted from one to another which no one of all the infinite successions are sufficient to obtain of them selves & yet that they have it without communication from any cause that is sufficient to have it of himself. /p./
¶? The case is just the same with respect to existence of this eternal succession of generations of men as it is with respect to this knowledge for by the supposition no one generation has in himself no more sufficiency to obtain existence of himself than a blind man has to obtain that knowledge of himself nor is there any thing more in the nature of things to direct or determine or make necessary such an effect as the existence of such generation of men than there is to direct & determine such an effect as blind mens having such ideas . & therefore there is [as (om.E)] much necessity that their existence which is not at all necessary should have some cause without the whole succession as that such knowledge should have a cause without the whole succession of generations of blind men.
¶An infinite succession of depende<a>nt beings don't only require an external efficiency as much as a finite succession of being or a number of beings existing without succession but it requires a much greater efficiency for the whole effect whether it be eternal or of temporary beginning is dependent on an external efficiency & the greater the effect is the greater efficiency does it require to produce it. Thus to hold up an infinite chain is required infinitely greater efficiency than to hold up a finite one so to move a cylinder of infinite length so on the supposition of an infinite succession of beings that give existence one to another the further we go back, the greater efficiency is required in the cause to give being [sic] such an existence & power as that they shall have power to produce others with power to produce others like them & so on
¶3. If we suppose that both matter & motion might possibly have been from eternity of themselves yet that wont help the objection that is made against the force of the argument from the order & final causes of things to prove the being of a God. The objection supposes that this order & regularity that is found in the creation may well enough be supposed to happen without any designing contriving cause once in a whole eternity in an infinite number of changes of the fortuitous positions of the parts of the matter that the universe is composed of in their endless wandrings in infinite space And that it is supposeable that the various parts of matter having so much room or opportunity as there is in an infinite duration to change their situations & come into an infinte number of various forms & contextures that tis not unreasonable to suppose that they might of themselves justle into that beautiful convenient order & wonderful contexture in which they now are And so as to produce such a general frame of the universe The heavenly bodies in such forms in such a system with such proportion such motions & with such properties & particularly with those wonderful phenomina [sic] of such a mutual regular attraction by some strange unsearchable mechanism and such a wonderful thing as the light [E's line] with all that is observed of its properties powers & effects and all that belongs to the particular planets as this earth in particular with its various elements of earth air & water with all their convenient dispositions & phenomina. & also all that belongs to the smaller systems that are the particular parts of the greater & more general systems such as the bodies of men & the other innumerable kinds of animals great & small visible to the naked eye & discoverable by the microscope with the infinite number of vegetables with such a mechanism or /p./ wonderful disposition as all of them to have a power to propagate their species to endless ages. The objection supposes that it is not unreasonable to suppose that the various parts of matter fortuitously existing & fortuitously moving might in infinite duration of themselves without any designing or contriving cause jumble into such a contexture as this. Not but that it would be very unreasonable to suppose that this should come to pass of it self in a short space of time but the whole weight of the objection is laid on the infinity of the room or opportunity there is for parts of matter to wander in & come into an infinite variety of positions & contextures.
¶But if we thoroughly consider the matter it will appear that whether we suppose an infinite duration or never so short an opportunity it is very much the same thing as to the present argument the supposed infinite duration will make but infinitely little difference as to the probability of such an event as the various parts of matter coming of themselves into such an infinitely regular beutiful & convenient frame. The difference is so small that it is as nothing & really worthy of no consideration.
¶And to avoid obscurity & repeated circumlocutions I would explain in what sense I use the word particle in what follows Hereby I intend the least parcel of matter that is of such a quantity as that its particular position or situation is of any consequence in the frame & system of things so that it's being placed so or otherwise should make some difference worthy to be regarded with respect to the regularity conveniency or excellency of the frame either the general frame or the particular parts in which regularity is in fact observed as in the bodies of animals vegetables &c-- Or in other words by particle I mean the smallest parcels or quantities of matter whose particular & exact position is actually that wherein that regularity beauty & convenience of the frame & composition of the universe that we observe does partly consist or on which the good ends that we see are obtaind by its disposition & contexture does partly depend
¶Having explaind the sense in which I would in this place use the word particle, I proceed to observe
¶1. If we suppose but two particles in all and there were some certain position or distance one from another that was more convenient than any other supposing that convenient distance to be the length of ten of both their diameters and suppose moreover these two particles from all eternity to be confined to one certain right line of an infinite length supposing these particles could exist without a cause and supposing also that they could have motion without a cause. It would be an infinite number to one whether these two particles would be in that most convenient situation at this time because there is but one convenient distance and an infinite number of other possible distances in that infinite line. And it is at least a thing as likely never to have been as to have been that these two particles should ever have come into this convenient situation at all at any time throughout all the past eternity. For it is manifest that the whole line that is infinitely extended both ways and without any beginning or any end is a length in extension that is equivalent to eternity that is an infinite length of duration that is infinitely extended both ways & without beginning or end and one part of that line taken from any particular point & extended infinitely but one way is a length that answers to eternity a parte ante or a past eternity an eternal duration is an infinite [A; mfo] length of single points of duration joined together /p./ & following one another extended to an infinite length in a manner equivalent to the single points following one another in a right line of infinite length. now if we should suppose that the two particles that exist in that right line that is infinite both ways might probably at some moment in the whole infinite duration from eternity to eternity come into that proposed convenient situation because in such a duration the two particles might come into all possible situations in that right line there being as many moments in that infinite duration as there are different points & so of situations & distances in that infinite line. if we allow it to be thus more likely than not that in a whole eternity without beginning or end these two particles might once come into that convenient situation yet if we take but half this duration viz. only eternity a parte ante we must suppose the probability not to be more than half so great & consequently that at most the probability of their ever coming into the situation is no more than equal to that of their not coming into it or in other words the probability of the affirmative is to that of the negative no more than one to one. N.B. It alters not the case as to what has been asserted whether we suppose these particles of matter in their motions to observe the laws of motion that now appear to be observed in the universe (& so to move on in the same direction perpetually) or no. for if this be supposed it is at least as probable that these two particles that move in this right line should from eternity move from one another as towards one another & so still the probability of their never coming into a convenient propinquity is at least as great as the affirmative or as was said before as one to one. Yea it must be more than so for the chance is one to one whether the particles will move at all or no (for matter in it self is indifferent to motion or rest.) & if so the probability of their not coming into the convenient situation is as two to one. but to avoid all occasion for disputes we will suppose it to be as one to one.
¶2. Supposing these two particles not to be confined to any certain infinite line but to a certain infinite plane. The probability then is infinitely less that ever these two particles would come into that convenient situation because an infinite plane contains an infinite number of such lines as many such lines as that infinite line did points so that as before the probability was to the improbability as one to one so now it is an infinite number to one. or in other words tho' we allow an infinite duration for these two particles to move & wander & change distance in yet confining them to one certain plain yet it would be infinitely unlikely that ever they should come at all throughout a whole eternity into that most convenient distance one from another or infinitely more likely that they should not than that they should
¶3. Let us suppose these two particles not to be confined either to any certain line or plain but to have the whole infinite solid to wander in then it is infinitely more improbable still that ever they would even throughout eternity come into that convenient situation because there are an infinite number of infinite planes in in [sic] an infinite solid as there are an infinite number of infinite lines in an infinite plane and an infinite number of points in an infinite line So that now the degree of improbability of the convenient situations ever happening throughout eternity beyond the chance there is that ever it would happen is expressed by an infinite number multiplied by an infinite number to one. /p./
[This entire page is xo by a vertical line; it is transcribed separately. The next p. treats the same point, slightly reworded.]
And now if instead of two particles we add a third and the thing required be that these three come at once into a convenient situation one with respect to another or that at the same time that the former two happen to come into that convenient situation this third also happen to be at the same distance from each of the other two so as with them to compose an equilateral triangle of certain dimensions or whose sides are of such a certain length now the improbability is still infinitely increased for let us now consider this third particle only with relation to some one of the other two the improbability that these two should ever come into the convenient distance throught [sic] eternity is just the same with that of the other two. But now this third particle has not only to come into that convenient distance with that one of the other two sometime or other in eternity but at a certain individual point viz. at that point of time when the other remaining one is also at the same distance from it (if that should ever be) which is infinitely more unlikely for it is infinitely more unlikely that two particles should come into a certain position at a certain individual point of time than that it should be at some time or other throughout eternity which contains an infinite number of such points of time so that now the degree of improbability that these three particles should ever throughout eternity come into that convenient situation one with respect to another is expressed by the disproportion there is between an infinite number multiplied by an infinite number and the sum of those multiplied again by an infinite number to an unit. So that the addition of the third particle to the system of particles that are to come into convenient situation diminishes the probability of this event as much as an eternal opportunity helps it because it diminishes it infinitely or makes the improbability as much more than it would otherwise be as an infinite number is more than an unit or (which is the same thing) as an infinite duration which consists of an infinite number of points of time exceeds one point of time
¶N. B. The addition of a third particle to the system makes the impro increases the improbility [sic] of the particles coming at once into the requisite order <viz.> so as to make an equilateral triangle of determinate dimensions in a vastly greater proportion than has been expressed. For what has been supposed in the argument has been only this that the third particle should come into the required distance from some one of the other two particles at the same point of time wherein the other particle happend to be at the same distance from it But that might be innumerable ways & yet the three not constitute an equilateral triangle three particles cant be so posited as to make an equilateral triangle of a certain bigness but in one kind of position. but two particles can be posited with respect to a third as both to be at the same distance from the third in innumerable different kinds of positions as many kinds as there are points in a sphere whose semidiameter is the distance of the two particles from that one that they are equally distant from. But however to avoid perplexity & to make the argument the easier I have supposed that the addition of the third particle does no more than infinitely increase the improbability.
[end of MS p. "125"]
¶And now if instead of two particles we add a third and the thing required be that these three come at once into a convenient situation one with another, or that the former two should at some time or other come into that convenient distance before spoken [of (om.E)] and also that this third do at the same time be so posited with them as to form such a certain convenient figure, as suppose an equicrural triangle having one right angle all three having an infinite solid expansion to wander in This will most prodigiously increase the account & magnify the improbability. For let us suppose the two first particles fixed at their due distance [om.A] as tho' each were fastend at the two ends of a rod of a proper length and so to remain fix'd throughout eternity waiting for the third to come into its point of proper situation with respect to them. Then the remaining thing required is equivalent to the third particles coming into a certain individual point in infinite space And the chance is just the same whether we suppose the point to be fix'd or moveable because just so much advantage is gained by its being moveable one way is lost another The advantage gained is that the point being moveable may move towards the particle & meet it but on the contrary if in its motion it should happen to fly from it that would be as great a disadvantage but its motion is just so likely to be from it [so (om.E)] as to increase the distance as towards it so as to approach nearer to it. So that it appears that the coming of the third particle into a due position with the other two that remain'd fixed at the same distance one from another is equivalent to this third particles coming into a contained fixed point in infinite space. But the improbability that lies against that is to the chance there is for it (as appears by what has already [been (om.E)] said) as an infinite number multiplied by an infinite to one. for if it were confined to a certain plane that had that fix'd point in it it would be as an infinite number to one but if wandring at liberty in an infinite solid it is as an infinite number multiplied by an infinite number to one. This expresses the improbability of the third particles coming into its due position with the [sic] supposing the others [A: -s?] to be fixed at a due position one with another throughout eternity but if the other two come into their due position but at one point of time in all eternity supposing that to be certain that it would be once it is still infinitely more unlikely that the third should come into its due position with them at that individividual [sic] point of time than if they were so tied together through all eternity because a whole eternity includes an infinite number of points of time So that now upon this supposition the improbability is expressed in an infinite number multiplied by an infinite number and the product again multiplied by an infinite number to one. Thus the matter would stand on the supposition that it was certain that the two first particles would some time in eternity come into their due position one with respect to another. But it has been shewn that that is so far from being certain, that the degree of improbability of it is expressed by an infinite number of infinite numbers to one which improbability is to [be (om.E;mg here] added to the foregoing it being still so many more times improbable so that now the degree of the whole improbabity [sic] of the three particles ever coming into such a position as to form such an equicrural triangle as has been mentioned is expressed by an infinite number of infinite numbers multiplied again by an infinite number and this again by an infinite number & this last product /p./ still by another infinite-- so unlikely is it that but only three particles should ever come into so simple a regularity as this fortuitously tho' there should be an whole eternity of opportunity for it
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what then would be the improbability of such a multitude of particles coming into such a complex & wonderfully regular frame as in in [sic] the body of an animalcule & as must be supposed to be in such a body having through the marvellous mechanism of its parts a power to make others like it self & they others through thousands of generations and what then in that infinitely more complex frame that contains so many millions of kinds of plants & animals & the frame of the universe so fitted for their habitation by its infinitely complex contexture & contrivance
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¶It appears from what has been observed that the eternity of opportunity makes so little odds [? A ed; my transcr] as to the probability of but three particles coming into so simple a regularity as that of a certain kind of equicrural triangle that the addition of one single particle to the frame does infinitely more than overbalance it The improbability of the regular position of the two particles with an eternity of opportunity as was before observed is expressed by an infinite once multiplied by an infinite to one. but if we suppose there had be [sic] no eternity of opportunity & but one single moment the opportunity would have been infinitely less still. so that then the improbability would be so added to that infinite must be multiplied by infinite twice instead of once. but the addition of another particle makes an infinitely greater odds than this for by this means instead of multiplying infinite by infinite twice the multiplication must be made four times.
¶And in this manner does the systems becoming more complex increase the improbability the addition of every single particle that goes to the making out the regularity or convenience of the system increases the improbability so much that the increase of it is expressed by multiplying the improbability by an infinite number three times. i.e by multiplying the improbability by an infinite number & that product by another infinite. to illustrate this by adding a fourth particle to the three forementioned I have already showed if there were but three particles how great the improbability would be that ever they should come into such a situation one with respect to another as to form a right angled equicrural triangle we will now suppose there to be four particles in all and the thing required be that they should come into such a situation one with respect to another as to form an exact square of such a bigness that each of the sides should be equal to to [sic] the two equal sides of the forementioned equicrural triangle or (which is the same thing) the thing required is that the three first particles should come at some moment into the forementiond situation of an equicrural triangle and also that the fourth should come into that individual point that makes the fourth angle of a square with these three & also at that individual moment wherein the other three come into their requisite situation . And in order to judge how great the improbability of all this is we must in the first place consider how great the improbability is that the three first particles should ever come into their requisite situation of such an equicrural triangle which is necessary in order to their being any such point as the fourth angle of a square with them But the degree of the improbability we have considered already & shewn it to be expressed by the proportion of the product of an infinite number multiplied into it self four times to an unit. This is the degree of improbability of their [sic] ever /p./ being any such point given as the fourth angle required But now if we suppose there to be such a point given at some moment in eternity the additional improbability is of the fourth particles coming into that point at that individual moment if the point was fixed & remained waiting through eternity it appears by what has already been demonstrated it would be an infinite number multiplied by an infinite number to one whether ever it would come into any fixed individual point at any time through eternity but as the point is supposed to be given but one moment in eternity this makes it yet infinitely more improbable. So that the improbability of the fourth particles coming into that point at the right time is expressed by an infinite [E's line] <number> (which multiplies the preceding) & this multiplied by an infinite [E's] number & that product by an infinite [E's] number. And this is the addition of the improbability of the whole system the preceding improbability is expressed by an infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite and the additional improbability is first an infinite [E's] which we must concieve of as multiplying the preceding product & then this multiplied by infinite & this still by infinite . So that the whole degree [of (om.E)] improbability of the four particules [sic] ever happening to be so situated as to make the requisite square at any time through eternity is expressed by an infinite number x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite, to one
¶And in like manner the improbability would be increased if we should go one [sic] and [wwxo] & suppose the required system & to the four particles should suppose a fifth to be added at some certain point requisite to make out the regularity suppose in the center of the square it will easily appear that the improbability will be increased by multiplying of it by infinites a like number of times. So that the improbability of five particles coming into this or any other determinate regular system tho there be an eternity of opportunity or the probability of the contrary is expressed by an infinite number x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite x infinite.
¶If there be so great an improbability of a regular system so simple, consisting of but five parts ever coming into existence through the fortuitous wandring of the parts in infinite space tho there be an eternity of opportunity given for it then how great would be the improbability of so many millions of different parts of matter as must be supposed in so complex a frame as that of an animalcule coming of themselves or by meer accident into a situation of such marvellous exactness of contrivance and regularity & such wonderful mechanism as not only to perform all those functions of life that are performed but also (which the atheists must suppose) as to have a power through the mechanism to make other frames like itself still with a power to make others like them & so on through thousands of generations And how great then is the improbability of the whole frame of the universe its coming into such a regularity as it exists in containing so many myriads of millions of millions of milions of such animal bodies and also as many if not more bodies of plants with all that mechanism whence arises all those phaenomena that are seen in them & particularly the like power of producing the species through thousands of generations as in animals and also such F many millions of such frames of matter (as the atheists suppose) so curious as to have /p./a power of understanding remembring reasoning & contriving & performing all the intelligent operations of mankind with a power of producing the like frames from generation to generation for so many thousand years. Besides the frame of the world about them every way so wonderfully fitted for their habitation & use with such a variety of substances earth, water air fire light & innumerable others some of which are of such wonderfull form power & use as the water air & many others & especially the use. & all disposed in such a manner in such parts situations & with such motions so excellently answering all ends I say how unreasonable will it appear from what has been observed to suppose that all this came to pass fortuitously by meer chance without any contriving disposing cause.
¶It appears from what has been said that the parts of matter wandring in infinite space being supposed to have an eternity of opportunity to get into this regularity makes no odds of any moment or worthy of any consideration as to the improbability of such an events ever coming to pass or the unreasonableness of supposing any more than if we suppose the opportunity only of a single moment. For it has been demonstrated from things that have been observed that the addition of the minutest particle that goes to the making up that complex frame adds infinitely more to the improbability than an eternity of opportunity diminishes it So that if we only suppose the whole frame to be less complex by one single particle than it [is (om.E)] then the infinite opportunity that is in eternity is balanced & infinitely more than balanced and it is infinitely less likely that the whole frame taking in that single particle should ever exist with an eternity of opportunity than that the frame without that single particle or being less complex by one particle should come into existence with but a single moments opportunity . Surely therefore the difference that is made in the improbability of the existence of the frame of the universe through a casual concourse of particles by supposing an eternity of opportunity is absolutely of no moment or worthy of no consideration in the argument between us & atheists.
¶[8 lines here xo and alm. exactly rewr. in next ¶]
¶We have supposed hitherto that all the particles that have any existence throughout the whole of infinite space do go to make up the frame of the universe But if we suppose a surplusage of particles it will not help the cause of the atheists. For the supposition of a surplusage of particles seems to give a better chance for such a regular frame to come accidentally into existence through a fortuitous jumbling of particles, & so [as] to less [sic] the improbability one way, yet it seems as much to increase it another. For let us suppose that besides the particles that belong to the frame of this universe the whole of infinite space to be possessed by particles as thick, take one part of space with another as they are in this universe or that it has as many particles in all parts of space equal to the extent of this universe, take one part with another, as there are particles in the universe . Then these /p./ two things must come to pass by meer accident 1 that all those particles of which the universe is constituted should come into such a regular and exact situation as to constitute such a wonderful infinitely complex & exact frame as this & 2. that all the other particles that fill space in general as full as this universe is all particles that are unserviceable and are not needed to make up the frame should agree to absent thems. & keep at a distance to leave so vast a vacuity for the regular frame & none of them interpose so as to hinder the regularity & beauty & disturb the order of the parts So that so vast a room should be left & avoided by all irregular particles as much as if they were fenced out & that altho other parts of space take one with another are as full of particles as this universe is which has such an immense and as it were infinite multitude . And if we suppose there to be a surplusage of particles but not so many as to fill up space in general so full as this universe is but elsewhere to be very thin & so therein to be less likely to interpose to disturb the order of this regular frame It is to be considered that as on this supposition the probability of disturbing the frame is diminished so the probability [of (om.E)] their helping it by their numbers is as much diminished so that whether we suppose the particles to be thick or rare it comes to the same thing the thicker they are the less likely it is that they would leave such vast room to be occupied only by regular particles & the more likely to thrust thems. amongs [sic] those that are regularly situated one with respect to another & the thinner or more rare they are the less do they through their multitude help the chance or for the existence of a regular situation of some particles or other [A: other] Thick particles jumbling together without any direction in some respects tend more to confusion than if they were very rare as they more to intrude, & so to disturb & break any regularity [sic] that might happen. & multitude [sic] of particles all without rule or direction tend more to interfere with any regularity of frame that they are conjoind with or incompass than a small number.
¶It is to be considered that the universe is one vast general frame consisting of an innumerable multitude of lesser regular frames there is a multitude of particular regular frames that constitute the body of an animal; as the frame of the eye the ear the lungs the heart &c-- and so it also is with the body of a plant the root the stem the leaf, flower, fruit & seed. but then the innumerable multitude of bodies & plants & animals that here [sic; mg. here] upon earth go to constitute another more general frame viz the animate world & this goes to the constitution of another larger frame together with the habitation provided for it & the very various provision made in it for the for their proper abode life preservation nourishmt growth propagation increase motion mutual subserviency & all the good they receive [sic] & use they are of through the provision of a proper variety of substances & their proper situation composition regular motions & alterations. such as the earth water air wind sea springs rivers. light heat cold vapours dew rain day night summer winter &c-- And the whole frame of this terraquous [sic] globe with its atmosphere is a part of another regular frame viz the planetary system & this of another made up of innumerable enlightend systems each from one fountain of light like the sun all posited at such a distance one from another as to enlighten & adorn one another and yet not to disturb one another sensibly for 6000 years
¶Now the supposition of infinite space being filled in general thick with particles wandring at random tho it may seem to lessen the improbability of such a frame coming by chance one way yet it exceedingly increases it another. For this whole universe is no other than an immense multitude /p./ of particular regular systems all with a convenient mutual vicinity & a proper relation & exact situation & commensuration. But now the supposition of infinite space being filled thick with particles all moving without rule or direction does in a way vastly increase the improbability of such a multitude of regular frames happening in such a mutual neighbourhood & relation for if certain particles fall into a due situation for one particular regular frame 'tis the more likely for the multitude of irregular particles about it that others will interpose among these regularly situated particulars [sic] to disturb and destroy the harmony And if there should notwithstanding the multitude of irregular busy crowding particles happen to be two systems of particles in a due regular situation it is still the more likely that other particles will interpose to disturb the order & mutual subserviency either by intruding among these regular particles or interposing between the two frames. and if we suppose three systems still the probability is greatly increased
¶But how great is the improbability, that in such an immense number of millions of millions of particular very complex & wonderfully regular frames which the universe consists of should all happen at once, fortuitously in a proper & exact proportion & convenient vicinity & relation & none of the surplusage of paticules [sic] with which infinite space is filled should interfere or interpose to disturb the harmony & subserviency or obscure the beuty & that altho' the room be so vast & the opportunity so great.
¶So that the objection made from the eternity of opportunity against the force of the argument from the wonderful contrivance of the world to prove the being of a God is but a meer amusemt such order & contrivance plainly shews a contriving & disposing Cause & is a demonstration of intelligence & wisdom whether we suppose an eternity of existence of wandring atoms or no an infinite length of time has no tendency to alter the case
¶If we should suppose people travelling in the snow one after another thousands in a day for thousands of years together & all should tread exactly without the least variation in one anothers steps so as in all this time to make no beaten path but only steps at a due [distance?] & [xo?] with the snow not broken between This is a demonstration of intention design & care or if we suppose that in the showers of rain that fall out of the clouds on all the face of the earth for a whole year the drops should universally fall in order on the ground so as to describe such figures that would be Roman letters in such exact order as to be Virgi [sic] Eneids [sic] written on every acre of ground all over the world or so as exactly to write the history of the world and all nations & families in it through all ages without departing from truth in one fact or minutest circumstance this would sufficiently demonstrate a designing cause. Length of time has no tendency at all to produce such an effect of it self if we multiply years never so much to give large opportunity it helps not the case without a designing cause 'tis no more likely to bring about such a years rain as this than if we suppose the opportunity of one year only /p./
¶And as that objection against the force of the argument for the being of a God from the order & contrivance of the frame of the universe, viz. that there has been an eternity of opportunity for this to come to pass in of it self is vain & insignificant . so would it be as vain to say that the world has existed in this regular beautiful & convenient frame from eternity For still contrivance shews wisdom & intelligence And to say that the world exists in such a regular frame because it did so alwaies no more solves the difficulty of its being so without wisdom & intelligence than if there were a blind man that had lived from eternity & alwaies blind that was able exactly to describe visible things as if he saw without ever having been informed as particularly the number & diverse magnitude position & motion of the stars and any should ask how he came to know this and it should be answered that there never was a time when he came to know it for he knew it from eternity & never needed the information of his senses or of his fellow creatures this is a meer put off & in no wise removes the difficulty for, seeing it, is as necessary in order to his knowing it from eternity as to his receiving [sic] the knowledge of it in time. So the orderly <convenient> & excellent disposing of things in order to obtain good ends is a thing that depends as much on knowledge & understanding as the knowledge of visible things depends on sight & therefore the former can no more be from eternity without understanding than the latter without sight. [finis]
[this entry is separately paginated by JE and has different running heads that appear to correspond to different sections of the entry]
[there are no entry Nos. 881, 882, 883. This is the end of bk 3. It is possible that JE intended to go back and write these entry nos. on the few blank pp. at the end of this book. It is also possible that they occurred at the beginning of Bk. 4. The first few leaves of bk 4 are missing. We have the beginning of entry No. 884 from an Andover copy. But there are no copies of the missing entries.]