¶821. SELF-LOVE. COMMON GRACE. SAVING GRACE There are two affectations that are natural to me<a>n that do especially seem to imitate vertue the one is gratitude or a disposition to love others that love them tis as easy to account for such an affections arising from self love as anger & revenge whereby men are disposed to hate those that hate them Math 5. 46. For if ye love them that love you what reward have ye; do not even the publicans the same.
¶2. Tis very plain by experience that pity is an affection natural to me<a>n. But this dont argue that men naturally have any true or proper love to others that dont arise from self love for men may pity those that they have no love to provided they dont hate them or if they do hate them they may pity them if they see that their misery goes beyond their hatred Pity is a painfull sensation in us arising from the sight or sense of misery in others that is disproportionable to our disposition towards them whenever /p./there is a dispropotion between our disposition towards others and the state we see them in it has a tendency to excite uneasiness in us let that disposition be what it will when we see those happy that we don't love or when their happiness exceeds our love or when their misery is less than our hatred that excites our envy. & on the other hand when we see those miserable that we don't hate or when their misery exceeds our hatred or when their happiness is less than our love it excites our pity. This natural pity may excite in men hatred of many acts of sin we have a remarkable instance in David when he dont seem to have been much in the exercise of grace 2. Sam. 12 [corr. A copyist? over E's nos. oblit] 5.6. And Davids anger was greatly kindled against the man and he said to Nathan As the Lord liveth the man that hath done this thing shall surely die and he shall restore the lamb fourfold because he did this thing & because he had no pity.
¶And self love may have influence to cause men to love vertue many more ways than one would be ready to imagine the ways of the working of a mans heart are so mysterious that in many instances it may be difficult to give an account how such & such things should arise from self love
¶That natural men should love just generous, meek & benevolent persons and persons possessed of such like vertues with a love of appetition & complacence tho' they have never recieved any benefit by those vertues in them and possibly have no expectation that ever they shall, is no more unaccountable than that they should love that sweet fruit & pleasant food the sweetness of which they are sensible of or have an idea of tho' they as yet recieve no benefit of it & don't know that ever they shall Yet they love it because they concieve of it as in it self tending to their pleasure if there were opportunity & due application so they concieve of those mention'd vertues as in like manner in their own nature tending to their good. Self love makes them love the quality in general in one case as in the other
¶A natural [man (om.E)] may love others but tis some way or other as appendages & apputenances to himself but a spiritual man loves others as of God or in God, or some way related to him. [finis]
[Is line in left mg. E's? or a mark to indic. prev. printing? This is used in some way or other in the True Virtue.]
¶822. DEGREES OF GLORY. PERFECTION OF HAPPINESS. What I mean by the largeness of capacity for happiness dont consist only in the strength & extent of the faculties but in the actual views which God gives whereby the appetite of the soul is excited and extended and the enjoying faculty (if I may so speak) is as it were open'd and prepared to recieve such a degree & such a manner of delight & satisfaction and their capacity will also partly depend on their particular station & circumstances God sets em in in heaven the degree & place they stand in in the heavenly society For not only the knowledge they have will excite their desires but also the consideration of the place they stand in in the body & so the consideration of what is suitable for them in their place.
¶Wherein the degree of capacity depends on the degree of knowledge it depends on three things 1. the extent & strength of the faculty. 2 The degree of notional knowledge. but it wont depend only on these two for the angels do doubtless far excell the saints in both in the extent & strength of their faculties & also in the degree & manner of those spiritual views that God lets into their minds and the particular manifestations that he is pleased to make of himself enlarging the appetite & opening the heart & extending the vessel viz the enjoying faculty opening the mouth wide to recieve the more
¶Every one shall have his cravings filled i.e. in such a sense as to leave no uneasiness of craving but not so as to leave no desire of increasing for doubtless when they study & contemplate [it will be(omE)] with a desire of gaining knowledge & the satisfaction that arises from it so we are told the angels desire to look into these things. But they shall have no uneasy desires their desires shall be no more than a suitable preparation for delight in their satisfaction Now the views we have cause uneasy desires we find obstructions & opposition in the way of our obtaining those things that our spiritual views excite an appetite after & great failing of such a satisfaction as we stand in great need of for the present & many & great frustrations in our desires Hence we read of groanings that cannot be uttered & the Psalmist says My soul breaketh for the longing it hath [finis; 3 or 54 line spaces blank at bottom of p.]
¶ 823. PERSEVERANCE. It shews the infallible perseverance of true Xtians that the spiritual life that they have is as partaking with X in his resurrection life or the life that he has recieved as risen from the dead & not as partaking of that life that he lived before his death for they live by Xs living in them Gal 2. 20. <quote[c]> this is by the life that he [wxo] has recieved since his resurrection and by communicating to them that fullness that he recieved when he rose from the dead when he rose he recieved the promise of the Father the Spirit of life without measure & sheds it forth on believers the oil poured on the risen head goes down the skirts of the garments & thus X lives in believers by his Spirits dwelling in them. Believers in their conversion are said to be risen with X Colos. 2. 12.13. Ye are risen with him trough the faith of the operation of God who hath raised him from the dead And you being dead in your sins & the uncircumcision of your flesh hath he quicken'd together with him & chap. 3. 1. If ye then be risen with X &c-- & Eph. 2. 5.6. Even when we were dead in sins hath quickened us together with X & hath raised us up together Rom 5. 10. For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son much more being reconciled we shall be saved by his life Philip. 3. 10.11. That I may know him & the power of his resurrection Rom. 6. 4.5. Therefore we are buried by him by baptism unto death that like as X was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father even so we also should walk in newness <of life: [c]> & so on throught [sic] that chapter.
¶This spiritual resurrection & life is procured & purchased for Xs members by Xs suffering obedience in the same manner as his own resurrection & life is purchased by it. & they recieve life as united to him as members of a rising Saviour and as being married in their conversion to him as in the beginning of the 7. chapter of Rom<ans[c]> which [is (om.E)] a continuation of that forecited discourse in the 6th chapter. That justification that believers have at their conversion is as partaking of the justification that X had in his resurrection & so all the benefits that believers [mg] <have[c]> their comfort & hope & joy here & their eternal life hereafter is <are[c]>[xo c] as partaking with a risen Saviour we are begotten again to a living hope by the res. of X from the dead to an inheritance incorruptible. See Eph. 1. 18.19.20.21 The eyes of your understanding being enlighten'd that ye may know what is the hope of his calling & what the riches of the glory of his inheiritance in the saints And what is the exceeding greatness of his power to usward who believe according to the working of his mighty power which he wrought in X Jesus when he raised him from the dead and set him at his own right hand in heavenly places
¶Hence it follows that the saints shall surely perserve in their spiritual life & their justified state The Apostle hence argues in the 6 of Rom<ans[c]> that believers are finally freed from sin & shall live forever with X & that sin shall no more have dominion over them v. 9. Knowing that X being raised from the dead dieth no more death hath no more dominion over him compared with v. 5.6.7.10.14. Xs resurrection life is an immortal unfailing life Rev. 1. 15. I am he that liveth & was dead & behold I am alive forever more Hence the benefits that believers recieve in [Rem; on?] being converted & risen with X are sure & unfailing mercies Acts 13. 34. And as concerning that he raised him up from the dead now no more to return to corruption he said on this wise I will give you the sure mercies of David this is the living bread & hence he that eath [sic] thereof shall not die but shall live forever. Joh. 6. 50.51. The saints can't die for their life is hid with X in God who is risen & ascended & is with God in glory in immortal life. Colos. 3. 3 4. [finis]
¶824. SAINTS HIGHER IN GLORY THAN THE ANGELS. Tis not in all respects that the saints will be in higher glory than the angels for the angels will be superiour in greatness in strength & wisdom & so in that honour that belongs to em on that [account (om.E)] but they will not be superiour in beauty & amiableness & in being most beloved of God and most nearly united to him & <having> the fullest & sweetest enjoyment of him . It hath pleased God in his infinite wisdom that the superiour greatness & the highest beauty & blessedness in the most intimate union with him & enjoymt of his love, should not go together that creature greatness mayn't lift up it self, that it may appear that God don't depend on creature greatness that creature greatness is nothingness before God and that all good is of God.
¶The nobles & barons & great ministers of a princes court may in strength & wisdom superiour be superiour to the queen or the kings children and so in some respects may have peculiar honour put upon them in that honourable business & those great employments they have answerable to their great abilities & that special sort of respect that is due such abilities. but yet yet [sic] the queen & the kings children are indeed all things considered most exalted In that the saints will be superiour in goodness & happiness they will have the most excellent superiority goodness is more excellent than creature greatness 'tis more di-/p./vine God communicates himself more immediately in it & therefore God is pleased to make goodness the end of greatness for he would make that in the creature which is properly belonging to the nature of the creature subordinate to that which is of God or a communication of the divine nature in the creature & accordingly has he disposed things between the two kinds of intelligent creatures that he has made he has made the good creature the end of the great creature he has made saints the end of the angels rather than the angels the end of the saints he has subordinated that kind of creatures wherein is most creature greatness to another sort of creatures that have not so much greatness but are appointed to more goodness i.e more divine beauty & joy in the communications of the Spirit of God.
¶Objec. The angels are called thrones dominions principalities & powers & how does thos consist with their being inferiour to the saints
¶Ans. This can't be understood as that <tho> they had principalities & dominion over the saints for being princes over the saints and their being their angels and ministring spirits to them hardly consist together. but they may be called thrones & dominions &c-- in two respects 1. with respect to their dominion in the earth or this lower visible T or 2. with respect to the various degrees & orders of angels whereby some are princes over others as tis among evil angels. or if they are princes with respect to the saints it must be only in some particular respects only wherein they are superiour the saints remaining still in the general superiour. [finis]
¶825. COVENANT of GRACE & REDEMPTION.
[See No. 617.B.1., 919.B.4., 1091.b.7.]
There are two covenants that are made that are by no means to be confounded one with another. 1. The covenant of God the Father with the Son & with all the elect in him whereby things are said to be given in X before the T began & to be promised before the T began This is what properly succeeds as tis revealed in the T in the room of Gods covenant with Adam and stands in direct opposition to it for as God made the first covenant with Adam for himself & all his posterity so God makes this covenant with X as second Adam for himself & all his posterity.
¶2. There is another covenant that is the marriage covenant between X and the soul the covenant of union or whereby the soul becomes united to X this cov. before marriage is only an offer or invitation . Behold I stand at the door & knock &c-- In marriage or in the souls conversion it becomes a proper covenant This is what is called the covenant of grace in distinction from the covenant of redemption [finis]
¶ 826. INDEFINITE PROMISES as they are called seem to be no other than promises of the publick covenant or the promises made to a professing covenant people God has has [sic] promised to his visible church a blessing on his ordinances & with respect to the publick society the visible church to whom the promises are made they are absolute<ly[c]> promised<s>[E?] but not being limited to particular persons to them they are no more than encouragements . such promises as these children are interested in by baptism God has promised to bestow salvation in his chh & in the way of his appointed worship. [space for ref?] In all places where I record my name there will I come unto thee & will bless thee When God sets his tabernacle amongst a people he has annexed a promise of his blessing [finis]
¶827.MILLENNIUM. Concerning Xs HUMAN presence on earth then. It is a greater priviledge to the church on earth to have X her head and Redeemer in heaven at the right hand of God than for him to be in this lower T For X in heaven is in his glorious throne for him to come down to this earth to dwell here would be a second humiliation, a descending from an higher glory to a lower. Christs exaltation and ascension to heaven is spoken of as cause of exceeding joy to his church It was an instating him in his throne in his peoples name. 'Tis a glorious priviledge to the church to have their Mediatour in heaven in the holy of holies at the right hand of God it tends to strengthen their faith & greatly to encourage and comfort them. No saint that considers things aright will desire that he should leave heaven Christs reigning on earth by his Spirit is more glorious & happy for his chh than his human presence would be As X intimates when he says Except I go away the comforter will not come. Xs ascension is spoken of as the most glorious cause of rejoicing in those Psalms that are penn'd on occasion of the ascension of the ark into Mt Zion. [finis]
¶828. RULE OF FAITH. SCRIPTURE CHH HISTORY FATHERS The way that history is to be made use of for our instruction and guidance in matters of faith is twofold tis either in interpreting the Scriptures or confirming the things that are taught in the Scripture . 1. There is no doubt but that what is to be learn'd of the antient customs & state of things at the time when the Scriptures were written as this is to be learn'd from other authors is to be made use of in interpreting the words & phrases. and the knowledge of antient customs and the state of things is needfull to [be (om.E)] known in order to an interpretation of the SS the same way as the knowledge of the custom of speech for from knowing what was the custom of speaking from other authors we argue that the penmen of SS. speak in the same manner for tis a known & manifest thing that custom governs the use of speech and language & so also it is a known & manifest thing that the state of affairs in every age & countrey governs the use of speech in many respects.
¶Indeed so hath God wisely ordered that the SS in both these respects is more sufficient for it self by far than any other book both the use & force of its own phrases is more fully to be learn'd from the Scriptures themselves & also the customs & state of things on which the interpretation mainly depends. The manifest design of God in the SS. is to speak so plainly as that the interpretation should be more independent than that of any other book which is ever <prob. "is ever"> [A; it owes?] to be remembered & should alwaies be of great weight with us in our interpretation of the SS. & so we should chiefly interpret SS. by SS.
¶2. Another way that we may make use of history &c. in affairs of this nature is to help our weakness and unbelief & to confirm the truths taught us in the SS. history & other antient writings may as well be made use of to confirm anything in the SS according to the force of reason that is in them as reason may be made use of for this purpose from experience from our present observation of what passes in our own hearts or what we observe among our neighbors or what is to be seen or heard of in the present state of Gods chh or the T of mankind or the present dispensations of Gods providence.
¶Whatever affords a just argument to reason whether history or any thing else may & ought to be made use [of (om.E)] fully according to the proportion of weight or force of real argument there is in it The only question there can be is concerning the proportion of weight of argument between the Scripture and other things and the danger is of not laying weight enough on what we find in the scripture not laying laying such weight on it as God expects we should on that which he has given to us on purpose that it might be a sufficient perfect & infallible rule. [finis]
¶829. JUSTIFICATION. MERIT. MORAL FITNESS. The Arminians suppose their scheme of justification don't imply that we are justified by our own merit. [A:-s] they utterly disclaim the doctrine of our own merit [A:-s] But tho' they disclaim the word [E's line] yet they fully maintain the thing, signified by that word whoever maintains that men are justified by their own vertue or goodness considered as his goodness therein does to all intents & purposes maintain that they are justified by their own merit or worthiness If our vertue and obedience is according to the strict truth of things all things considered is to be looked upon as some moral goodness of our person or we are to be looked upon as in some degree morally good upon the account of it There is no dispute but that there is merit or worthiness worthiness is of the essence of moral goodness and universally & necessarily attends it as much as guilt or blame attends sin or moral evil. as all moral evil is blame worthy & worthy of abbhorrence and the fruits of abhorrence so all moral goodness is praise worthy worthy of acceptance approbation and of the fruits of acceptance and approbation & therefore that scheme that supposes that a mans vertue & good works are accepted as some moral goodness of him and that he is accordingly justified on the account of it that scheme supposes a man is justified by his merits. & [xo? A om.] tho it is true their scheme may be inconsistent with it self & some parts of their scheme may contradict this. To suppose that a man is looked upon as in any degree morally good is to suppose him in some degree worthy & that tho' we suppose him to have more sin than goodness for still if he is to be looked upon according to truth as in some de-/p./gree good he is worthy of a reward or an abatement of punishment, which is equivalent to a reward.
¶Indeed there is a sort of merit or worthiness that this scheme of justification dont necessarily suppose & that is that sort that is peculiar to X as a divine person which worthiness differed from that of all others in that what he offered to God was what originally was not due by a debt of subjection But it implies fully the highest possible kind of merit or worthiness of a creature tho not the highest degree of that kind. [finis]
¶830. FREE WILL. According to the present prevailing notion of liberty it consists in a state of indifference that the soul was in antecedent to the act of choice so that if when the [wwxo] the two opposites are proposed set before the will in order to its determination or choice the soul is not found hitherto in a state of indifference and don't so remain till it has determined it self by its own act of choice the proposal did not find the soul ina state of liberty neither is the choice that is made upon it a free choice and that any thing done can be no further blame worthy than it is the fruit of a choice made by will in this sense left to it self & to its own sovereignty without any weight lying upon it antecedent to its own determination & act of choice to put it out of its balance to bypass and sway it one way & in any measure by its power to govern its determination,<or ;> because they suppose that a free will must be determined only by its self & that nothing but its own sovereign command of it self
can have any hand in its determination. [-s?] But in case of such an antecedent byassing power affecting the will to turn it one way the will is in some thing out of it self. So that according to this notion of liberty if there be any original corruption of nature took from the liberty of the will and hence it will follow, that if a man be naturally a very ill natured man and from that ill nature does often treat his neighbours maliciously & with great indignity his neighbours ought to excuse & not to be angry with him so far as what he does is from ill nature & so if he be naturally of a very proud haughty spirit t 'tis unreasonable in his neighbours to resent his haughty contemptuous carriage towards them so far as it arises from a proud natural temper . And so on the other hand if any person be naturally of an excellent spirit or <a-?A:a> disposition strongly inclining him to vertue, & the most amiable actions so far does it take from the commendableness & praiseworthiness of his actions . and so none of the holy excellent actions or voluntary sufferings of Jesus X are worthy of any reward or commendation because he was naturally perfectly holy he had a nature so strongly inclining him to holiness that it certainly and indeclinably determined him to holy actions And so of the holy actions of the angels and above all of the holy & righteous & excellent acts of God himself for he by nature is infinitely holy . He is so far from exercising liberty in any of [wwxo] of his holiness or vertue that according to this notion of liberty that he is infinitely far from it for his will antecedently to the act is infinitely out of balance his inclination one way is so strong & makes it so necessary that he should choose on the holy side, that tis infinitely impossible that his will should be determined the other way.
¶and so tis equally against this notion of liberty if there was previous to the act of choice a preponderancy in those visible circumstances of the two opposite proposed objects of choice . So that antecedent to its act of choice there was more manifested or apparent to the soul on one side that naturally tended to byass & sway the choice on that side than on the other, when the will proceeds on <in (prob.)> its act of choice according to such a byass it is not a free choice because it was not determind only by it self but partly at least by something without it self viz that apparent preponderance of circumstances that put the will out of its balance so that it was not under equal advantages to choose either in the meer exercise of its own sovereignty . A preponderance in visible circumstances that naturally tend [sic] to sway the disposition on one side, is equivalent to a preponderance of the natural disposition on one side & indeed it is the same thing for tis supposed that in such circumstances nature preponderates that way . To say that there is a preponderance of such circumstances as naturally tends that way As for instance when the circumstances of a case proposed to the will for its choice, are such that most of the visible pleasure and advantage which we naturally incline to is on one side this is equivalent to a preponderating of nature towards one side, and cant be distinguished from it because it is supposed that the natural inclination preponderates towards the greatest apparent advantage . Hence it is scarcely worth the while to offer any arguments to perswade men to choose that which is good and refuse that which is evil 'tis not worth the while to set before men the wisdom of ways of vertue and piety & the folly of ways of vice by shewing the great advantages and benefits of the former & the mischievous tendency of the latter, no nor the deformity of the one & the beuty & amiableness of the other (for men naturally incline to what appears beautifull to them & abhor deformity) This notion of liberty seems to frustrate all such endeavors to perswade men to vertue for tho these things may induce em to what is materially vertuous yet at the same time they take away the form of vertue because they put the soul out of its equilibrium wherein its liberty consists and occasion something else to determine the will besides its own sovereignty and the more powerfull the arguments are the more likely are they to be in vain in this respect for the more is the inclination put out of its balance & the greater hand has something external in determining the will & so the more effectually is the form of vertue destroyed And so likewise when men are led into the practice of virtue or vice by powerfull example the form of vertue and vice are wanting because men naturally incline to follow example
But how absurd are these things.[thus on page]
¶Corol. 1. From the absurdity of this notion of liberty we may infer that it is false and that the liberty of men dont at all consist in or depend upon such an equilibrium but is entirely of another nature and that whether the will or inclination be more or less out of its equilibrium before the act of choice it don't at all concern the liberty of that act of choice.
¶Corol. 2. And from hence it follows that necessity, if by necessity is meant only certain connection of nature between one thing and another is not a thing opposite to liberty or at all inconsistent with it, tho compulsion or force be inconsistent with it. for if as has been just shewn it is not in any measure inconsistent with liberty that the soul be out of an equilibrium or that its natural preponderates before the act of choice let it preponderate more or less but no one will deny that the preponderance may be & often is such as to imply a necessity or certain connection with an act of choice agreable to it.
¶Corol. 3. from what has been said also it appears that tis not against human liberty for the will to be determined by something out of it self, as when it is determined by such a preponderating of circumstances
¶Corol. 4. Hence it is not at all inconsistent with human liberty for mans will to be determined by the ordering of divine providence as when providence orders that the prevailing natural inclination or that preponderating visible circumstances should be on one side yea tho' providence should so order it as that a particular determination of the will should be in nature be [sic] certainly connected with such a disposal of providence. & so that [sic] neither the commendableness nor blameworthiness of the acts of the will is hereby infringed.
¶Corol. 5. Hence it is not at all against human liberty for God absolutely to decree that such a determination of the will shall come to pass or to decree to order circumstances so that such a determination of the will shall certainly follow. [finis]
[Very imp. no. Prob. the first to lay out the driving purpose, main lines of argument, and points JE thought involved; cf. title of published work. The line in left mg. is probably JE's and if so indicates the use or usabilness of this material in projected work.]
¶831. JUSTIFICATION BY faith i.e By reason of the NATURAL FITNESS there [is (om.E)] between faith in X and a being looked upon as united to X. It has been objected by some against what is here advanced that this scheme of things seems to suppose that a believers being justified has its foundation in nature & not in Gods pleasure in that it supposes that if a person believes in X there is a natural fitness in it that he should have an interest in X prior to any constitution of God which seems to /p./ suppose that 'tis so far from being owing to Gods arbitrary constitution that he makes faith the condition of an interest in X that he could not fitly or suitably have done otherwise
¶To this objection I answer. 1. This don't suppose that it is depending on Gods sovereign will & meer pleasure whether or no he would give mankind a Saviour to be their head and surety and to suffer all their punishment as their head & substitute and to fulfill the law & perform all the obedience required by the law in order to a title to eternal life. This gift of X to do & suffer such things for us in such a manner & for such a purpose I suppose to be altogether the fruit of Gods sovereign good pleasure.
¶2. This dont suppose that it is not a thing that depends on Gods meer good pleasure when a Saviour is thus given and has thus been substituted for us and as our substituted [sic] has thus perfectly obeyed and satisfied. whether or no this Saviour shall be offered to all or whether it shall be limited and whom in particular it shall be made to so that the offer of salvation or opportunity for salvation by X on any terms at all as to every individual person or whether it shall be offered wholly to all or to some in part only depends wholly on Gods arbitrary pleasure
next p.
God has of his meer good pleasure given his Son to be the Saviour of sinners & substituted him for them & he as their substitute has perfectly answer'd the law both in its threatnings & precepts and this Saviour is revealed to be for all to seek an interest in without limitation I say I do not suppose that after this any one will say, every thing relating to the way in which persons should become interested in this Saviour & what he has done & suffered is still in such a sense wholly depending on Gods arbitrary constitution that no one way is in it self more fit than another & more agreable to things as thus already constituted so that there can be no more suitableness in appointing one than another (will any one say so.) Particularly it would not in it self be suitable after this that the way of being interested in X should be by their own vertue or righteousness because this contains an inconsistency with the giving a Saviour to perform all righteousness for us as will be hereafter shewn And so I suppose there [sic] would be in itself unsuitable, that some wholly indifferent thing that has neither any moral goodness in it nor any relation to X the Mediatour or to God that has given him or any of his benefits should be the great thing by which persons should become interested in X.
¶4. I would ask of any one that makes the foregoing objection whether or no things relating to our redemption being as they are in the foremention'd respects abating any consideration of any further constitution and only considering the nature of things in themselves on that by the sincere act of his own heart unites & closes with X as his Head and Saviour & the way of salvation by his satisfaction & righteousness & so as a rational voluntary agent is one with X by his own act is not on that account much more fitly & suitably [E's lines] to be looked upon as [wwxo] & belonging to & legally one with him than others in whom there never has been any such active unition with X. &
¶5.[The brackets within this paragraph are later additions and in black ink.] I would further ask whether or no if the case be so indeed & all must needs acknowledge it that there is a great suitableness [E's line] [& it is a thing more wise] that those that as creatures capable of act & choice [should be required] actively & in heart [to] unite X as their head [in order to a] be[ing] acepted of God as one with X [& that this is more fit than that] others that dont close with him [should be looked upon as one with him] prior to any divine constitution about this matter and we now see that God has actually constituted that he will acept such & such only as one with X & that BY [E's] or on the ACCOUNT of this active unition Where is the absurdity of our supposing that he doth thus accept such rather than others as one with X because of that [wisdom] suitableness & fitness there [is in so doing] /p./ and that the wisdom of G. appears therein. when reason shews us that things that God does have a suitableness in their own nature, is it absurd for us to suppose that God does it because it is suitable [& wise]. when reason shews us that they & they only believe on [A; in?] X are suitably qualified to be looked upon as in him & God declares that he will acept of them & them only as suitably qualified & that he does it by [E's line] or on the account [E's line] of that qualification is it unreasonable for us to suppose that he does it because thay are suitably qualified or is it not indeed fully implied.
¶ 3. These things being already thus fixed by a divine constitution, to fix the particular way in which persons should become interest [sic?] in this Saviour still depends on Gods arbitrary constitution in the sense in which we commonly use such an expression, i.e God still remains absolutely at liberty from any such thing as we call obligation or any indebtedness to men to fix one way & not another. but God may fix the way in which an interest in the Saviour shall be determined as his own will & wisdom shall direct free from any tie in justice, (for tis moral fitness only & not natural that ever more brings what we call obligation.) But yet I don't suppose that any one will say that since see last p.
¶ 6. I would ask such an objector, whether or no if it be nit allowed that believers are accepted as one with X by faith [E's line] in this sense, viz that it is from respect to something in faith whereby it does in its own nature [E's line] especially qualify a person or ( which is the same thing) render him fit to be looked upon as one with X, It [possibly "if"] be possible to find out any sense wherein it may be said to be by faith [E's line] that we are accepted as being in X but that the same may in the same sense be equally said of any other grace
¶The objection is against persons being acepted in X by faith on the account of any relation that faith in X has to a being in X, in the nature of the things [-s added later; "the" shd then probl have been xo] & so it is insisted that faith has no relation to a being in X only by positive constitution & if it be so wherein has faith any relation to this benefit different from that which [is (om.E)] common to every other grace for the relation that is by constitution can be nothing more than [that?] a constituted connection between the grace and the benefit shall not be without the grace nor the grace without the benefit, without any regard to any real fitness or qualification or any relation in nature whatsoever. but what grace is [there (om.E)] that is not in this sense fully as much connected with this benefit as faith
¶7. Some that have made this objection seem to suppose it a new notion that it should be supposed that God justifies so by faith [E's line] as that he has in that act respect to any relation that faith has to an interest in X in its own nature, when indeed it is far from being a new thing for all that suppose that men are justified by faith or are acepted as being in X by faith is the instrument by which X is recieved do suppose that men are accepted in X by faith because of the relation that [it (om.E)] stands in to X and his righteousness in its own [nature] viz because the very nature of it is to apprehend X or that is in its own nature related to the benefit as the hand that recieves is to the gift recieved. See No. 877. [finis]
¶832. PREFACE. To Rational Account. To mention some things that may justly make us suspect that the presnt fashionable divinity is wrong. 1. Whether or no it be likely that an age that is distinguished from all other ages of the Xtian church for deadness in the practice of religion & for practical licentiousness & so of the absence of the Spirit of God and prevalence of the spirit of the devil should be distinguished from all latter ages in purity of doctrine and in being conducted by the providence and Spirit of God into the Knowledge of the truth as it is in Jesus and enjoying glorious light being delivered from the errours of former generations; If we look into past ages was ever any thing seen parallel with this when the T had new light breaking forth after heathenism it was accompanied with a glorious reformation of manners So when new light broke forth at the Reformation & has it always been so in ages past that the most corrupt times with respect to practice have most abounded with errour. [space on line] And how strange would it be in its own nature if it should be and how diverse from what God declares he will do who will not lead /p./ the wicked into his truth but the secret of the Lord is with them that fear him & he will shew them his covenant & the meek are those that he will guide in judgement & teach in his way and those that do his commandmts shall know what doctrines are of God. and besides the Scripture teaches that tis Gods manner to bless his truth & to cause that the pure doctrines of the gospel should be accompanied with the power of his Spirit & with a powerfull effect on the hearts & lives of men
¶Since this fashionable divinity has been growing & getting ground hant vice and deadness and a decay of vital Xtianity kept pace with it . The Dissenters have of late for some time been refining on their principles they see as they imagine the errours & impertinences [A; look again] of the tenets of their fathers but unsuccessfullness [? A's "unfaithfulness" is dif. wrong] in their ministry kept pace with their refinings
¶2. Has there ever been any instance in any age of any great reformation of manners wrought in any society whatever by proceeding on the foot of those principles that are now so fashionable uncontestible & plentifull instances can be produced of this effect of other principles [finis]
[Could this possibly have been written before the Great Awakening??]