¶780. JUSTIFICATION. That the ACCEPTANCE of the saints WORKS is consequent on the acceptance of their persons now under the covenant of grace God accepts their PERSONS & then accepts their deeds or offerings. So it was with Abel in that acceptance which the Apostle in Heb. 11. 4 says he had by faith, as appears by Gen 4. 4. The Lord had respect unto Abel & to his offering. So God accepted the offerings [-s? om. A] & prayers [-s? om. A.] which Job offered up for his three friends because of the acceptance which his person had found with him Job. 42. 8. Therefore take unto you now seven bullocks & seven rams and go to my servant Job & offer up for your selves a burnt offering & my servant Job shall pray for you for him will I accept. When the prophet Isaiah is speaking of the calling of the Gentiles Gods accepting their offerings is spoken of as consequent on his accepting them, Isai 56. 3. Neither let the son of the stranger that hath joined himself to the Lord speak saying the Lord hath utterly separated me from his people, together with v. 6. 7. Also the sons of the stranger that join themselves to the Lord to serve him & to love the name of the Lord to be his servants every one that keepeth the sabbath from polluting it, & taketh hold of my covenant. even them will I bring to my holy mountain & make them joyfull in my house of prayer. Their burnt offerings & their sacrifices shall be accepted upon mine altar So chap. 60. 5. 6. 7. The forces of the Gentiles shall come unto thee, &c-- ----all the flocks of Kedar shall be gathered together unto thee the rams of Nebaioth shall minister unto thee They shall come up with acceptance on mine altar. So when the Jews return to God is /p. 25/ spoken of tis represented as tho God would accept them first & then their offerings shall be loved & sought of God & delighted in of him in consequence of his accepting them Ezek 20. 40. 41 For in mine holy mountain, in the mountain of the height of Israel saith the Lord God there shall all the house of Israel all of them in the land serve me there will I accept them and there will I require your offerings and the first fruits of your oblations with all your holy things I will acept you with your sweet savour. That Gods having pleasure in mens persons is the ground of his accepting an offering at their hands is evident by Mal. 1. 10. I have no pleasure in you saith the Lord of hosts nor will I accept an offering at your hands. [finis]

 

¶ 781. Xs MEDIATION. The WISDOM of God in the work of REDEMPTION How God gathers together in one all things in X. Christ God man is not only Mediatour between God and sinfull men but he acts as a middle person between all other persons & all intelligent beings. that all things may be gatherd together in one in him, agreable to Eph. 1. 10. He is the middle Person between the other two divine persons and acts as such in the affair of our redemption as has been shewn No. 772. Tho he bent properly a Mediatour between God and angels yet he acts in many respects as a middle person between them so that all that eternal life glory & blessedness that they are possessed of is by his mediety. [sic] And he is a kind of Mediatour between one man and another to make peace between them as he reconciles God and ma<e>n together by his blood and by his word and by his Spirit so by the same he reconciles one man to another He reconciles one man to another by his blood by taking away all just cause one can have to hate another for what is indeed hatefull in them & for which they deserve to be hated of both God and man by suffering for it fully as much as it deserves so that what the hatred of both God & man desires is here fully accomplished tis a punishment fully proportionable to the hatefullness of the crime were it not that the sins of men are already fully punished in the sufferings of X all both angels & men might justly hate all sinners for their sins for appearing as they are in themselves they are indeed infinitely hatefull & could appear no otherwise to any than as they are in themselves had not another been substituted for them & therefore they must necessarily appear hatefull to all that saw things as they be It is impossible for any to hate a crime as a crime or fault without desiring that it should be punished For he that hates sin is thereby an enemy to it & therefore necessarily is inimical or inclined to act against it that it may suffer or to see it suffer & if we impute mens sins to them i.e. if we look on the hatefullness of their sins as their hatefullness we necessarily hate them & are inclined that the sufferings that we desire for their sins should be their sufferings But now X has suffered for the sins of the T we ought to hate no man because there is room to hope that X has suffered and satisfied for his sins & therefore we should endeavour to bring him to X. a right consideration of Xs sufferings for the sins of others is enough to satisfy all just indignation against them for their sins. When once the saints and angels come to know certainly that X has not satisfied for any mens sins [-s? om. A] they will hate them & will rejoice in their infernal & eternal sufferings which they will see to be no more than in proportion to the hatefullness of their sins. So that X by his sufferings has in a sense made propitiations [sic] for mens sins not only with God but with their fellow creatures & so by his obedience he recomends them not only to the favour of God but of one another for Xs righteousness is exceeding amiable to all men and angels that see it aright & X himself is amiable to them on that account & it renders all that they look upon to be in him amiable in their eyes to consider em as members of so amiable an head as we naturally love the children of those that we have a very dear love to. X by his death has also has [sic] laid a foundation for peace & love among enemies in that therein he has done two things 1 in setting the most marvellous affecting example of love to enemies an example in an instance wherein we are most nearly concerned for we ourselves are those enemies that he has manifested such love to & 2. he has done the greatest thing to engage us to love him & so to follow his example For the examples of such as we have a strong love to have a most powerfull influence upon us. & again as X unites mankind with the Father by being the bond of union between them or [A; as] the third person in whom both are united, for the Father & he from eternity are one & therefore by making sinfull men one with himself as he does by three things viz by substituting himself in their stead from eternity & by taking on their nature & bringing them home [A; hence??] to an union of hearts & vital union I say by thus bringing them to himself he unites them to the Father So also he unites mankind one to another by being a middle being in which all are united for he brings and unites em all to himself as in their head & thereby without more ado for they become nearly related & closely united on to another for they become members of the same body And again a X reconciles men to the Father by his word preaching the word of reconciliation & powerfully drawing [A;?] & uniting their hearts to God by his Spirit so he also unites them one to another. He by his word & Spirit as it were does the part of an intercessour between them. /p./

¶ X was a Mediatour between the Jews & Gentiles to reconcile them together breaking down the middle wall of partition & he also unites men & angels he unites angels to men by the following things by taking away their guilt by his blood & suffering for that which otherwise would necessarily have renderd them hatefull to the angels & by taking away sin it self by sanctification & by rendring those that are so much inferiour to them in their natures honourable in their eyes & worthy that they should be ministring spirits going forth to minister to them by his taking their nature upon him & by dying for them & uniting them to be members of himself & by setting them such a wonderfull example manifesting Gods & his own eternal transcendent love to them by the great things he did & sufferd for them & by being an intermediate person as a bond & head of union being a common head to each in which both are united & by confirming their hearts by his Spirit against all pride which was the thing that caused such an alienation between the angels that fell & me<a>n so that they could not endure to be ministring spirits to him which was the occasion of their fall. [finis]

 

¶ 782. IDEAS. SENSE of the HEART. SPIRITUAL KNOWLEDG or CONVICTION. FAITH. Great part of our thoughts & the discourse of our minds concerning [sic] is without the actual ideas of those things of which we discourse & reason but the mind makes use of signs instead of the ideas themselves. A little attentive reflection may be enough to convince any one of this. Let any man for his own satisfaction take any book and read down one page of it as fast as he ordinarily is wont to read with understanding He finishes perhaps the whole page in about a minute of time wherein it may be were many such terms as God, man, angel, people, misery, happiness, salvation, destruction; consideration, perplexity, sanctification, & many more such like & then let him consider whether he has had the actual ideas of all those things & things signified by every other word in the whole page in this short space of time as particularly let him consider whether or no when in the course of his reading he came upon the word God in such a line which his mind dwelt not a moment upon whether or no he had an actual idea of God i.e whether he had an actual idea that moment of those things that are principally essential in an idea of God as whether he had an actual idea of supremacy, of supream power, of supream governmt of supream knowledge, of will &c-- I apprehend that diligent attention will convince him that he has no actual idea of one of these things when he understandingly reads or hears or speaks the word of God I will instance but in one thing that seems most fundamention [sic] of all in the idea of God viz understanding or knowledge he will find that in such cases he had no actual idea at all of this for if he had an actual idea of understanding or knowledge then he had an actual idea of ideas of ideas of perception or consciousness of judging or percieving connections & relations between different ideas & so had an actual idea of various ideas & relations between them. So when he read the word people [above ma<e>n xo] let him enquire whether he had any actual idea of that which was signified by this word in order to this he must have an actual idea of ma<e>n I dont mean only a confused idea of an outw. [sic] appearance like that of ma<e>n for if that was all that was not an idea of man properly but only a sign made use of instead of an idea. but he must have an actual idea of those things wherein manhood most essentially consists. as an idea of reason which contains many other actual ideas as an actual idea of consciousness an actual idea of a consequent perception of relations & connections between them &c-- & so he must have an actual idea of will which contains an actual idea of pleasure or pain agreableness or disagreableness & a consequent command, [also T; A & M: concord] <A cop. made X here & on copy> /p."27"/ or imperate act of the soul &c-- So when he read the word perplexity let him consider whether he had an actual idea of that actual thing signified by that word which containd [an s wr. over the d?] many actual ideas as an idea an actual idea of thought & an actuall idea of intenseness of thought an actual idea of earnestness of desire & also earnestness of desire, an actual idea of [wwxo] then an actual idea of disappointmt or crossness to desire which contains many other actual ideas and an actual idea of manifoldness of troubles & crosses &c--. So when he read the word sanctification the actual idea of which contains a great many actual ideas viz an actual idea of what is implied in the faculties of an intelligent voluntary being & then an actual idea of holiness which contains a great number of other actual ideas. But I need not insist on more instances I should think that these might be enough to convince any one that there is very often no actual idea of those things when we are said to think of them & that the thought is not employed about things themselves immediately or immediately exercised in the idea it self but only some sign that the mind habitually substitutes in the room of the idea.

¶ Our thoughts are often times a [wwxo] ten times swifter than our reading or speech men oftentimes think that in a few minutes which it would take em a long time to speak & if there be no room to suppose that all the ideas signified by the words of a discourse can be actually excited in the mind in reading or speaking much less can it be in such swift discourse of thought

¶ We thus in the discourse of our minds generally make use of signs instead of ideas especially with respect to two kinds of things subjects of our thoughts viz.

¶ 1. With respect to general things or kinds and sorts such are such are [sic] kinds of substances & such also are what Mr Locke calls mixed modes. When we in the course of our thoughts in reading or hearing or speaking or meditation think of any sort of substances or distinct beings as particularly of man instead of going about with attention of mind actually to excite the ideas of those things that belong to the nature of man that are essential to it & that distinguish it from other creatures and so having actually such an abstract idea as Mr Locke speaks of, we have only an idea of something in our mind either a name or some external sensible idea that we use as a sign to represent that idea. So when in the discourse of our minds there passes a thought of that sort of creatures called lions or that sort of natural bodies called metal or that called trees. So in mixed modes such as confusion decency harmony & the like.

¶ 2. Tis commonly so in our discourses of those things that we <can?> know only by reflection which are of a spiritual nature or things that consist in the ideas acts & exercises of minds It has been shewn elsewhere that there is no actual idea of those things but what consists in the actually [y xo?] existence of the same things or like things in our own minds as for instance to excite the idea of an idea we must renew that very idea in our minds we must have the same idea to have an an [sic] actual idea of a thought is to have that thought that we have an idea of then in our minds. To have an actual idea of any pleasure or delight there must be excited a degree of that delight so to have an actual idea of any trouble or kind of pain there must be excited a degree of that pain or trouble & to have an idea of any affection of the mind there must be then present a degree of that affection. This alone is sufficient to shew that in great part of our discourses & reasonings on things are without the actual ideas of those things of which we discourse & reason for most of our discourses & reasonings are about things that belong to minds or [wwxo] or things that we know by reflection or at least do involve some relation to them in some respect or other but how far are we when we speak or read or hear or think of those beings that have minds or intelligent beings or of their faculties & powers or their dispositions principles & acts & those mixed modes that involve relations to tho<e>se thing [sic] from actually having present in our minds those mental things those thoughts & those mental acts that those spiritual things do consist in or are related to. very commonly we discourse about them in our minds & argue & reason concerning them without any idea at all of the things themselves in any degree but only make use of the signs instead of the ideas. as for instance how often do we think & speak of the pleasure & delight or pain & trouble that such have or have had in such & such things or things that do in some respect involve pleasure or pain in their idea without the presence /p./ of any degree of that pleasure or that trouble or any real idea of those troublesom or pleasing sensations

¶ Those signs that we are wont to make use of in our thoughts for representatives of things and to substitute in the room of the actual ideas themselves are either [wwxo] either the ideas of the names by which we are wont to call them or the ideas of some external sensible thing that some way belongs to the thing some sensible image or resemblance or some sensible part or some sensible effect or sensible concomitant or a few sensible circumstances we have the ideas of some of tho<e>se excited which we substitute in the room of those things that are most essential & use em as signs as we do words & have respect to em no further in our discourse.

¶ The signs that those that have the use of speech do principally make use of in their thoughts are words or names which are indeed very frequently accompanied with some slight confused glance of some sensible idea that belongs to the thing named but the name is the principal sign the mind makes use of others that are deaf & dumb do probably make use of the ideas of those signs which they have been accustomed to signify the thing by or (if we may judge by what we find in things that we have no names for as there are many such) they make use of some sensible effect part concomitant or circumstance as the sign

¶ Tis something external or sensible that we are wont to make use [of (om.E)] for signs of the ideas of the things themselves for they are much more ready at hand and more easily excited than ideas of spiritual or mental things which for the most part can't be without attentive reflection and very often the force of the mind is not sufficient to excite them at all, because we are not able to excite in our minds those acts exercises or passions of the mind that we think of.

¶ We are under a necessity of thus putting signs in our minds instead of the actual ideas of the things signified on several accounts partly by reason of the difficulty of exciting the actual ideas of things especially in things that are not external & sensible which are a kind of things that we are mainly concerned with and also because, if we must have the actual ideas of every thing that came in our way in the course of our thoughts this would render our thoughts so slow as to render our thoughts so slow as to render our powers of thinking in a great measure useless. as may be seen in the instance mentioned of a man reading down a page now we use signs instead of the actual ideas themselves we can sufficiently understand what is contained in that page in minute of time & can express the same thoughts to another in as little time by our voices & can think ten times as swiftly as we can read or speak but if in order to an understanding of what was contained in that page we must have an actual idea of every thing signified by every word in that page it would take us up many hours to go through with it for taking in all the ideas that are either directly signified or involved in relations that are signified by them it would take us up a considerable time before we could [cwxo] could be said to understand one word but if our understandings were so slow it would frustrate all use of reading or writing & [xo?] all use of speech yea & all our thoughts must have remained infants all the days of our lives & seventy years would have been sufficient to have proceeded but a few steps in knowledge

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¶ Hence we dont stand at all on the clearness & distinctness of that external idea that we thus make use of but commonly tis very dimm & transient & exceeding confused & indistinct as when in a course of meditations we think of man angels nations conversion & consideration <conviction> if we have any thing further in our thoughts to represent those things than only the words we commonly have only some very confused passing notion of something external some way [?] which we dont at all insist on the clearness & distinctness of nor do we find any need of it because we make use of that external idea no otherwise than as a sign of the idea or something to stand in its stead & the notion need not be distinct in order to that because if we may habitually understand the use of it as a sign without it whereas it would be of great consequence that it should be clear & distinct if we regarded it as an actual idea & proper representation of the thing it self

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¶ This way of thinking by signs, unless as it is abused to an indulgence of a slothfull inattentive disposition very well serves us to many of the common purposes of thinking for in many respects, we without the actual presence of the idea know how to use the sign as if it were the idea it self having learn'd by frequent experience & our minds on the presence of the sign being habitually led to the relations & connections with other things. the presence of the sign in the mind does by custom as naturally & spontaneously suggest many relations of the thing signified to others as the hearing of such a certain sound or seeing such letters does by custom & habit spontaneously /p./ excite such a thought But if we are at a loss concerning a connection or consequence or have a new inference to draw or would see the force of some new argument then commonly we are put to the trouble of exciting the actual idea & making it as lively & clear as we can & in this consists very much in an ability to excite actual ideas so as to have them lively & clear & in its comprehension whereby it is able to excite several at once to that degree as to see their connection & relations

¶ Here by the way we may observe the exceeding imperfection of the HUMAN UNDERSTANDING & one thing wherein it appears immensely BELOW GODS UNDERSTANDING. In that he understands himself & all other things by the actual & immediate presence of an idea of the things understood all his understanding is not only by actual ideas of things without ever being put to it to make use of signs instead of ideas either through an inability or difficulty of exciting the<o>se ideas or to avoid a slow progress of thought that would arise by so manifold & exact an attention but he has the actual ideas of things perfectly in his mind without the least defect of any part & & with perfect clearness and without the imperfection of that fleetingness or transitoriness that attends our ideas & without an troublesom exertion of the mind to hold the idea there & without the trouble we are at to have in view a number at once that we may see the relations but he he [sic] has the ideas of all things at once in his mind & all in the highest possible perfection of clearness & all permanently & invariably there without any transitoriness or fading in any part Our understandings are not only subject to the imperfection that consists in those things which necessitates [sic] us to make use of such signs as we have been speaking [;of (om.E)] but this is a source of innumerable errours that we are subject to tho' as was said before such a use of signs serves us well to many purposes yet the want of the actual ideas & making use only of the signs instead of them causes mankind to run into a multitude of errours which <the falsity of which> [sic] would be manifest to them if the ideas themselves were present.

¶ From what has been said we see that there are two ways of thinking & understanding especially of spiritual or mental things that we recieve a notion of by reflection or consciousness viz 1. that wherein we dont directly view the things themselves by the actual presence of their ideas or (which is the same thing in mental matters) sensation of their resemblances, but apprehend them only indirectly in their signs which is a kind of a mental reading wherein we dont look on the things themselves but only on those signs of them that are before our eyes This is a meer cognitation[E's line] without any proper apprehension of the things thought of. 2. There is that which is more properly called apprehension[E's line] wherein the mind has a direct ideal view or contemplation[E's line] of the thing thought of

¶ this ideal apprehension or view of mental things is either 1. of things that pertain meerly to the faculty of understanding or what is figuratively called the head including all the modes of meer discerning judging or speculation [sic? A] or 2. of the things that appertain to the other faculty of the will or what is figuratively called the heart whereby things are pleasing or displeasing, including all agreableness & disagreableness all beauty & deformity all pleasure & pain & all those sensations exercises & passions of the mind that arise from either of these. an ideal apprehension or view of things of this latter sort is what is vulgarly called a having A SENSE Tis commonly said when a person has an ideal view of any thing of this nature that he has a sense of it in his mind, & tis very properly so expressed For by what has been said already persons cant have actual ideas of mental things without having those very things in the mind and seeing all of this latter sort of mental things that belong to the faculty of will or the heart do in great part at least consist in a sensation of agreableness or disagreableness or a sense or feeling of the heart of pleasedness or displeasedness therefore it will follow that every one that has an ideal view of the<o>se things has therein some measure of that inward feeling or sense.

¶ Hence arises another great distinction of the kinds of understanding of mental things or those thing [sic] that appertain or relate to spiritual beings which is somewhat diverse from the former viz of speculative and sensible, or 1. that understanding which consists in meer SPECULATION or the understanding of the head or 2. that which consists in the SENSE OF THE HEART The former includes all that understanding <that is> without any proper ideal apprehension or view or all understanding of mental things of either faculty that is only by signs & also all ideal views of things that are meerly intellectual or appertain only to the faculty of understanding i.e all that understanding of things that dont consist in or imply some motion of the will or in other words (to speak figuratively) <some> feeling of the heart is meer speculative knowledge whether it be an ideal apprehension of them or no. but all that understanding of things that does consist in or involve such a sense or feeling is not meerly speculative but sensible knowledge <s?> So is all ideal apprehension of beauty & deformity or loveliness & hatefullness & all ideas of delight or comfort & pleasure of body or mind and pain trouble or misery & all ideal apprehensions of desires & longings esteem, acquiescence, hope, fear, contempt, choosing, refusing acepting rejecting loving hating anger & the idea [sic? A] of all the affections of the mind & all their motions & exercises /p./ & all ideal views of dignity or excellency of any kind & also all ideas of terrible greatness or awfull majesty, meanness or contemptibleness, value & importance.<*see next p. but one> An ideal apprehension or view of these things is in vulgar speech called an having a sense of them & in proportion to the intensive degree of this ideal apprehension or the clearness & liveliness of the idea of them so persons are said to have a greater or lesser sense of them and according to the easiness or difficulty of persons recieving such a sense of things especially things that it much concerns them to be sensible of are they called either sensible or stupid.

¶ This distribution of the human knowledge into SPECULATIVE & SENSIBLE [only slightly larger letters] tho it seems to pertain [to (om.E;mg)] only one particular kind of the objects of our knowledge viz those things that appertain or relate to the will & affections yet indeed may be extended to all the knowledge we have of all objects whatsoever for there is no kind of thing that we know but what may be considered as in some respect or other concerning the wills or hearts of spiritual beings and indeed we are concerned to know nothing on any other account so that perhaps this distinction of the kinds of our knowledge into speculative & sensible if duly weighed will be found the most important of all <?> the distribution is with respect to those properties or our knowledge that immediately relate to [the (om.E)] end [A: and] <of all our knowledge> & that in the objects of our knowledge on the account of which alone they are worthy to be known viz their relation to our wills & affections & interest as good or evil important or otherwise & the respect they bear to our happiness or misery.

¶ The will in all its determinations whatsoever is governed by its thoughts and apprehensions of things with regard to those properties of the objects of its thoughts wherein the degree of the sense of the heart has a main influence.

¶ There is a twofold division or distribution may be made of the kinds of sensible knowledge of things that men have. <above?> The first [E's line] is that which follows with[xo E?] respects the ways we come by it 1. There is that which is purely natural either such as mens minds come to be impressed with by the objects that are about them by the laws of nature as when they behold any thing that is beautifull or deformed by a beauty & deformity that men by nature are sensible of, then they have a sensible knowledge of their beauty or deformity as when the ear hears a variety of sounds harmoniously proportiond the soul has a sensible knowledge of the excellency of the sound when it tastes any good or ill savour or odour it has a sensible knowledge of the excellency or hatefullness of that savour or odour. So it may have a sensible knowledge of many things by memory & reflection. So a man may have a sensible apprehension of pleasure or sorrow that others are the subjects of indirectly by reflection either by exciting from the memory something that he has felt heretofore which he supposes is like it or by placing himself in others circumstances or by placing things about himself in his imagination & from ideas so put together in his mind exciting something of a like pleasure or pain transiently in himself, or if these ideas come so together into the mind by the senses or by the relation of others such a sensation will spontaneously arise in the mind in like manner men may have a sense of their own happiness or misery concieved as future. So men may by meer nature come to have a sense of the importance or terribleness or desireableness of many things. 2. That sense of things which we dont recieve without some immediate influence of the Spirit of impressing a sense of things that do concern our greatest interest on our minds. Tis found very often a very difficult thing to excite a sense of temporal things in the mind requiring great attention and close application of thought & many times it is not in our power & in many instances wherein we have a sense of temporal things that is purely natural it depends not meerly on the force of our thoughts but the circumstances we are in or some special accidental situation & concurrence of things in [wwxo] in the course of our thoughts & meditations or some particular incident in providence that [wwxo] that excites a sense of things or gives an ideal view of them in a way inexplicable. But the exciting a sense of things pertaining to our eternal interest is a thing that we are so far from & so unable to attain of our selves by reason of the alienation of the inclinations & natural dispositions of the soul from tho<e>se things as they are & the sinking of our intellectual powers & the great subjection of the soul in its fallen state to the external senses that a due sense of the<o>se things is never attained without immediate divine assistance

¶ 'Tis in this that the ORDINARY WORK OF THE SPIRIT OF GOD in the hearts of men CONSISTS viz in giving a sense of spiritual and eternal things or things that appertain to the business of religion and our eternal interest the extraordinary influence of the Spirit of God in inspiration imparts speculative knowledge to the soul, but the ordinary influence of Gods Spirit communicates only a sensible knowledge of those things that the mind had a speculative knowledge of before and an imagination that some have of speculative knowledge recieved from the Spirit of God in those that have no real inspiration is that wherein ENTHUSIASM consists.

¶ Secondly. The other distribution that may be made of the kinds of sensible knowledge is according to the different nature of the objects of it, into a sense of things with respect to the natural good or evil that is in them or that they relate to or & that /p./ or a sense of them with respect to spiritual good or evil by spiritual good I mean all true moral good all real moral beauty & excellency & all those acts of the will or that sense of the heart that relates to it & the idea of which involves it as all sense of it all relish & desires [sic] of it & delight in it happiness consisting in it &c-- by natural good & evil I mean all that good or evil which is agreable or disagreable to human nature as such without regard to the moral disposition as all natural beauty & deformity such as a visible sensible proportion or disproportion in figures sounds & beauty of colours any good or evil that is the object of the external senses & all that good or evil which arises from gratifying or crossing any of the natural appetites all that good & evil which consists in gratifying or crossing a principle of self-love consisting in others esteam of us & love to us or their hatred & contempt & that desireableness or undesireableness of moral dispositions & actions so far as arising from hence & all that importance worth or terribleness arising from a relation to this natural good or evil.

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¶ last p.]. * All knowledge of this sort as it is of things that concern the heart or the will & affections so it all relates to good or evil that the sensible idea of things of this nature involve [sic]

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¶ Persons are capable of some sensible knowledge of things of religion of the former sort viz with respect to the natural good or evil that attends them, of themselves with the same improvement of their natural powers that they have this [sic] sensible knowledge of temporal because this good or evil consists in an agreableness or disagreableness to human nature as such and therefore no principles are required in men beyond those that are contained in human nature to discern them but yet by reason of the natural stupidity of the soul with respect to things so diverse from all the objects of sense & so opposite to the natural disposition of the heart tis found by experience that men never will obtain any very considerable sense of them without the influence of the Spirit of God assisting the faculties of human nature & impressing a lively sense of them. But as to the other viz a sense of divine things with respect to spiritual good & evil because these dont consist in any agreableness or disagreableness to human nature as such or the meer human faculties or principles therefore man only <in a natu> meerly with the exercise of tho<e>se faculties & his own natural strength can do nothing towards getting such a sense of divine things but it must be wholly & entirely a work of the Spirit of God not meerly as assisting & coworking with natural principles but infusing some thing above nature.

¶ Hereby we may see the difference between the influences of the Spirit of God on the minds of natural men in awakenings & CONVICTIONS, and his gracious spiritual influences on the hearts of natural men never proceeds further than [sic] in its effects than the former sort of sensible knowledge of things of religion viz that which respects the natural good or evil that is in them. Those awakenings that natural apprehensions that natural men have before conversion of their guilt & Gods wrath & their misery wholly consists in or arises from this sort of sense of things of religion They who before while they were unawaken'd had little else besides a speculative knowledge of the things of religion now they have some sensible knowledge Their notions of things before were in great measure only [¶ ends here]

¶ By the things that have been said we may see the difference between the influences of the Spirit of God on the minds of natural men in AWAKENINGS, common CONVICTIONS & ILLUMINATIONS, and his spiritual influences on the hearts of the saints at and after their conversion 1. Natural men while they are senseless & unawakened have very little sensible knowledge of the things of religion even with respect to the natural good or<&?> evil that is in them & attends them & indeed have very little of an ideal apprehension of any sort of divine & eternal things, by reason of their being left to the stupifying influence of sin & the objects of sense but when they are awakened & convinced the Spirit of God by assisting their natural powers gives em an ideal apprehension of the things of religion with respect to what is natural in them i.e. a sense of that which is speculative in them & that which pertains to a sensibleness of their natural good & evil or all but only that which involves a sense of their spiritual excellency. The Spirit of God assists to an ideal view of Gods natural perfections wherein consists his greatness & gives a view of this as manifested in his works that he has done & in the words that he has spoken & so gives a sensible apprehension of the heinousness of sin & his wrath against it & the guilt of it & the terribleness of the sufferings denounced against it & so they have a sense of the importance of things of religion in general & herein consists what we commonly call conviction. & in a sense of the natural good that attends the things of religion viz the favour of so great a being his mercy as it relates to our [A; an?] natural good or deliverance from natural evil, the glory of heaven with respect /p./ to the natural good that is to be enjoyed there & the like consists those affecting joyfull common illuminations that natural men sometimes have. In thus assisting mens faculties to an ideal apprehension of the natural things of religion together with what assistance God may give mens natural reason & judgmt to see the force of natural arguments consists the whole of the common work of the Spirit of God on men & <above?> it consists only in assisting natural principles without infusing any thing supernatural. 2. The special work of the Spirit of God or that which is peculiar to the saints consists in giving the sensible knowledge of the things of religion with respect to their spiritual good or evil which indeed does all originally consist in a sense of the spiritual excellency beauty or sweetness of divine things which is not by assisting natural principles but by infusing something supernatural.

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¶ <Last p but one> All knowledge of this sort as it is of things that concern the heart or the will and affections so it all relates to the good or evil that the sensible knowledge of things of this nature involves & nothing is called a sensible knowledge upon any other account but on the account of the sense or kind of inward tasting or feeling of sweetness or pleasure bitterness or pains [sic] that is implied in it or arises from it. Yet tis not only the meer ideal apprehension of that good or evil that [is (om.E)] included in what is called of [sic] being sensible but also the ideal apprehensions of other things that appertain to the thing known on which the goodness or evil that attends them depends as for instance some men are said to have a sense of the dreadfullness of Gods displeasure this apprehension of Gods displeasure is called having a sense & is to looked upon as a part of sensible knowledge because of that evil or pain in the object of Gods displeasure that is connected with that displeasure [notes by TAS illegible] an [and??] idea of what God is supposed to feel in his own heart in having that displeasure But yet in a sense of the terribleness of Gods displeasure there is implied an ideal apprehension of more things than meerly of that pain or misery or sense of Gods heart there is implied an ideal apprehension of the being of God or of some intellectual existence & an ideal apprehension of his greatness & of the greatness of his power.

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¶ The ideal apprehension & sensible knowledge of the things of religion will give that conviction of their truth or reality which can no otherwise be obtained and is the principal source of that CONVICTION of the TRUTH of the things of religion that is given by the immediate influence of the Spirit of God on mens hearts 1. An ideal apprehension & sensible knowledge of the things of religion with respect to what is natural in them such as natural men have that are under awakenings will give some degree of conviction of the truth of divine things further than is [as? xo?] a meer notion of them in their signs or only a speculative apprehension of them because by this means men are enabled to see in many instances the agreement of the declarations & threatnings of the word of God with the nature of things that without an ideal and sensible knowledge of them they could not have. As for instance they that from the tokens of Gods greatness his power & awfull majesty in his works & in his words have an idea or sense of that greatness & power & awfull majesty & so see the agreement between such works & such words & such power & majesty & therefore hence have a conviction of that truth that otherwise they could not have viz. that it is a very great Being that made the<o>se things & spake the<o>se things & so from a sense they may hence have of the dreadfullness of the wrath of such a Being they have a conviction of the truth of what the Scripture teaches about the dreadfullness of Gods wrath & of the punishment of hell & from the sense they hereby have of the heinousness or dredfullness of sin against such a God & the natural agreement between affronts of such a majesty & the suffering of extreme misery, it appears much more credible to them that there is indeed an extreme misery to be suffered for sin. And so a sense of the natural good that there is in the things of religion such as is given in common illuminations makes what the Scriptures declare of the blessedness of heaven &c-- more credible

¶ 2. An ideal & sensible apprehension of the spiritual excellency of divine things is proper source of all SPIRITUAL CONVICTION of the truth of divine things, or that belief of their truth that there is in SAVING FAITH There can be no saving conviction without it & it is the great thing that mainly distinguishes saving belief or conviction from all other or the thing wherein its distinguishing essense does properly lie that it has a sense of the divine or spiritual excellency of the things of religion as that which it arises from. /p./

¶ Saving conviction of divine truth does most essentially arise from the spiritual sense of the excellency of divine things Yet this sense of spiritual excellency is not the only kind of ideal apprehension or sense of divine things that is concerned in such a conviction but it also partly depends on a sensible knowledge of what is natural in religion as this may be needfull to prepare the mind for a sense of its spiritual excellency. and as such a sense of its spiritual excellency may depend upon it for as the spiritual excellency of the things of religion it self does depend of & presuppose those things that are natural in religion they being as it were the substratum of this spiritual excellency so a sense or ideal apprehension if the one depends in some measure on the ideal apprehension of the other. Thus a sense of the excellency of Gods mercy in forgiving sin depends on a sense of the great guilt of sin the great punishment it deserves a sense of the beauty & wonderfullness of divine grace does in great measure depend on a sense of the greatness & majesty of that being whose grace it is & so indeed a sense of the glory of Gods holiness & all his moral perfections a sense of the excellency of Xs salvation depends on a sense of the misery & great guilt of those that are the subjects of this salvation & so tho' a saving conviction of the truth of things of religion does most directly & immediately depend on a sense of their spiritual excellency yet it also in some measure & more indirectly & remotely depends on an ideal apprehension of what is natural in religion & is a[in? (A)] a [xo?] common conviction [not clear whether ast. also xo]

¶ Common conviction or an ideal & sensible apprehension of what is natural in the things of religion contributes to a saving conviction of the truth of the gospel especially this way men by being made sensible of the great guilt of sin or [A; as?] the connection or natural agreableness there is between that & a dreadfull punishmt & how that the greatness & majesty of God seem to require and demand such a punishment they are brought to see the great need of a satisfaction or something to intervene to make it honourable to that majesty to shew em favour & being for a while blind to the suitableness of Xs satisfaction in order to this & then afterwards having a sense given them of Xs divine excellency & so of the glorious dignity of his person & what he did & suffered for sinners hereby their eyes are as it were opend to see the perfect fitness there is in this to satisfy for sin or to render their being recieved into favour consistent with the honour of Gods offended majesty The sight of this excellent congruity does very powerfully convince of the truth of the gospel or that this way of satisfying for the sins which now they see to be so congruous is certainly a real way not a meer figment but a divine contrivance and that there is indeed acceptance to be hac with God in this & so the soul savingly believes in X. The sight of this congruity convinces the more strongly when at last it is seen because tho the person was often told of it before yet could see nothing of it--[?] which convinces that it was beyond the invention of ma<e>n to discover it F<f>or by experience they found themselves all their lifetime wholly blind to it but now they see the perfect suitableness there is which convinces em of the divine wisdom that is beyond the wisdom of ma<e>n that contrived it

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¶ Tis a sight of the high & super humane wisdom of the contrivance that is the thing that immediately convinces This wisdom is a natural excellency but the sight of it most directly & immediately arises from a sense of the spiritual excellency & worthiness of X but indirectly on [sic] a sense of the great guilt of sin

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¶ and 2 There is a spiritual conviction of the truth of religion does arise immediately from a sense of their natural excellency. But this sense of their natural excellecy

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¶ The truth that the soul is most immediately convinced of in this case by a sense of the divine excellency of X with a preparatory sense of the need of satisfaction for sin is not that the gospel is the word of but this is the truth the mind firstly & more directly falls under a conviction of, viz that the way of salvation that the gospel reveals is a proper suitable & sufficient way perfectly agreable to reason & the nature of things & that which tends to answer the ends proposed. & the mind being convinced of this truth which is the great subject of the gospel it then naturally & immediately infers from this fitness & sufficiency /p./ of this salvation which the mind has experience to be so much [beyond (om.E)] the power of human reason of it self to discern, that it is certainly a contrivance of a superhumane excellent, wisdom holiness & justice and therefore Gods contrivance. [finis]